FOUR  YEARS 


WITH 


&ENEK AL    LEE 


SEING  A   SUMMARY   OF  THE  MORE  IMPORTANT  EVENTS 

TOUCHING    THE  CAREER    OF  GENERAL  ROBERT  E. 

LEE,  IN  THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  STATES; 

TOGETHER  WITH 

AN  AUTHORITATIVE  STATEMENT  OF  THE  STRENGTH  OF  THE 
ARMY  WHICH  HE  COMMANDED  IN  THE  FIELD. 


BY 


WALTER  II.  TAYLOR, 
\\ 

OP  HIS  STAFF,   AND  LATE   ADJUTANT-GENERAL  OF  THE  ARMY 
OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


~r 


NEW  YORK : 
D.    APPLETON    AND   COMPANY, 

549    &    551    BROADWAY. 

1878. 


(      '    v- 

,33 


COPTEIGHT   BY 

D.   APPLETON   AND    COMPANY, 
1877. 


TO  THE 

EIGHT  THOUSAND  VETERANS 

(THE  SURVIVING  HEROES  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA) 

WHO,  IX  LINE  OF  BATTLE, 

ON    THE    9Tii    DAY     OF    APEIL,    18G5, 

WERE    REPORTED    PRESENT    FOR    DUTY, 

THE   FOLLOWING    PAGES   ARE    RESPECTFULLY    DEDICATED 
BY 

THE  AUTHOE. 


"  THOSE  who  undertake  to  write  histories  do  not,  I  perceive,  take  that 
trouble  on  one  and  the  same  account,  but  for  many  reasons,  and  those  such  as 
are  very  different  one  from  another.  For  some  of  them  apply  themselves  to 
this  part  of  learning  to  show  their  great  skill  in  composition,  and  that  they 
may  therein  acquire  a  reputation  for  speaking  finely.  Others  of  them  there  are 
who  write  histories  in  order  to  gratify  those  that  happen  to  be  concerned  in 
them  ;  and  on  that  account  have  spared  no  pains,  but  rather  gone  beyond  their 
own  abilities  in  the  performance.  But  others  there  are  who,  of  necessity  and 
by  force,  are  driven  to  write  history,  because  they  were  concerned  in  the  facts, 
and  so  cannot  excuse  themselves  from  committing  them  to  writing,  for  the  ad 
vantage  of  posterity.  Nay,  there  are  not  a  few  who  are  induced  to  draw  their 
historical  facts  out  of  darkness  into  light,  and  to  produce  them  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public,  on  account  of  the  great  importance  of  the  facts  themselves  with 
which  they  have  been  concerned.  Now,  of  these  several  reasons  for  writing 
history,  I  must  profess  the  last  two  were  my  own  reasons  also." — JOSEPHUS. 


PEEFAOE. 


IT  was  my  peculiar  privilege  to  occupy  the  position  of  a 
confidential  staff -officer  with  General  Lee  during  the  entire 
period  of  the  War  for  Southern  Independence.  From  the 
time  he  assumed  the  duties  of  the  position  of  general-in- 
chief  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  ;  through  the  campaign  in  the 
western  portion  of  the  State ;  during  the  time  of  his  com 
mand  in  the  Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Florida  ;  while  he  was  charged  with  the  control  of  the  mili 
tary  operations  of  all  the  armies  of  the  South,  at  Kichmond ; 
and  in  all  his  campaigns,  when  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia — I  had  the  honor  to  be  at  his  side.  Of 
necessity,  therefore,  some  facts  concerning  him  and  the  army 
movements  which  he  directed  are  known  to  me,  which  are 
not  of  public  record ;  and  perhaps  some  value  will  attach  to 
my  statements  in  regard  to  those  matters  of  fact  which  came 
under  my  immediate  observation,  and  the  recollection  of 
which  is  still  fresh  in  my  memory.  I  propose  to  speak  of 
these  briefly  and  with  entire  candor.  The  manner  of  pre 
senting  these  memoirs  will  necessarily  be  very  imperfect. 
It  accords  neither  with  my  tastes  nor  the  consciousness  of 
my  unfitness  for  me  to  attempt  a  work  of  this  character ; 
and,  moreover,  the  duties  of  my  daily  life  are  such  as  do  not 


8  PREFACE. 

permit  any  continuous  or  steady  devotion  to  such  an  under 
taking. 

But  the  conviction  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  one,  in 
possession  of  material  information  relative  to  the  late  sec 
tional  conflict,  to  do  what  he  can  to  insure  a  true  under 
standing  of  that  struggle,  silences  those  personal  scruples 
which  would  deter  me,  and  impels  me  to  give  to  the  public 
the  following  pages.  It  will  be  at  once  seen  that  it  is  not 
my  purpose  to  attempt  a  review  of  the  military  career  of 
General  Lee,  no$fci  critical  history  of  the  army  which  he 

/rjb  ' 

commande4'4ri  the  field  ;  this  will  devolve  upon  the  future 
historian.^  'minejsp. the  more  humble  task  of  giving  a  sum 
mary  of  the  n)tfre  prominent  events  in  the  career  of  the 
great  Confederate  leader,  together  with  a  comparative  state 
ment 'of  'the  strength  of  the  Confederate  and  Federal  armies 
that  were  engaged  in  the  operations  in  Virginia .  Having 
for  a  long  time  supervised  the  preparation  of  the  official 
returns  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  having  been 
permitted  to  make  a  recent  examination  of  a  number  of  those 
returns,  now  on  file  in  the  archive-office  of  the  "War  Depart 
ment  at  Washington,  I  am  enabled  to  speak  with  confidence 
of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Confederate  forces ;  my 
information  concerning  that  of  the  Federal  forces  is  derived 
from  official  documents  emanating  from  the  officers  and 
authorities  of  the  United  States  Government. 

W.  H.  T. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Virginia. — General  R.  EilJjee  assigned  to  the 
Command  of  the  State  Troops.  —  Transfer  to^jto  Southern  Confed 
eracy  

CHAPTER 

General  Lee  retained  in  Richmond  as 

the  Confederate  Forces  under  General 

west  Virginia. — Lamentable  Condition  of  Affai 

CHAPTER  III. 

Strength  and  Positions  of  the  Opposing  Armies  in  Northwest  VirgVnia. — General 
Lee  determines  to  take  the  Offensive. — Ineffectual  Attempt  To  carry  the 
Positions  held  by  the  Federal  Troops. — Responsibility  for  the  Failure  .  20 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Affairs  in  Southwestern  Virginia. — Want  of  Harmony  between  Generals  Floyd 
and  Wise. — General  Lee  proceeds  to  that  Section. — Preparations  to  resist 
General  Rosecrans. — Retreat  of  the  Federals  .  ,32 


CHAPTER   V. 

General  Lee  repairs  to  Richmond. — He  is  ordered  to  the  Department  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida. — His  Return  thence  to  Richmond. — He  is 
charged  with  the  Control  of  the  Military  Operations  of  all  of  the  Confed 
erate  Annies. — His  Duties  in  that  Position. — General  Johnston  wounded  in 
the  Battle  of  Seven  Pines. — General  Lee  in  Command  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.— The  Seven  Days'  Battles  around  Richmond.— Strength 
of  the  Two  Opposing  Armies 37 


CHAPTER  VI. 

General  Lee  manoeuvres  to  effect  the  Withdrawal  of  General  McClellan's  Army. 
— Jackson  engages  Pope  at  Cedar  Run,  or  Slaughter's  Mountain. — Removal 
of  the  Federal  Army  from  James  River. — The  Second  Battle  of  Manassas. — 
The  First  Invasion. — Operations  in  Maryland. — McClellan  in  Possession  of 
Lee's  Order  of  Battle. — Boonesboro,  or  South  Mountain. — Capture  of  Har- 


10  CONTENTS. 

per's  Ferry  by  Jackson's  Forces. — Battle  of  Sharpsburg. — General  Lee  re 
tires  to  Virginia. — Incidents  illustrating  the  Devotion  to  Duty  and  Great 
Self-Control  of  the  Confederate  Leader  PAGE  5*7 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg. — Federal  Army  One  Hundred  Thousand  strong :  Con 
federate  Army  Seventy-eight  Thousand  strong. — Battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
— Federal  Army  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-two  Thousand  strong:  Confed 
erate  Army  Fifty-seven  Thousand  strong 79 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Pennsylvania  Campaign. — The  Battle  of  Gettysburg. — Strength  of  the 
Opposing  Armies 90 

CHAPTER  IX. 

General  Lee  retires  to  Virginia. — Affair  at  Bristoe  Station. — The  Tete-de-Pont. 
—  Mine  Run.  —  General  Meade's  Advance  and  Retreat.  —  Dahlgren's 
Raid  115 


CHAPTER  X. 

General  Grant  in  Command  of  the  Federal  Army  of  the  Potomac. — His  Advance. 
— From  the  Wilderness  to  Petersburg. — Strength  of  the  Two  Armies  .  124 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Siege  of  Petersburg. — General  Lee's  Views  as  to  the  Removal  of  General  John 
ston  from  the  Command  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee. — Movements  of  Sher 
man's  Army. — Inevitable  Result  of  the  Persistent  Effort  to  hold  Petersburg 
and  Richmond  .  138 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Evacuation  of  Petersburg. — General  Lee's  Retreat  up  James  River. — Appo- 
mattox. — Surrender. — General  Lee  goes  to  Richmond        .         .         .     149 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

General  Lee  indicted  by  the  Grand-Jury  at  Norfolk. — His  Advice  to  the  Young 
Men  of  Virginia. — His  Purpose  to  write  a  History  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia. — His  Desire  to  obtain  Correct  Information  of  the  Strength 
of  that  Army 155 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  taken  from  the  Original  Re 
turns  now  on  File  in  the  Archive-Office  of  the  War  Department,  Washing 
ton,  D.  C .  .  .162 

Address  on  the  Character  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee  .         .         .         .190 


FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Virginia. — General  R.  E.  Lee  assigned  to  the 
Command  of  the  State  Troops. — Transfer  to  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

ON  the  2d  day  of  May,  1861,  in  obedience  to  telegraphic 
orders  from  Governor  Letcher,  I  repaired  to  Richmond,  and 
was  at  once  assigned  to  duty  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
Army  of  Yirginia.  General  Lee  had  been  assigned  to  the 
chief  command,  and  Colonel  Robert  S.  Garnett  had  been 
announced  as  the  adjutant-general  of  the  active  State  troops. 

The  utmost  activity  prevailed,  and  the  general-in-chief 
and  his  indefatigable  and  most  efficient  adjutant-general  de 
voted  their  entire  time  and  energies  to  the  very  difficult  task 
of  organizing,  arming,  equipping,  and  putting  into  the  field 
the  volunteers,  with  and  without  partial  organization,  who 
responded  with  so  much  alacrity  to  the  call  of  the  State  au 
thorities.  The  first  matter  of  importance  was  the  discussion 
and  decision  of  the  question  as  to  the  period  of  service  for 
which  the  troops  should  be  received  and  mustered  in.  While 
the  politicians,  and  indeed  the  vast  majority  of  the  people, 
anticipated  but  a  very  short  and  decisive  struggle,  General 
Lee  took  a  different  view,  and  stands  alone,  of  all  of  those 
then  known  to  me  whose  opinions  were  entitled  to  consid 
eration,  as  having  expressed  his  most  serious  apprehensions 
of  a  prolonged  and  bloody  war :  he,  in  an  especial  degree, 


12  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

seemed  to  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  the  impending  con 
test,  and  to  realize  the  inevitable  suffering,  sacrifice,  and  woe, 
which  would  attend  a  determined  and  bitter  conflict  between 
the  two  sections  of  the  United  States,  each  animated  by  a 
traditional  devotion  to  cherished  institutions ;  each  entitled 
by  inheritance  to  those  characteristic  traits  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race,  the  possession  of  which  precludes  the  idea  of  a 
passive  resistance  or  a  mild  aggression,  when  liberty  and 
honor  are  involved ;  each  falsely  estimating  the  powers  and 
temper  of  its  adversary,  and  each  confident  of  success. 

At  this  period  there  was  a  considerable  display  of  bom 
bastic  rhetoric;  the  purifying  process  had  not  yet  begun, 
which  ultimately  proved  the  metal  of  men :  would-be  and 
accustomed  leaders,  not  yet  stripped  of  their  pretensions, 
misled  the  people ;  some  without  judgment  discoursed  flip 
pantly  about  the  sixty  or  ninety  days'  war  that  we  were  to 
have,  demanding  only  so  much  time  to  overcome  the  entire 
Yankee  nation.  Many  who  entertained  views  equally  absurd 
were  to  be  found  in  the  North.  Doubtless  these  patriots  of 
both  sections  were  content  to  retire  from  service  at  the  ex 
piration  of  their  short  terms,  convinced  that,  if  the  war  was 
not  ended,  it  should  have  been,  and  would  have  been,  had 
they  had  the  direction  of  affairs.  No  wonder,  then,  that  when 
the  troops  were  to  be  mustered  into  service  there  was  a  de 
cided  sentiment  in  favor  of  a  twelve  months*  enlistment.  Had 
General  Lee's  wishes  prevailed,  they  would  have  been  mus 
tered  in  for  the  war.  It  is  not  known  how  far  he  endeavored 
to  have  his  views  adopted,  beyond  the  expression  of  opinion 
repeatedly  made  to  those  who  consulted  him  in  his  office,  in 
my  hearing,  in  favor  of  the  war  enlistment.  He  contended 
that,  if  the  conflict  should  terminate  in  twelve  months,  or 
less,  the  troops  would  be  at  once  disbanded  and  no  harm 
would  result;  but,  if  it  should  be  prolonged  beyond  that 
period,  then  there  would  be  a  more  urgent  need  for  the 
troops  than  in  the  beginning ;  and  the  Government  would 
have  to  deal  with  the  very  serious  question  of  the  disintegra- 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA.  13 

tion  and  disorganization  of  the  army,  and  the  substitution  of 
recruits  for  veterans,  in  the  very  face  of  the  enemy.  The 
civil  authorities,  however,  were  loath  to  believe  that  there 
could  possibly  be  any  need  of  troops  beyond  the  period  of 
twelve  months,  and  accordingly  the  men  were  enlisted  for 
that  time.  The  same  course  had  been  pursued  in  the  other 
States  in  their  volunteer  organizations;  and  thus  was  the 
first  step  taken  toward  creating  the  necessity  for  the  law  of 
conscription  which  was  subsequently  enacted  by  the  Confed 
erate  Congress. 

Under  the  direction  of  General  Lee,  with  the  aid  of  the 
extraordinary  administrative  ability  of  Colonel  Garnett,  the 
cordial  support  of  the  Governor,  and  the  hearty  cooperation 
of  a  most  efficient  corps  of  State  officials,  the  Virginia  vol 
unteers  were  in  a  wonderfully  short  time  organized,  armed, 
equipped,  and  sent  to  the  front :  so  that  when  the  Confed 
erate  authorities  assumed  control  of  affairs  after  the  State 
had  formally  joined  the  Confederacy,  Governor  Letcher  was 
enabled  to  turn  over  to  them  the  "  Army  of  Virginia,"  vol 
unteers  and  provisional,  thoroughly  organized  and  ready  for 
work,  and  around  which,  as  a  nucleus,  was  collected  what 
afterward  became  the  historic  "  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.". 
The  capital  of  the  Confederacy  was  removed  from  Mont 
gomery  to  Richmond,  and  the  various  departments  of  the 
Government  immediately  transferred  to  the  latter  city ;  the 
"War  Department  carried  on  the  process  of  organization  and 
preparation;  the  functions  of  General  Lee  as  general-in- 
chief  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  terminated,  and  he  was 
created  one  of  the  five  generals  provided  for  by  a  law  of 
Congress,  in  the  Army  of  the  Confederate  States.  Briga 
dier-General  G.  T.  Beauregard l  and  General  J.  E.  Johnston, 
already  in  the  field,  were  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
troops  in  Virginia — the  former  having  the  "Army  of  the 
Potomac  "  (Confederate  States  Army)  and  the  latter  the  forces 

1  General  Bcauregard  was  promoted  to  be  General  immediately  after  the 
first  battle  of  Manassas. 


14  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

then  collected  in  the  lower  Yalley  of  Yirginia ;  these  two 
armies  were  subsequently  united  and  won  the  first  battle  of 
Manassas  under  General  J.  E.  Johnston.  General  A.  S. 
Johnston  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  troops 
raised  in  the  "West  and  Southwest,  and  which  were  concen 
trating  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

General  Lee  retained  in  Richmond  as  Adviser  to  President  Davis. — Disaster  to 
the  Confederate  Forces  under  General  Garnett. — General  Lee  sent  to  North 
west  Virginia. — Lamentable  Condition  of  Affairs  in  that  Department. 

AFTER  the  transfer  of  the  Virginia  forces  to  the  Con 
federate  States,  and  there  being  then  no  suitable  command 
in  the  field  to  which  General  Lee  could  be  assigned,  he  was 
retained  in  Richmond  by  the  President  to  give  the  benefit 
of  his  counsel  and  advice  in  all  the  important  measures  in 
volved  in  the  stupendous  undertaking  of  suddenly  transform 
ing  an  agricultural  people  into  a  nation  of  soldiers,  prepared 
for  immediate  war.  During  the  month  of  July,  1861,  in 
obedience  to  the  orders  of  Mr.  Davis,  he  made  a  personal 
examination  of  the  troops  and  defenses  around  Norfolk,  and 
also  paid  a  visit  of  inspection  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
(C.  S.  A.).  At  this  period  the  President  became  very  anx 
ious  concerning  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  western  por 
tion  of  Virginia.  In  the  northwest  the  Confederate  forces 
under  Brigadier-General  Eobert  S.  Garnett  (who,  when  re 
lieved  as  adjutant-general  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  had  been 
appointed  brigadier-general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  troops  in  this  section)  had 
suffered  defeat,  and  the  brave  Garnett  himself,  while  en 
deavoring  to  rally  his  troops  at  Carricksford,  had  received  a 
mortal  wound.  Brigadier-General  W.  W.  Loring  had  been 
assigned  as  his  successor  in  the  command  of  this  department, 
and  having  collected  the  scattered  remnants  of  Garnett's  lit 
tle  army,  together  with  such  reinforcements  as  the  Govern- 


IQ  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

ment  had  been  able  to  send  to  his  relief,  had  taken  position 
at  Valley  Mountain.  In  the  southwest  Brigadier-Generals 
Floyd  and  Wise  were  operating  under  great  disadvantages  ; 
each  having  an  independent  command,  and  neither  being 
disposed  to  act  a  part  subordinate  to  the  other.  It  was  im 
possible,  under  such  circumstances,  to  secure  harmonious 
action  or  any  united  and  spirited  effort  to  resist  the  enemy. 
There  was  an  evident  and  imperative  need  in  this  quarter 
for  the  personal  presence  of  some  one  who  could  both  re 
store  confidence  to  the  troops  and  compel  the  respect  and 
subordination  of  commanders.  General  Lee,  of  all  men  the 
most  fit  for  this  duty,  was  also  the  most  available.  A  bat 
tle,  however,  appeared  imminent  at  this  juncture  between 
the  two  armies  facing  each  other  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Manassas :  it  was  a  critical  time,  and  the  President  suspend 
ed  the  execution  of  his  designs  as  to  Western  Virginia  un 
til  that  crisis  was  passed ;  but  immediately  after  the  first  bat 
tle  of  Manassas  General  Lee  was  dispatched  to  the  scene  of 
operations  in  that  department  to  reconcile  the  differences 
between  Brigadier-Generals  Floyd  and  Wise,  and  to  aid 
Brigadier-General  Loring  in  the  reorganization  and  recruit 
ing  of  the  shattered  forces  of  Garnett,  so  that,  with  the  aid 
of  the  reinforcements  sent,  the  army  there  collected  might 
be  put  in  such  condition  as  to  prevent  any  aggressive  move 
ment  of  the  enemy,  and,  if  circumstances  justified  it,  to  take 
the  offensive.  Accompanied  by  two  aides-de-camp — Colonel 
John  A.  Washington  and  myself — he  proceeded  by  rail  to 
Staunton,  and  thence  on  horseback  to  Valley  Mountain. 
Upon  his  arrival  there  he  established  himself  near  the  head 
quarters  of  General  Loring,  with  whom  he  maintained  regu 
lar  and  constant  communication.  He  never  assumed  imme 
diate  personal  command  of  the  army,  although  it  was  under 
stood  that  Brigadier-General  Loring  was  subject  to  his 
orders. 

It  is  useless  to  attempt  to  recount  all  the  difficulties  this 
little  army  encountered  in  that  most  impracticable,  inhospi- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  17 

table,  and  dismal  country;  only  those  who  participated  in 
that  campaign  can  ever  properly  estimate  the  disadvantages 
under  which  commanders  and  troops  operated.  The  season 
was  a  most  unfavorable  one :  for  weeks  it  rained  daily  and 
in  torrents  ;  the  condition  of  the  roads  was  frightful ;  they 
were  barely  passable.  It  was  very  seriously  debated  whether 
the  army  could  be  fed  where  it  was,  and  it  was  feared  that 
it  would  have  to  retire  to  some  point  nearer  the  railroad. 
Time  and  time  again  could  be  seen  double  teams  of  horses 
struggling  with  six  or  eight  barrels  of  flour,  and  the  axle 
of  the  wagon  scraping  and  leveling  the  road-bed ;  in  other 
words,  the  wagons  were  hub-deep  in  mud,  and  could  only  be 
moved  step  by  step,  and  then  with  the  greatest  difficulty. 
At  the  same  time,  and  doubtless  as  a  result  of  the  excessive 
rains,  the  troops  were  sorely  afflicted  with  measles  and  a 
malignant  type  of  fever,  which  prostrated  hundreds  of  each 
command ;  and,  being  entirely  destitute  of  proper  food  and 
other  supplies  indispensable  to  the  successful  treatment  of 
disease,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  medical  skill  failed 
to  arrest  the  terrible  scourge. 

In  the  subsequent  campaigns  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  the  troops  were  subjected  to  great  privations  and 
to  many  very  severe  trials — in  hunger  often ;  their  naked 
ness  scarcely  concealed  ;  strength  at  times  almost  exhausted — 
but  never  did  I  experience  the  same  heart-sinking  emotions 
as  when  contemplating  the  wan  faces  and  the  emaciated  forms 
of  those  hungry,  sickly,  shivering  men  of  the  army  at  Yal- 
ley  Mountain!  I  well  recall  the  fact  that  a  regiment  of 
North  Carolina  volunteers,  under  Colonel  Lee,  that  reported 
with  one  thousand  effective  men,  was  in  a  very  short  time 
reduced  to  one-third  of  its  original  strength,  without  ever 
having  been  under  fire.  Though  not  to  the  same  extent, 
the  other  commands  were  all  seriously  reduced  by  disease ; 
and  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  one-half  of  the  army 
was  ineffective.  Moreover,  although  some  of  our  best  and 
bravest  men  were  from  that  section,  there  was  great  disaffec- 
2 


18          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

tion  among  that  portion  of  the  people  who  had  not  respond 
ed  to  the  call  of  the  State  for  troops.  Spies  lurked  around 
every  hill ;  our  weakness,  our  embarrassments,  and  our  every 
movement,  were  promptly  reported  to  the  enemy.  "With 
some  honorable  exceptions,  there  was  an  utter  absence  of 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  who  had  remained 
at  home,  and,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  we  were  in  an 
enemy's  country.  In  the  language  of  another  who  witnessed 
this  deplorable  hostility :  "  Northwestern  Virginia  has 
brought  grief  and  shame  to  the  State  and  to  the  South  by 
her  woful  defection  ;  but  by  none  is  that  felt  more  keenly 
than  by  those  sons  of  that  section  who  have  left  their  homes, 
and  in  many  instances  their  wives  and  little  ones,  to  battle 
for  the  right.  They  hear  jeers  and  sneers  thrown  out,  even 
at  themselves,  and  endure  them  with  apparent  patience,  but 
with  an  inward  resolve  to  testify  on  the  battle-field  their 
fidelity  to  their  country's  cause." 

How  little  was  this  lamentable  condition  of  affairs  in  that 
department  then  appreciated  by  the  public  mind ! 

From  the  reputation  which  General  Lee  enjoyed,  even 
at  that  date,  much  was  expected  of  him  when  he  took  the 
field.  The  difficulties  of  his  situation  were  not  properly 
estimated,  and  the  press  and  people  of  Virginia  became,  at 
first,  impatient,  then  indignant,  because  the  Federal  army 
that  had  defeated  the  Confederate  forces  under  Garnett  and 
Pegram  was  not  immediately  assailed  by  him  and  driven  out 
of  the  State. 

To  those  who  realized  the  situation  it  was  an  occasion  of 
pain  and  mortification  to  learn  from  the  journals  of  the  day, 
that  occasionally  reached  them,  of  the  general  dissatisfaction 
that  found  expression  in  scathing  editorials,  abounding  in 
sneers  and  abuse,  and  which  was  both  unjust  to  those  charged 
with  the  conduct  of  military  operations  in  that  impractica 
ble  region,  and  well  calculated  to  dishearten  the  men*under 
their  command,  whose  trials  were  already  of  no  ordinary 
character. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  19 

Ko  one  felt  this  public  judgment  so  keenly  as  did  Gen 
eral  Lee ;  and  yet,  on  one  occasion,  when  his  attention  had 
been  directed  to  a  fierce  newspaper  attack,  as  unjust  in  its 
conclusions  as  it  was  untrue  in  its  statements,  and  he  was 
asked  why  he  silently  suffered  such  unwarranted  aspersions, 
he  calmly  replied  that,  while  it  was  very  hard  to  bear,  it  was 
perhaps  quite  natural  that  such  hasty  conclusions  should  be 
announced,  and  that  it  was  better  not  to  attempt  a  justifica 
tion  or  defense,  but  to  go  steadily  on  in  the  discharge  of 
duty  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  leaving  all  else  to  the  calmer 
judgment  of  the  future  and  to  a  kind  Providence. 


CHAPTEK  III. 

Strength  and  Positions  of  the  Opposing  Armies  in  Northwest  Virginia. — General 
Lee  determines  to  take  the  Offensive. — Ineffectual  Attempt  to  carry  the 
Positions  held  by  the  Federal  Troops. — Responsibility  for  the  Failure. 

BUT,  to  return  to  our  narrative,  despite  the  embarrass 
ments  heretofore  alluded  to,  the  command  was  finally  brought 
to  a  sufficiently  efficient  condition  to  induce  the  general  to 
take  the  offensive.  On  the  8th  of  September,  and  after  full 
conference  with  Brigadier-General  Loring,  the  order  of  attack 
was  prepared ;  it  was  issued,  however,  in  the  name  of  the 
latter,  and  prescribed  a  line  of  operations  which  I  will  now 
attempt  to  describe.  In  order  to  a  correct  understanding  of 
what  is  to  follow,  it  is  proper  to  make  some  remarks  upon 
the  character  and  prominent  features  of  the  immediate  local 
ity  which  was  to  be  the  scene  of  operations,  and  of  the 
strength  and  positions  of  the  two  armies. 

The  advance  force  of  the  enemy  held  the  Cheat  Mountain 
Pass,  where  the  Staunton  and  Parkersburg  turnpike  crossed 
the  centre-top  of  Cheat  Mountain  range,  about  twelve  miles 
east  of  Huttonsville.  Just  where  the  road  crossed  the  moun 
tain-top  heavy  defensive  works  had  been  constructed.  Na 
ture  assisted  in  no  small  degree  to  render  the  position  im 
pregnable  :  the  descent  on  both  sides  was  very  precipitous, 
and  the  surface  of  the  earth  was  covered  with  a  most  re 
markable  undergrowth  of  laurel,  so  dense  and  interlocked  as 
to  be  almost  impenetrable.  The  Federals  had  cleared  a  con 
siderable  space  around  their  intrenched  position,  constructed 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN   VIRGINIA.  21 

abatis  and  fosses  around  their  entire  work,  and,  having  a  gar 
rison  of  three  thousand  men,1  might  well  have  deemed  them 
selves  impregnable. 

They  also  held  a  strongly-fortified  position  at  Elk  Water, 
on  the  road  running  from  Valley  Mountain  through  Tygart's 
Valley  to  Huttonsville,  at  which  latter  place  it  intersected 
the  Staunton  and  Parkersburg  turnpike.  The  force  in  Ty 
gart's  Valley  was  estimated  to  be  five  thousand  strong.  The 
reserve  force  was  stationed  at  Huttonsville,  and  here  also 
was  their  depot  for  supplies. 

The  two  roads,  mentioned  as  uniting  at  Huttonsville, 
were  the  only  practicable  routes  by  which  that  point  could 
be  reached  from  the  east ;  both,  as  before  explained,  were 
protected  by  works  of  formidable  aspect  and  difficult  ap 
proach.  General  Reynolds  was  in  command  of  the  troops 
defending  the  passes  of  Cheat  Mountain,  and  had  an  army 
estimated  at  from  eight  to  ten  thousand  men.  General  Rose- 
crans  commanded  the  entire  Federal  force  operating  in  West 
ern  Virginia,  embracing  that  under  General  Reynolds,  and 
that  operating  in  the  Kanawha  Valley,  under  General  Cox. 

One  portion  of  the  Confederate  army  was  encamped  at 
"  Camp  Bartow,"  on  the  Parkersburg  pike,  near  its  crossing  of 
the  Greenbrier  River.  The  force  upon  this  line  was  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Brigadier-General  II.  R.  Jackson,  and 
consisted  of  the  following  organizations  :  First  Georgia  Regi 
ment  (Colonel  Ramsay),  Twelfth  Georgia  (Colonel  Edward 
Johnson),  Twenty-third  Virginia  (Colonel  William  B.  Talia- 
ferro),  Thirty-first  Virginia  (Colonel  Jackson),  Thirty-sev 
enth  Virginia  (Colonel  Fulkerson),  Forty-fourth  Virginia 
(Colonel  Scott),  Third  Arkansas  (Colonel  Rust),  Hans- 
brough's  and  Roger's  battalions  of  Virginia  Volunteers,  two 
batteries  of  artillery,  and  a  few  companies  of  cavalry — in  all 
about  twenty-five  hundred  effective  men. 

1  A  requisition  for  rations  for  three  thousand  men  was  found  upon  the  per 
son  of  a  staff-officer  captured  while  pursuing  the  road  from  Cheat  Mountain  Pass 
to  Huttonsville. 


22          £OUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

The  other  wing  of  the  army,  under  General  Loring,  was 
camped  at  Valley  Mountain,  and  consisted  of  a  brigade 
(under  General  D.  S.  Donelson)  of  one  North  Carolina  and 
two  Tennessee  regiments ;  a  brigade  of  Tennessee  troops 
(under  General  Anderson) ;  a  brigade  (under  Colonel  Wil 
liam  Gilham)  consisting  of  the  Twenty-first  and  Forty- 
second  Virginia  Regiments,  and  the  Irish  Battalion  (Pro 
visional  Army  of  Virginia)  ;  a  small  command  under  Colonel 
Burk  ;  and  a  battalion  of  cavalry,  under  Major  W.  H.  F.  Lee. 

These  commands  had  been  greatly  reduced  by  sickness, 
and  the  total  effective  of  this  wing  of  the  army  did  not  ex 
ceed  thirty-five  hundred  men. 

Being  without  accurate  maps  of  the  country,  and  having 
no  regular  engineer-officer  available,  General  Loring  had  to 
rely  upon  his  scouts  and  a  few  citizens  of  that  country,  who 
acted  in  a  volunteer  capacity  as  guides,  for  all  information  as 
to  the  roads,  and  the  movements  and  positions  of  the  enemy. 
One  of  these  citizen  volunteers,  a  professional  surveyor,  hav 
ing  been  informed  that  General  Lee  was  particularly  anxious 
to  obtain  accurate  information  of  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  works  of  the  enemy  on  the  centre-top  of  Cheat  Moun 
tain,  undertook  the  task  of  reaching  such  a  point  on  the 
mountain  as  would  enable  him  to  take  a  deliberate  and  care 
ful  survey  of  the  fortified  position.  He  was  also  to  ascer 
tain  and  report  if  it  was  practicable  to  lead  a  body  of  infan 
try  to  the  vicinity  of  that  point,  by  any  route  which  would 
prevent  the  disclosure  of  the  movement. 

The  only  route  other  than  the  turnpike  by  which  this 
point  of  the  range  of  mountains  could  be  reached  was  by 
pursuing  a  course  along  and  up  the  precipitous  and  ragged 
sides  of  the  mountain,  through  undergrowth  and  trees,  over 
rocks  and  chasms,  and  with  nothing  save  the  compass  or  the 
stars  to  indicate  the  direction  of  the  summit.  The  quasi 
engineer:oificer  made  the  ascent  successfully,  and  obtained  a 
complete  view  of  the  enemy's  works.  On  a  second  recon 
naissance  he  was  accompanied  by  Colonel  A.  Rust,  of  the 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  33 

Third  Arkansas  Regiment,  who  was  very  enterprising,  and 
appeared  to  be  most  anxious  to  make  a  personal  observation. 
Together  they  made  the  ascent  of  the  mountain,  and  again 
complete  success  crowned  their  efforts.  A  full,  unobstructed 
view  of  the  entire  line  of  works  occupied  by  the  enemy  was 
had  without  discovery.  On  their  return  they  made  their 
report  to  General  Lee,  and  represented  that  the  works  were 
of  such  a  character  as  to  justify  the  hope  of  being  carried,  if 
attacked  from  the  direction  of  the  point  reached  by  them, 
from  which  they  could  plainly  see  all  that  was  going  on 
within ;  and  on  which  flank  the  enemy  appeared  to  have  be 
stowed  but  little  attention.  The  only  difficulty  was,  to  reach 
this  point  with  a  body  of  troops  without  attracting  the  atten 
tion  of  the  enemy,  so  that  he  might  be  surprised  and  the 
more  readily  captured.  Of  the  successful  accomplishment  of 
this,  however,  Colonel  Rust  was  sanguine,  and  enthusiasti 
cally  asked  to  be  permitted  to  lead  a  column  in  an  assault 
upon  this  position.  General  Lee  decided  to  give  battle.  A 
column  of  infantry  twelve  hundred  strong,  consisting  of  the 
Twenty-third,  Thirty-first,  and  Thirty-seventh  Virginia  Regi 
ments,  the  Third  Arkansas  Regiment,  and  Hansbrough's 
Virginia  battalion,  was  selected  to  assail  the  works  of  the 
enemy  on  Centre-top.  Colonels  Taliaferro  and  Fulkerson, 
who  were  senior  in  rank  to  Colonel  Rust,  magnanimously 
waived  the  question  of  rank,  and  acquiesced  in  placing  them 
selves  at  the  head  of  their  respective  regiments  and  under 
Colonel  Rust's  command. 

The  order  of  battle  directed  General  II.  R.  Jackson  to 
advance,  with  the  balance  of  his  command,  by  the  turnpike, 
and  to  threaten  the  enemy  from  this  direction — this  was 
especially  designed  to  divert  attention  from  Rust's  flank- 
movement. 

The  third  column,  under  Brigadier-General  Anderson, 
was  to  advance  to  the  third  or  west  top  of  Cheat  Mountain, 
secure  possession  of  the  turnpike  at  that  point,  and  be  in 
position  both  to  take  the  enemy  in  rear  and  prevent  any 


24          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

escape ;  as  also  to  resist  any  effort  that  might  be  made  to  re- 
enforce  Centre-top  with  any  troops  that  might  be  in  reserve. 
The  rest  of  the  army  was  to  move  down  the  valley  of 
Tygart's  River  npon  the  enemy  there  stationed ;  but,  as  will 
appear  more  fully  hereafter,  the  movements  of  this  column 
were  made  to  depend  upon  the  success  which  should  attend 
the  assault  upon  the  fortified  position  on  Cheat  Mountain. 
The  plan  of  attack  was  carefully  and  maturely  considered, 
and  was  communicated  to  the  commanders  in  the  following 
order : 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

HEADQUARTERS,  VALLEY  MOUNTAIN,  September  8,  1861. 
[Special  Order  No.  23.] 

1.  General  H.  R.  Jackson,  commanding  Monterey  division, 
will  detach  a  column  of  not  more  than  two  thousand  men  under 
Colonel  Rust,  to  turn  the  enemy's  position  at  Cheat  Mountain 
Pass  at  daylight  on  the  12th  instant  (Thursday). 

During  the  night  preceding  the  morning  of  the  12th  instant, 
General  Jackson  having  left  a  suitable  guard  for  his  own  position 
with  the  rest  of  his  available  force,  will  take  post  on  the  east 
ern  ridge  of  Cheat  Mountain,  occupy  the  enemy  in  front,  and 
cooperate  in  the  assault  of  his  attacking  column  should  circum 
stances  favor.  The  march  of  Colonel  Rust  will  be  so  regulated 
as  to  attain  his  position  during  the  same  night,  and  at  the  dawn 
of  the  appointed  day  (Thursday,  12th)  he  will,  if  possible,  sur 
prise  the  enemy  in  his  trenches  and  carry  them. 

2.  The  "  Pass  "  having  been  carried,  General  Jackson,  with 
his  whole  fighting  force,  will  immediately  move  forward  toward 
Huttonsville,  prepared  against  an  attack  from  the  enemy,  taking 
every  precaution  against  firing  upon  the  portion  of  the  army 
operating  west  of  Cheat  Mountain,  and  ready  to  cooperate  with 
it  against  the  enemy  in  Tygart's  Valley.     The  supply-wagons 
of  the  advancing  columns  will  follow,  and  the  reserve  will  occupy 
Cheat  Mountain. 

3.  General  Anderson's  brigade  will   move  down  Tygart's 
Valley,  following  the  west  slope  of  Cheat  Mountain  range,  con 
cealing  his  movements  from  the  enemy.     On  reaching  Wyman's 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  25 

(or  the  vicinity)  he  will  refresh  his  force  unobserved,  send  for 
ward  intelligent  officers  to  make  sure  of  his  further  course,  and 
during  the  night  of  the  llth  (Wednesday)  proceed  to  the 
Staunton  turnpike  where  it  intersects  the  west  top  of  Cheat 
Mountain,  so  as  to  arrive  there  as  soon  after  daylight  on  the 
12th  (Thursday)  as  possible.  He  will  make  dispositions  to  hold 
the  turnpike,  prevent  reinforcements  reaching  Cheat  Mountain 
Pass,  cut  the  telegraph-wire,  and  be  prepared,  if  necessary,  to 
aid  in  the  assault  of  the  enemy's  position  on  the  middle  top  of 
Cheat  Mountain  by  General  Jackson's  division,  the  result  of 
which  he  must  await.  He  must  particularly  keep  in  mind  that 
the  movement  of  General  Jackson  is  to  surprise  the  enemy  in 
their  defenses.  He  must,  therefore,  not  discover  his  movement, 
nor  advance — before  Wednesday  night — beyond  a  point  where  he 
can  conceal  his  force.  Cheat  Mountain  Pass  being  carried,  he 
will  turn  down  the  mountain  and  press  upon  the  left  and  rear  of 
the  enemy  in  Tygart's  Valley,  either  by  the  old  or  new  turnpike, 
or  the  Becky  Run  road,  according  to  circumstances. 

4.  General  Donelson's  brigade  will  advance  on  the  right  of 
Tygart's  Valley  River,  seizing  the  paths  and  avenues  leading 
from  that  side  to  the  river,  and  driving  back  the  enemy  that 
may  endeavor  to  retard  the  advance  of  the  centre  along  the 
turnpike,  or  turn  his  right. 

5.  Such  of  the  artillery  as  may  not  be  used  on  the  flanks 
will  proceed    along   the  Huttonsville  turnpike,  supported   by 
Major  Munford's  battalion,   followed  by  the  rest  of    Colonel 
Gilham's  brigade  in  reserve. 

6.  Colonel  Burk's  brigade  will  advance  on  the  left  of  Ty 
gart's  Valley  River,  in  supporting  distance  of  the  centre,  and 
clear  that  side  of  the  valley  of  the  forces  of  the  enemy  that 
might  obstruct  the  advance  of  the  artillery. 

7.  The  cavalry  under  Major  Lee  will  follow,  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  in  rear  of  the  left,  Colonel  Burk's 
brigade.     It  will  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  that 
quarter  ;  give  notice  of,  and  prevent,  if  possible,  any  attempt  to 
turn  the  left  of  the  line,  and  be  prepared  to  strike  when  oppor 
tunity  offers. 

8.  The    wagons    of    each    brigade,   properly   parked    and 


26  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

guarded,  under  the  charge  of  their  respective  quartermasters — 
who  will  personally  superintend  their  movements — will  pursue 
the  main  turnpike,  under  the  general  direction  of  the  chief 
quartermaster,  in  rear  of  the  army  and  out  of  cannon-range  of 
the  enemy. 

9.  Commanders  on  both  lines  of  operations  will  particu 
larly  see  that  their  corps  wear  the  distinguishing  badge,  and 
that  both  officers  and  men  take  every  precaution  not  to  fire  on 
our  own  troops.  This  is  essentially  necessary,  as  the  forces  on 
both  sides  of  Cheat  Mountain  may  unite.  They  will  also  use 
every  exertion  to  prevent  noise  and  straggling  from  the  ranks, 
correct  quietly  any  confusion  that  may  occur,  and  cause  their 
commands  to  rapidly  execute  their  movements  when  in  presence 
of  the  enemy. 

By  order  of  General  \V.  "W.  LORIXG  : 

CAKTEE  L.  STEVENS  ox, 
Assistant  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General. 


On  the  same  day  that  General  Loring  issued  the  order 
of  march  and  attack  to  his  army,  General  Lee  issued  the  fol 
lowing: 


HEADQUARTERS.  VALLEY  MoryrAiy,  September  8,  1861. 
[Special  Order  Xo.  -.] 

The  forward  movement  announced  to  the  Army  of  the  North 
west  in  Special  Order  No.  28,  from  its  headquarters,  of  this 
date,  gives  the  general  commanding  the  opportunity  of  exhort 
ing  the  troops  to  keep  steadily  in  view  the  great  principles  for 
which  they  contend,  and  to  manifest  to  the  world  their  deter 
mination  to  maintain  them.  The  eyes  of  the  country  are  upon 
you.  The  safety  of  your  homes,  and  the  lives  of  all  you  hold 
dear,  depend  upon  your  courage  and  exertions.  Let  each  man 
resolve  to  be  victorious,  and  that  the  right  of  self-government, 
liberty  and  peace,  shall  in  him  find  a  defender.  The  progress 
of  this  army  must  be  forward. 

R.  E.  LEE, 
General  commanding. 


THE   CAMPAIGN    IX   WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  27 

Inasmuch  as  Rust's  column  had  the  most  difficult  part 
to  perform,  and  it  was  impossible  to  estimate  accurately  the 
time  which  would  be  consumed  in  reaching  his  point  of 
attack,  he  was  started  in  advance  of  the  other  columns,  and 
it  was  determined  and  ordered  that  they  should  await  the 
signal  of  his  attack,  before  doing  anything  more  than  secur 
ing  positions  from  which  they  could  readily  and  quickly 
advance  to  the  work  to  which  they  had  been  respectively 
assigned.  All  were  ordered  to  take  every  precaution  to  pre 
vent  their  movements  from  being  discovered,  as  the  success 
of  the  whole  undertaking  depended  on  taking  the  enemy  on 
Centre-top  by  surprise.  Although  the  several  tops  of  the 
mountain  were  in  a  direct  line,  not  very  distant  from  each 
other,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  considerable  circuit  in 
riding  from  one  to  the  other ;  and  as  Rust's  musketry  could 
be  more  readily  and  promptly  observed  than  any  other  sig 
nal,  the  general  attack  was  made  to  depend  upon  it. 

The  several  commands,  being  in  every  respect  prepared 
for  the  anticipated  battle,  moved  forward  at  the  time  men 
tioned,  and  in  the  several  directions  indicated,  in  the  order 
of  march  and  attack. 

All  progressed  satisfactorily.  Anderson  reached  and 
occupied  the  turnpike  at  its  crossing  on  the  third  or  rear  top 
of  Cheat  Mountain.  So  unsuspecting  was  the  enemy,  and  so 
silently  was  Anderson's  movement  made,  that  his  men  capt 
ured  an  engineer-officer  of  Rosecrans's  staff,  and  others,  qui 
etly  and  confidently  pursuing  the  road  toward  their  rear. 

General  Jackson  had  his  command  well  in  hand,  pre 
pared  to  engage  the  enemy  in  front. 

General  Donelson's  brigade  rested  the  latter  portion  of  the 
night  not  far  from  the  camps  of  his  enemy  on  Tygart's  Val 
ley  River. 

Morning  found  everything  just  as  the  most  confident 
could  have  hoped,  with  the  exception  that  the  night  had  been 
a  very  rainy,  disagreeable  one,  and  the  men  were  conse 
quently  quite  uncomfortable  ;  this,  however,  would  soon  be 


28  FOUR  YEARS   WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

forgotten  in  the  excitement  of  battle  and  the  promise  of  cer 
tain  victory.  All  was  ready,  and  Bust's  attack  was  anxiously 
awaited.  General  Jackson  worried  the  enemy  considerably 
by  attacking  his  advanced  guard  on  the  first  top  of  the  moun 
tain,  only  awaiting  the  signal  from  Bust  to  press  forward 
earnestly  with  his  entire  command.  Hours  passed,  and  no 
signal  was  heard !  What  could  have  happened  ?  Enough 
time  had  elapsed  to  enable  the  troops  to  reach  Centre-top, 
unless  prevented  by  some  unexpected  impediment. 

"Would  Bust  never  attack  ?    Alas !  he  never  did ! 

As  was  subsequently  learned,  upon  an  examination  of 
the  works  of  the  enemy  made  after  he  had  succeeded  in 
reaching  his  proper  position,  he  was  surprised  to  find  them 
far  more  formidable  than  he  had  supposed.  Whether  addi 
tional  strength  had  been  given  them  since  his  reconnais 
sance,  or  whether  he  was  too  easily  satisfied  and  not  suffi 
ciently  thorough  in  his  observations  when  he  made  that 
reconnaissance,  is  not  known.  He  decided  that  the  works 
were  too  formidable  to  justify  an  assault,  and  no  attack  was 
made.  Even  had  he  discharged  his  guns  and  vigorously  en 
gaged  the  enemy,  without  attempting  to  carry  the  works  by 
storm,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  believe  that  the  combined 
efforts  of  the  other  columns  would  have  been  attended  with 
success. 

All,  however,  depended  on  the  enemy's  being  surprised, 
and  simultaneously  and  swiftly  attacked.  Much  precious 
time  had  been  lost.  Donelson's  men,  uneasy  about  their 
arms,  fearful  that  their  powder  had  been  dampened  by  the 
rain,  commenced  a  spirited  fusillade  in  order  to  reload  and 
avoid  a  "flash  in  the  pan."  This  and  Jackson's  activity 
aroused  the  enemy:  hurried  preparations  to  resist  attack 
were  made ;  scouting-parties  of  cavalry  were  sent  out  to 
scour  the  surrounding  country.  One  of  these  detachments 
came  very  near  capturing  General  Lee,  who,  accompanied  by 
his  aide  and  a  few  horsemen,  on  his  way  to  join  General 
Donelson,  had  scarcely  emerged  from  a  piece  of  woods,  when 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  £9 

quite  a  troop  thundered  along  the  road  skirting  the  woods, 
too  near  to  be  comfortable,  but  galloping  rapidly  away  on 
suddenly  observing  their  proximity  to  Donelson's  column  of 
infantry.  It  was  also  in  a  brush  between  one  of  these  de 
tachments  of  the  enemy  and  a  portion  of  Major  "W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  battalion  of  cavalry  that  the  pious  Christian  and  gal 
lant  gentleman,  Colonel  John  A.  "Washington,  who  had  been 
sent  with  Major  Lee  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy,  was  shot  dead 
from  an  ambuscade. 

Detached,  discovered,  without  knowledge  of  the  cause  of 
Bust's  silence,  the  other  commands  were  powerless  for  good. 
Occupied  with  the  necessity  of  providing  for  their  own  safe 
ty,  it  only  remained  to  have  them  recalled  to  their  former 
positions.  The  enemy  made  no  advance,  and,  beyond  driv 
ing  in  their  outposts,  our  troops  were  not  seriously  engaged. 

On  the  next  day  Colonel  Rust  personally  reported  to 
General  Lee.  The  only  cause  assigned  by  him  for  his  non- 
action  is  that  heretofore  given.  Possibly  his  regimental 
commanders  may  have  agreed  with  him  in  esteeming  the 
works  of  the  enemy  too  formidable  to  be  attacked;  but 
surely  the  responsibility  attached  to  him  alone.1 

Some  may  think  that  this  was  a  proper  matter  for  inves 
tigation  by  a  court  of  inquiry,  or  for  trial  by  court-martial. 
Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  was  ever  had,  and  possibly 

1  "  By  this  time  most  of  the  command  had  come  up,  and  a  council  of  war  was 
held  as  to  what  we  should  do,  consisting  of  Colonels  Rust,  Taliaferro,  and  Ful- 
kerson,  and  Lieutenant-Colonels  Barton,  Jackson,  and  Hansbrough.  It  should 
be  here  stated  that  none  of  the  officers  were  fully  apprised  of  the  plan  of  com 
bined  attack,  and  of  the  fact  that  everything  depended  on  the  ball  being  set  in 
motion  by  our  command,  except  Colonel  Rust. 

"  I  shall  never  forget  the  appearance  of  the  officers  composing  this  council ; 
Fulkerson  looked  pale  and  worn,  but  intrepid ;  Taliaferro  stern  but  indifferent. 
The  latter  soon  broke  off  the  deliberations  by  saying,  '  Well,  if  we  have  to  fight 
these  people,  let's  do  it  at  once.'  Immediately  the  rear  of  the  column  was 
deployed  around  to  the  right,  while  we  who  had  led  the  file  remained  on  the 
left ;  and  there  we  stood  anxiously  awaiting  the  word  to  advance  to  the  assault. 
This  word  never  came." — Extract  from  letter  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  W.  Hans 
brough. 


30          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

no  public  good  would  have  resulted  had  either  been  con 
vened. 

Having  failed  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  his  strong 
hold,  the  season  having  advanced  too  far  to  attempt  any 
movement  away  from  our  base  of  supplies,  and  there  being 
no  probability  of  any  serious  advance  by  the  enemy,  the 
campaign  in  the  northwest  was  regarded  as  ended  for  the 
winter. 

The  following  letter  from  General  Lee  to  Governor 
Letcher,  but  recently  made  public,  serves  to  confirm  what 
has  been  stated : 

VALLEY  MOUNTAIN,  September  17, 1861. 

MY  DEAR  GOVERNOR  :  I  received  your  very  kind  note  of  the 
5th  instant  just  as  I  was  about  to  accompany  General  Loring's 
command  on  an  expedition  to  the  enemy's  works  in  front,  or  I 
would  have  before  thanked  you  for  the  interest  you  take  in  my 
welfare,  and  your  too  flattering  expressions  of  my  ability.  In 
deed,  you  overrate  me  much,  and  I  feel  humbled  when  I  weigh 
myself  by  your  standard.  I  am,  however,  very  grateful  for  your 
confidence,  and  I  can  answer  for  my  sincerity  in  the  earnest  en 
deavor  I  make  to  advance  the  cause  I  have  so  much  at  heart, 
though  conscious  of  the  slow  progress  I  make.  I  was  very  san 
guine  of  taking  the  enemy's  works  on  last  Thursday  morning. 
I  had  considered  the  -subject  well.  With  great  effort  the  troops 
intended  for  the  surprise  had  reached  their  destination,  having 
traversed  twenty  miles  of  steep,  rugged  mountain-paths  ;  and 
the  last  day  through  a  terrible  storm  which  lasted  all  night,  and 
in  which  they  had  to  stand  drenched  to  the  skin  in  cold  rain. 
Still  their  spirits  were  good.  When  morning  broke,  I  could  see 
the  enemy's  tents  on  Valley  River  at  the  point  on  the  Huttons- 
ville  road,  just  below  me.  It  was  a  tempting  sight.  We  waited 
for  the  attack  on  Cheat  Mountain,  which  was  to  be  the  signal. 
Till  10  A.  M.  the  men  were  cleaning  their  unserviceable  arms. 
But  the  signal  did  not  come.  All  chance  for  a  surprise  was 
gone.  The  provisions  of  the  men  had  been  destroyed  the  pre 
ceding  day  by  the  storm.  They  had  had  nothing  to  eat  that 
morning,  could  not  hold  out  another  day,  and  were  obliged  to  be 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  31 

withdrawn.  The  party  sent  to  Cheat  Mountain  to  take  that  in 
rear  had  also  to  be  withdrawn.  The  attack  to  come  off  from 
the  east  side  failed  from  the  difficulties  in  the  way  •  the  oppor 
tunity  was  lost,  and  our  plan  discovered.  It  is  a  grievous  dis 
appointment  to  me,  I  assure  you.  But  for  the  rain-storm,  I 
have  no  doubt  it  would  have  succeeded.  This,  Governor,  is  for 
your  own  eye.  Please  do  not  speak  of  it ;  we  must  try  again. 
Our  greatest  loss  is  the  death  of  my  dear  friend  Colonel  Wash 
ington.  He  and  my  son  were  reconnoitring  the  front  of  the 
enemy.  They  came  unawares  upon  a  concealed  party  who  fired 
upon  them  within  twenty  yards,  and  the  colonel  fell  pierced  by 
three  balls.  My  son's  horse  received  three  shots,  but  he  escaped 
on  the  colonel's  horse.  His  zeal  for  the  cause  to  which  he  had 
devoted  himself  carried  him,  I  fear,  too  far. 

We  took  some  seventy  prisoners,  and  killed  some  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  of  the  enemy.  Our  loss  was  small  besides  what  I 
have  mentioned.  Our  greatest  difficulty  is  the  roads.  It  has 
been  raining  in  these  mountains  about  six  weeks.  It  is  impos 
sible  to  get  along.  It  is  that  which  has  paralyzed  all  our 
efforts.  With  sincere  thanks  for  your  good  wishes, 
I  am,  very  truly  yours, 

R.  E.  LEE. 

His  Excellency  Governor  JOHN  LETCHER. 


CHAPTER  IY. 

Affairs  in  Southwestern  Virginia. — Want  of  Harmony  between  Generals  Floyd 
and  Wise. — General  Lee  proceeds  to  that  Section. — Preparations  to  resist 
General  Rosecrans. — Retreat  of  the  Federals. 

MEANWHILE  the  Federal  commander  had  been  active  in 
the  Kanawha  Valley,  and,  owing  to  matters  of  discord  be 
tween  Generals  Floyd  and  Wise,  it  became  imperatively 
necessary  for  General  Lee  to  repair  to  that  quarter,  in  order 
to  restore  harmony  among  our  own  people,  and  to  resist  the 
further  advance  of  the  enemy.  Simultaneously  General 
Rosecrans  moved  with  a  large  portion  of  his  army  to  ree'n- 
force  General  Cox ;  and  General  Lee  ordered  General  Lor- 
ing  to  leave  a  sufficient  force  to  watch  the  enemy  at  Cheat 
Mountain,  and  move  with  the  rest  of  his  army  to  the  Kana 
wha  Valley. 

General  Lee  proceeded  without  delay  across  the  country 
in  that  direction. 

On  the  14th  of  September  General  Floyd  encamped  on 
Big  Sewell  Mountain,  and  ordered  General  "Wise  to  go  into 
camp  a  short  distance  east  of  him.  On  the  night  of  the  16th 
he  retreated  to  Meadow  Bluff,  directing  General  "Wise  to 
cover  the  movement  and  follow  with  his  command  to  that 
point.  This. order  General  Wise  positively  refused  to  obey  ; 
and,  selecting  a  favorable  position  on  Little  Sewell  Mountain, 
he  proceeded  to  make  it  good  by  a  line  of  defensive  works. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  as  reported  to  General 
Lee,  who,  upon  his  arrival,  found  General  Floyd  with  his 
command  at  Meadow  Bluff,  and  General  Wise  some  ten  or 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN   VIRGINIA.  33 

more  miles  in  advance,  at  Little  Sewell,  with  his  legion  of 
seventeen  hundred  men,  now  confronted  by  Rosecrans's  en 
tire  army. 

"Without  entering  into  the  merits  of  the  controversy  be 
tween  Generals  Floyd  and  "Wise,  General  Lee  perceived  at 
a  glance  that  Little  Sewell  was  the  most  favorable  point  at 
which  to  make  a  stand  ;  that  being  naturally  a  strong  posi 
tion,  and  much  more  easily  defended  than  Meadow  Bluff. 
General  Floyd  was  therefore  at  once  ordered  to  move  for 
ward  to  Little  Sewell.  The  bitter  feeling  which  had  been 
engendered  between  the  two  commanders  had  imparted  it 
self,  in  some  degree,  to  the  troops,  and  seriously  threatened 
to  impair  their  efficiency.  'No  little  diplomacy  was  required, 
therefore,  to  produce  harmony  and  hearty  cooperation,  where 
previously  had  prevailed  discord  and  contention.  It  will  be 
readily  understood  that  the  partisans  of  Floyd  at  first  viewed 
in  no  pleasant  frame  of  mind  the  apparent  indorsement  of 
Wise's  judgment,  if  not,  by  a  forced  construction  (to  wrhich 
a  prejudiced  mind  is  always  liable),  the  approval  of  his  dis 
obedience  and  insubordination,  implied  in  General  Lee's 
order  that  Floyd  should  forsake  his  chosen  position  and  re 
turn  to  that  persistently  held  by  Wise. 

A  junction  of  the  commands  of  Floyd  and  Wise  hav 
ing  been  effected,  a  line  of  defense  was  established,  and  as 
well  fortified  as  circumstances  would  admit  in  that  broken 
country. 

The  reinforcements  from  Loring's  army  soon  arrived, 
and  the  aggregate  strength  of  the  troops  under  General  Lee 
was,  in  round  numbers,  about  eight  or  nine  thousand  men. 

Soon  after  the  arrival  of  General  Lee  a  messenger  came 
with  an  order  from  the  President,  relieving  General  Wise  of 
his  command,  and  directing  him  to  repair  to  Richmond  for 
assignment  to  another  field  of  duty  of  equal  importance  and 
dignity. 

I  express  no  opinion  in  regard  to  the  matters  of  differ 
ence  between  Generals  Floyd  and  Wise,  and  no  conclusion 
3 


34  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

prejudicial  to  the  latter  should  be  drawn  from  the  action  of 
the  War  Department,  relieving  him  of  his  command.  Gen 
eral  Lee,  so  far  as  is  known  to  me,  never  undertook  to  ascer 
tain  or  decide  the  merits  of  the  controversy  between  those 
officers  ;  but,  as  the  good  of  the  service  required  that  one  or 
the  other  should  be  relieved  from  duty  with  that  army,  an 
order  to  that  effect  was  issued  by  direction  of  the  President, 
and  with  General  Lee's  concurrence. 

The  combined  forces  of  the  enemy,  under  Generals  Rose- 
crans  and  Cox,  were  estimated  to  be  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
thousand  strong.1 

With  such  an  army,  elated  by  its  previous  encounters 
with  the  small  force  heretofore  opposed  to  it,  it  was  reason 
ably  presumed  that  the  Federal  commander  would  continue 
on  the  aggressive.  General  Lee  caused  every  preparation  to 
be  made  to  give  battle.  He  was  but  too  recently  on  the  field 
to  adopt  any  other  than  a  defensive  policy :  he  had  already 
demonstrated  his  unwillingness  to  recede,  by  the  advance 
from  Meadow  Bluff  to  Little  Sewell  Mountain.  The  enemy 
held  a  strong  position  on  Big  Sewell  Mountain,  from  which, 
as  a  base,  he  had  already  advanced  to  engage  the  troops  of 
General  Wise.  There  was  no  reasonable  cause  to  doubt  that 
General  Hosecrans,  \vho  was  now  in  command,  would  con 
tinue  this  advance,  and  assail  the  Confederate  position.  It 
was  a  matter  of  great  surprise,  therefore,  when,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th  of  October,  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy 
was  no  longer  in  our  front ;  and  this  surprise  was  increased 
when,  on  pursuing  the  road  over  which  Eosecrans's  army 
had  retreated,  it  was  evident,  from  the  manner  in  which  pro 
visions  and  accoutrements  had  been  tumbled  out  or  left  upon 
the  route,  that  the  flight  had  been  somewhat  precipitate  and 
disorderly. 

We  had  now  reached  the  latter  days  of  October :   the 

1  This  was  a  great  exaggeration  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates.  General 
Rosecrans  puts  his  effective  strength  at  this  time  at  but  eight  thousand  five 
hundred. — "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Second  Series,  vol.  iii.,  p.  10. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.  35 

lateness  of  the  season  and  the  condition  of  the  roads  pre 
cluded  the  idea  of  earnest  aggressive  operations,  and  the  cam 
paign  in  Western  Virginia  was  virtually  concluded. 

Judged  from  its  results,  it  must  be  confessed  that  this 
series  of  operations  was  a  failure.  At  its  conclusion  a  large 
portion  of  the  State  was  in  possession  of  the  Federals,  in 
cluding  the  rich  valleys  of  the  Ohio  and  Kanawha  Rivers, 
and  so  remained  until  the  close  of  the  war.  For  this,  how 
ever,  General  Lee  cannot  be  reasonably  held  accountable. 
Disaster  had  befallen  the  Confederate  arms,  and  the  worst 
had  been  accomplished,  before  he  reached  the  theatre  of 
operations ;  the  Alleghanies  then  constituted  the  dividing 
line  between  the  hostile  forces,  and  in  this  network  of 
mountains,  sterile  and  rendered  absolutely  impracticable 
by  a  prolonged  season  of  rain,  Nature  had  provided  an  in 
surmountable  barrier  to  operations  in  the  transmontane 
country. 

It  was  doubtless  because  of  similar  embarrassments  that 
the  Federal  general  retired,  in  the  face  of  inferior  numbers, 
to  a  point  nearer  his  base  of  supplies. 

During  the  time  that  General  Lee  was  in  this  depart 
ment  (his  first  service  in  the  field  under  Confederate  au 
spices),  he  manifested  that  complete  self-abnegation  and  dis 
like  for  parade  and  ceremony  which  later  in  the  war  became 
characteristic  of  him.  Accompanied  originally  by  a  staff  of 
but  two  persons,  and,  after  the  death  of  Colonel  Washington, 
with  but  one  aide-de-camp,  with  no  escort  nor  body-guard, 
no  couriers  nor  guides,  he  made  the  campaign  under  alto 
gether  unostentatious  and  really  uncomfortable  circum 
stances.  One  solitary  tent  constituted  his  headquarters- 
camp  ;  this  served  for  the  general  and  his  aide ;  and  when 
visitors  were  entertained,  as  actually  occurred,  the  general 
shared  his  blankets  with  his  aide,  turning  over  those  of  the 
latter  to  his  guest.  His  dinner-service  was  of  tin — tin  plates, 
tin  cups,  tin  bowls,  everything  of  tin — and  consequently  in 
destructible  ;  and  to  the  annoyance  and  disgust  of  the  sub- 


36  FOUR  YEARS   WITH  GENERAL   LEE. 

ordinates,  who  sighed  for  porcelain,  could  not  or  would  not 
be  lost ;  indeed,  with  the  help  of  occasional  additions,  this  tin 
furniture  continued  to  do  service  for  several  campaigns ;  and 
it  wras  only  in  the  last  year  of  the  war,  while  the  army  was 
around  Petersburg,  that  a  set  of  china  was  surreptitiously  in 
troduced  into  the  baggage  of  the  headquarters  of  the  army. 
This  displaced  for  a  time  the  chaste  and  elaborate  plate ; 
but  on  resuming  "light  marching  order"  at  the  time  of  the 
evacuation  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  the  china,  which 
had  been  borrowed  by  the  staff,  was  returned ;  the  tins  were 
again  produced  and  did  service  until  the  surrender  of  the 
army,  when  they  passed  into  the  hands  of  individuals  who 
now  preserve  them  as  mementos  of  the  greatest  commander 
in  the  great  war. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

General  Lee  repairs  to  Richmond. — He  is  ordered  to  the  Department  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida. — His  Return  thence  to  Richmond. — He  is 
charged  with  the  Control  of  the  Military  Operations  of  all  of  the  Confed 
erate  Armies. — His  Duties  in  that  Position. — General  Johnston  wounded  in 
the  Battle  of  Seven  Pines. — General  Lee  in  Command  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. — The  Seven  Days'  Battles  around  Richmond. — Strength 
of  the  Two  Opposing  Armies. 

SOON  after  the  occurrences  in  Western  Virginia  just  re 
lated,  General  Lee  returned  to  Richmond  and  resumed  his 
position  and  duties  as  adviser  and  counselor  to  the  Presi 
dent.  On  the  6th  of  November,  1861,  he  proceeded  to 
South  Carolina  for  the  purpose  of  directing  and  supervising 
the  construction  of  a  line  of  defense  along  the  coasts  of 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida.  He  arrived  immedi 
ately  after  the  capture  of  Port  Royal  by  the  Federal  navy, 
and  established  his  headquarters  at  Coosawhatchie,  on  the 
railroad,  about  midway  between  Charleston  and  Savannah. 
Beyond  the  prosecution  of  the  work  of  fortifying  the  cities 
and  principal  points  on  the  coast  and  rivers,  nothing  of  im 
portance  occurred  during  his  three  months'  stay  in  this  de 
partment.  He  was  in  Charleston  at  the  time  of  the  great 
conflagration,  and  was  compelled  to  leave  the  Mills  House, 
where  he  had  taken  rooms,  and  which  was  with  great  diffi 
culty  saved  from  destruction,  and  to  take  refuge  in  a  private 
house  on  the  "  Battery." 

In  March,  1862,  he  returned  to  Richmond,  and  was  as 
signed,  on  the  13th,  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  to 
the  conduct  of  the  military  operations  of  all  the  armies  of 


38  FOUR  YEARS  WITH   GENERAL   LEE. 

the  Confederate  States.  This  position  was  regarded  by  some 
as  rather  anomalous  in  character,  and  yet  there  devolved 
upon  the  general  a  great  deal  of  work  that  did  not  appear  on 
the  surface,  and  was  of  a  kind  not  to  be  generally  appreci 
ated.  Exercising  a  constant  supervision  over  the  condition 
of  affairs  at  each  important  point,  thoroughly  informed  as  to 
the  resources  and  necessities  of  the  several  commanders  of 
armies  in  the  field,  as  well  as  of  the  dangers  which  respec 
tively  threatened  them,  he  was  enabled  to  give  them  wise 
counsel,  to  offer  them  valuable  suggestions,  and  to  respond 
to  their  demands  for  assistance  and  support  to  such  extent  as 
the  limited  resources  of  the  Government  would  permit.  It 
was  in  great  measure  due  to  his  advice  and  encouragement 
that  General  Magruder  so  stoutly  and  gallantly  held  his  lines 
on  the  Peninsula  against  General  McClellan  until  troops 
could  be  sent  to  his  relief  from  General  Johnston's  army.  I 
recollect  a  telegraphic  dispatch  received  by  General  Lee 
from  General  Magruder,  in  which  he  stated  that  a  council  of 
war  which  he  had  convened  had  unanimously  determined 
that  his  army  should  retreat ;  in  reply  to  which  General  Lee 
urged  him  to  maintain  his  lines  and  to  make  as  bold  a  front 
as  possible,  and  encouraged  him  with  the  prospect  of  being 
early  reenforced. 

ISTo  better  illustration  of  the  nature  and  importance  of 
the  duty  performed  by  General  Lee,  while  in  this  position, 
can  be  given  than  the  following  letter — one  of  a  number  of 
similar  import — written  by  him  to  General  Jackson,  the 
"rough"  or  original  draft  of  which  is  still  in  my  possession : 

HEADQUARTERS,  RICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  April  29,  1862. 

Major- General  T.  J.  JACKSON,  commanding,  etc..  Swift  Run  Gap,  Vir 
ginia. 

GENEKAL  :  I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  letter 
of  yesterday's  date.  From  the  reports  that  reach  me  that  are 
entitled  to  credit,  the  force  of  the  enemy  opposite  Fredericks- 
burg  is  represented  as  too  large  to  admit  of  any  diminution 
whatever  of  our  army  in  that  vicinity  at  present,  as  it  might  not 


GENERAL  LEE   IN   RICHMOND.  39 

only  invite  an  attack  on  Richmond,  but  jeopard  the  safety  of 
the  army  in  the  Peninsula.  I  regret,  therefore,  that  your  re 
quest,  to  have  five  thousand  men  sent  from  that  army  to  reen- 
force  you,  cannot  be  complied  with.  Can  you  draw  enough 
from  the  command  of  General  Edward  Johnson  to  warrant  you 
in  attacking  Banks  ?  The  last  return  received  from  that 
army  shows  a  present  force  of  upward  of  thirty-five  hundred, 
which,  it  is  hoped,  has  been  since  increased  by  recruits  and  re 
turned  furloughs.  As  he  does  not  appear  to  be  pressed,  it  is 
suggested  that  a  portion  of  his  force  might  be  temporarily  re 
moved  from  its  present  position,  and  made  available  for  the 
movement  in  question.  A  decisive  and  successful  blow  at 
Banks's  column  would  be  fraught  with  the  happiest  results,  and 
I  deeply  regret  my  inability  to  send  you  the  reinforcements  you 
ask.  If,  however,  you  think  the  combined  forces  of  Generals 
Ewell  and  Johnson,  with  your  own,  inadequate  for  the  move, 
General  Ewell  might,  with  the  assistance  of  General  Anderson's 
army  near  Fredericksburg,  strike  at  McDowell's  army  between 
that  city  and  Aquia,  with  much  promise  of  success  ;  provided 
you  feel  sufficiently  strong  alone  to  hold  Banks  in  check. 

Very  truly  yours,  R.  E.  LEE. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  this  letter  bears  the  date 
"April  29,  1862."  On  the  5th  or  6th  of  May  General  Jack 
son  formed  a  junction  between  his  own  command  and  that 
of  General  Edward  Johnson  ;  on  the  Sth  of  May  lie  defeated 
Milroy  at  McDowell.  Soon  thereafter  the  command  of  Gen 
eral  Ewell  was  united  to  that  already  under  Jackson,  and  on 
the  25tli  of  the  same  month  Banks  was  defeated  and  put  to 
flight. 

Other  incidents  miglit  be  cited  to  illustrate  this  branch  of 
the  important  service  rendered  at  this  period  by  General 
Lee.  The  line  of  earthworks  around  the  city  of  Richmond, 
and  other  preparations  for  resisting  an  attack,  testified  to  the 
immense  care  and  labor  bestowed  upon  the  defense  of  the 
capital,  so  seriously  threatened  by  the  army  of  General 
McClellan. 


40  FOUR  TEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

On  the  last  day  of  May  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  or 
Fair  Oaks,  was  delivered,  and  General  Johnston  was  wound 
ed.  On  that  afternoon  the  President  and  General  Lee  had 
gone  out  on  the  lines,  and  were  present  and  under  a  severe 
fire  as  the  troops  of  General  Whiting  went  into  action. 
Major-General  G.  W.  Smith  was  next  in  rank  to  General 
Johnston,  and  assumed  command  of  the  army  after  the 
wounding  of  the  latter.  The  next  day,  by  order  of  the 
President,  General  Lee  took  personal  command  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia.  He  proceeded  at  once  to  make  its 
position  secure  against  attack,  and  to  enhance  its  efficiency 
and  strength,  by  every  means  in  his  power,  so  as  to  justify 
aggressive  movements. 

The  brilliant  achievements  of  the  army  under  General 
Jackson,  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  had  so  startled  and  par 
alyzed  the  Federal  authorities,  and  had  excited  such  fears  for 
the  safety  of  Washington,  as  to  remove  all  apprehension  of 
any  immediate  trouble  from  the  enemy  heretofore  operating 
in  the  Valley,  and  to  render  improbable  the  junction  of  the 
army  under  McDowell  with  that  of  McClellan.  General 
Lee,  quick  to  observe  and  profit  by  the  advantage  to  be  de 
rived  from  this  propitious  state  of  affairs,  conceived  the  plan 
of  drawing  Jackson's  command  to  his  aid,  swiftly  and  secret 
ly,  in  order  that  he  might,  when  thus  reenforced,  fall  with 
all  his  strength  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  compel 
him  to  a  general  engagement.  The  necessary  orders  were 
given.  General  Jackson  moved  with  all  possible  celerity, 
and  when  he  had  reached  Ashland,  General  Lee,  having  left 
Generals  Magruder,  Holmes,  and  Huger,  with  about  twenty- 
eight  thousand  men,  in  the  defenses  of  Richmond,  on  the 
26th  of  June  moved  to  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy 
River  with  the  remainder  of  his  army,  and  took  the  initia 
tive  in  the  engagements  embraced  in  the  seven  days'  battles, 
from  which  resulted  the  complete  discomfiture  of  the  army 
under  General  McClellan,  and  its  retreat  to  the  protection 
of  the  fleet  operating  in  James  Eiver. 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  41 

Without  attempting  an  account  of  any  one  of  the  severe 
engagements  embraced  in  the  seven  days'  battles,  so  fully 
described  in  General  Lee's  official  report,  I  cannot  forbear 
mention  of  a  maladroit  performance  just  before  their  termi 
nation,  but  for  which  I  have  always  thought  that  McClellan's 
army  would  have  been  further  driven,  even  "  to  the  wall," 
and  made  to  surrender — a  trifling  matter  in  itself  apparent 
ly,  and  yet  worthy  of  thoughtful  consideration.  General 
McClellan  had  retreated  to  Harrison's  Landing;  his  army, 
supply  and  baggage  trains  were  scattered  in  much  confusion 
in  and  about  Westover  plantation  ;  our  army  was  moving 
down  upon  him,  its  progress  much  retarded  by  natural  and 
artificial  obstacles  ;  General  Stuart  was  in  advance,  in  com 
mand  of  the  cavalry.  In  rear  of  and  around  Westover  there 
is  a  range  of  hills  or  elevated  ground,  completely  command 
ing  the  plains  below.  Stuart,  glorious  Stuart !  always  at 
the  front  and  full  of  fight,  gained  these  hills.  Below  him, 
as  a  panorama,  appeared  the  camps  and  trains  of  the  enemy, 
within  easy  range  of  his  artillery.  The  temptation  was  too 
strong  to  be  resisted :  he  commanded  some  of  his  guns  to 
open  fire.  The  consternation  caused  thereby  was  immediate 
and  positive.  It  frightened  the  enemy,  but  it  enlightened 
him. 

Those  heights  in  our  possession,  the  enemy's  position  was 
altogether  untenable,  and  he  was  at  our  mercy ;  unless  they 
could  be  recaptured  his  capitulation  was  inevitable.  Half  a 
dozen  shells  from  Stuart's  battery  quickly  demonstrated  this. 
The  enemy,  not  slow  in  comprehending  his  danger,  soon  ad 
vanced  his  infantry  in  force,  to  dislodge  our  cavalry  and  re 
possess  the  heights.  This  was  accomplished  :  the  hills  were 
fortified,  and  became  the  Federal  line  of  defense,  protected 
at  either  flank  by  a  bold  creek  which  emptied  into  James 
River,  and  by  the  heavy  batteries  of  the  fleet  anchored  oppo 
site.1  Had  the  infantry  been  up,  General  Lee  would  have 

1  "  The  retreat  of  the  army  from  Malvern  Hill  to  Harrison's  Bar  was  very 
precipitate.  The  troops  upon  their  arrival  there  were  huddled  together  in  great 


42  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

made  sure  of  this  naturally  strong  line,  fortified  it  well, 
maintained  it  against  assault,  and  dictated  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan  terms  of  surrender ;  and  had  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  not  been  so  precipitately  directed  to  his  danger  by  the 
shots  from  the  little  howitzers,  it  is  reasonable  to  presume 
that  the  infantry  would  have  been  up  in  time  to  secure 
the  plateau.  The  following  extract  from  General  Stuart's 
manuscript,  "  Reports  and  Notes  on  the  War,"  1  gives  more 
in  detail  the  circumstances  just  related  : 

HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY,  July  14,  1862. 

....  I  therefore  sent  down  that  night  a  howitzer  toward 
Westover,  under  Captain  Pelham,  supported  by  living's  squad 
ron,  First  Virginia  Cavalry,  with  orders  to  reach  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  river-road  below,  so  as  to  shell  it  if  the  enemy 
attempted  to  retreat  that  night.  A  squadron  was  left  (Georgia 
Legion)  near  Shirley,  and  the  main  body  bivouacked  contiguous 
to  oat-fields — of  necessity  our  sole  dependence  for  forage  since 
leaving  the  White  House ;  but  the  regiments  were  warned  that 
the  pursuit  might  be  resumed  at  any  moment  during  the  night 

confusion,  the  entire  army  being  collected  within  a  space  of  about  three  miles 
along  the  river.  No  orders  were  given  the  first  day  for  occupying  the  height 
which  commanded  the  position,  nor  were  the  troops  so  placed  as  to  be  able  to 
resist  an  attack  in  force  by  the  enemy  ;  and  nothing  but  a  heavy  rain,  thereby 
preventing  the  enemy  from  bringing  up  their  artillery,  saved  the  army  there 
from  destruction.  The  enemy  did  succeed  in  bringing  up  some  of  their  artillery, 
and  threw  some  shells  into  the  camp,  before  any  preparations  for  defense  had 
been  made.  On  the  3d  of  July  the  heights  were  taken  possession  of  by  our 
troops,  and  works  of  defense  commenced,  and  then,  and  not  until  then,  was  our 
army  secure  in  that  position." — Extract  from  the  "Report  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  "  (U.  S.  Congress),  Part  I.,  p.  27. 

General  Casey  testified  as  follows :  "  The  enemy  had  come  down  with  some 
artillery  upon  our  army  massed  together  on  the  river,  the  heights  commanding 
the  position  not  being  in  our  possession.  Had  the  enemy  come  down  and  taken 
possession  of  those  heights  with  a  force  of  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  men,  they 
would,  in  my  opinion,  have  taken  the  whole  of  our  army,  except  that  small 
portion  of  it  that  might  have  got  off  on  the  transports.  I  felt  very  much  alarmed 
for  the  army  until  we  had  got  possession  of  those  heights,  and  fortified  them. 
After  that  it  was  a  strong  position." — Ibid.,  p.  446. 

1  On  file  in  the  archives  of  the  Southern  Historical  Society,  Richmond,  Ya. 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  43 

should  Captain  Pelham's  reconnaissance  apprise  us  of  a  continu 
ance  of  the  retreat. 

During  the  night  Captain  Pelham  wrote  to  me  that  the 
enemy  had  taken  position  between  Shirley  and  Westover,  nearer 
the  latter,  and  described  the  locality,  the  nature  of  Herring 
Creek  on  the  enemy's  right,  and  indicated  the  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  taking  possession  with  artillery  of  Evelington  Heights 
—  a  plateau  commanding  completely  the  enemy's  encamp 
ment.  I  forwarded  this  report  at  once  to  the  commanding 
general  through  General  Jackson,  and  proceeded  to  the  ground 
with  my  command,  except  one  regiment — the  Ninth  Virginia 
Cavalry,  Colonel  W.  H.  F.  Lee — which  was  ordered  down  the 
road  by  Nance's  shop,  and  thence  across  toward  Charles  City 
Court-House,  so  as  to  extend  my  left,  and  keep  a  lookout 
toward  Forge  Bridge,  by  which  route  I  was  liable  to  be  at 
tacked  in  flank  and  rear  by  Stoneman,  should  he  endeavor  a 
junction  by  land  with  McClellan. 

I  found  Evelington  Heights  easily  gained.  A  squadron  in 
possession  vacated  without  much  hesitation,  retreating  up  the 
road,  the  only  route  by  which  it  could  reach  Westover,  owing 
to  the  impassability  of  Herring  Creek  below  Roland's  mill. 
Colonel  Martin  was  sent  around  farther  to  the  left,  and  the 
howitzer  brought  into  action  in  the  river-road,  to  fire  upon  the 
enemy's  camp.  Judging  from  the  great  commotion  and  ex 
citement  caused  below,  it  must  have  had  considerable  effect. 
We  soon  had  prisoners  from  various  corps  and  divisions,  and 
from  their  statements,  as  well  as  those  of  citizens,  I  learned  that 
the  enemy's  main  body  was  there,  but  much  reduced  and  demor 
alized.  I  kept  the  commanding  general  apprised  of  my  move 
ments,  and  I  soon  learned  from  him  that  Longstreet  and  Jack 
son  were  en  route  to  my  support.  I  held  the  ground  from  about 
9  A.  M.  until  2  P.  M.,  when  the  enemy  had  contrived  to  get  one 
battery  into  position  on  this  side  the  creek.  The  fire  was,  how 
ever,  kept  up  until  a  body  of  infantry  was  found  approaching 
by  our  right  flank.  I  had  no  apprehension,  however,  as  I  felt 
sure  Longstreet  was  near  by ;  and,  although  Pelham  reported 
but  two  rounds  of  ammunition  left,  I  held  out,  knowing  how  im 
portant  it  was  to  hold  the  ground  until  Longstreet  arrived. 


44          TOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

The  enemy's  infantry  advanced,  and  the  battery  kept  up  its 
fire.  I  just  then  learned  that  Longstreet  had  taken  the  wrong 
road,  and  was  at  Nance's  shop,  six  or  seven  miles  off.  Pelham 
fired  his  last  round,  and  the  sharp-shooters,  strongly  posted  in 
the  skirt  of  woods  bordering  the  plateau,  exhausted  every  car 
tridge,  and  had  at  last  to  retire ;  not,  however,  without  teaching 
many  a  foeman  the  bitter  lesson  of  death. 

My  command  had  been  so  cut  off  from  sources  of  supply,  and 
so  constantly  engaged  with  the  enemy,  that  the  abundant  supply 
it  began  with  on  the  26th  of  June  was  entirely  exhausted.  I  kept 
pickets  at  Bradley's  store  that  night,  and  remained  with  my 
command  on  the  west  side  of  the  creek  near  Phillip's  farm. 
General  Longstreet  came  up  late  in  the  evening ;  he  had  been 
led  by  his  guide  out  of  his  proper  route.  The  next  day,  July 
4th,  General  Jackson's  command  drove  in  the  enemy's  advance- 
pickets. 

I  pointed  out  the  position  of  the  enemy,  now  occupying, 
apparently  in  force,  the  plateau  from  which  I  shelled  their  camp 
the  day  before,  and  showed  him  the  route  by  which  the  plateau 
could  be  reached  to  the  left,  and  submitted  my  plan  for  dispos 
sessing  the  enemy  and  attacking  his  camp.  This  was  subse 
quently  laid  before  the  commanding  general. 

The  enemy's  position  had  been  well  reconnoitred  by  Black- 
ford,  of  the  engineers,  the  day  before,  from  a  close  view,  and 
further  on  this  day,  July  4th,  demonstrating  that  his  position 
was  strong,  difficult  to  reach,  except  with  rifled  cannon,  and 
completely  flanked  by  gunboats — all  which  were  powerful  ar 
guments,  and  no  doubt  had  their  due  weight  with  the  command 
ing  general  against  renewing  an  attack,  thus  far  of  unbroken 
success,  against  a  stronghold  where  the  enemy  had  been  reen- 
forced  beyond  a  doubt.  .  .  , 

It  is  most  disingenuous  to  speak  of  the  retreat  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan's  army  as  a  "change  of  base"  which  that 
commander  had  purposed  to  make  for  some  time  previous 
to  General  Lee's  attack.  This  has  been  claimed  by  certain 
writers,  but  his  repeated  dispatches  to  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  the  last  bearing  date  the  25th  of  June,  in  which 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  45 

lie  signifies  his  intention  to  attack  General  Lee,  completely 
refute  the  idea  that  his  movements  after  General  Lee's  as 
saults  were  the  carrying  out  of  a  preconceived  determination 
to  change  his  base  of  operations  to  the  James  River.  His 
army  was  well  in  hand,  and  greatly  outnumbered  that  of  his 
antagonist;  he  had  proposed  to  assume  the  offensive  and 
bring  on  a  "  general  engagement "  on  the  very  day  that  he 
was  assailed ; 1  after  the  first  attack  at  Mechanicsville,  when 
the  purpose  of  General  Lee  was  fully  disclosed,  he  received 
the  assaults  of  the  latter  on  ground  of  his  own  selection ;  his 
men  were  protected  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  by  hastily- 
constructed  but  effective  works — especially  was  this  the  case 
at  Games' s  Mill,  where  Hood's  command  charged  upon  and 
captured  one  of  the  strongest  positions  ever  assailed  by  either 
side  during  the  entire  war — and  he  destroyed  large  quanti 
ties  of  stores  in  his  hurried  movements  to  his  "  new  base." 
In  all  this  there  is  incontestable  proof  that  he  was  fairly 
beaten  and  compelled  to  retreat.  In  this  connection  I  sub 
mit  the  following  extracts  from  the  dispatches  sent  by  Gen 
eral  McClellan  at  that  period  to  the  President  and  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  and  published  in  full  in  the  "  Eeport  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  L,  pages  327-340 : 

May  21, 1862. — ...  I  believe  there  is  a  great  struggle  before 
this  army,  but  I  am  neither  dismayed  nor  discouraged.  I  wish 
to  strengthen  its  force  as  much  as  I  can ;  but,  in  any  event,  I 
shall  fight  it  with  all  the  skill  and  caution  and  determination 
that  I  possess.  And  I  trust  that  the  result  may  either  obtain 
for  me  the  permanent  confidence  of  my  Government,  or  that  it 
may  close  my  career. 

June  2,  1862. — .  .  .  The  result  is,  that  our  left  is  within  four 
miles  of  Richmond.  I  only  wait  for  the  river  to  fall,  to  cross 
with  the  rest  of  the  force,  and  make  a  general  attack.  The 
morale  of  my  troops  is  now  such  that  I  can  venture  much.  I  do 
not  fear  for  odds  against  me.  .  .  . 

June  7,  1862. — .  .  .  I  shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  move 

1  General  McClellan's  report. 


46  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

forward  to  take  Richmond  the  moment  that  McCall  reaches 
here  and  the  ground  will  admit  the  passage  of  artillery.  .  .  . 

June  11,  1862. — McCall's  troops  have  commenced  arriving 
at  White  House.  .  .  .  Weather  good  to-day.  .  .  .  Give  me  a 
little  good  weather,  and  I  shall  have  progress  to  report  here. 

June  12,  1862. — .  .  .  Have  moved  headquarters  across  the 
Chickahominy.  Weather  now  good ;  roads  and  ground  rapidly 
drying. 

June  14,  1862. — Weather  now  very  favorable.  I  shall  ad 
vance  as  soon  as  the  bridges  are  completed  and  the  ground  fit 
for  artillery  to  move. 

June  18, 1862. — .  .  .  A  general  engagement  may  take  place 
any  hour.  An  advance  by  us  involves  a  battle  more  or  less 
decisive.  After  to-morrow  we  shall  fight  the  rebel  army  as 
soon  as  Providence  will  permit.  We  shall  await  only  a  favor 
able  condition  of  the  earth  and  sky,  and  the  completion  of  some 
necessary  preliminaries.  .  .  . 

June  25,  1862. — The  rebel  force  is  stated  at  two  hundred 
thousand,  including  Jackson  and  Beauregard.  I  shall  have  to 
contend  against  vastly  superior  odds,  if  these  reports  be  true ; 
but  this  army  will  do  all  in  the  power  of  men  to  hold  their  posi 
tion  and  repulse  any  attack.  I  regret  my  great  inferiority  of 
numbers,  but  feel  that  I  am  in  no  way  responsible  for  it.  .  .  . 
I  will  do  all  that  a  general  can  do  with  the  splendid  army  I 
have  the  honor  to  command,  and  if  it  is  destroyed  by  over 
whelming  numbers,  can  at  least  die  with  it  and  share  its  fate ; 
but  if  the  result  of  the  action  which  will  probably  occur  to 
morrow  or  within  a  short  time  is  a  disaster,  the  responsibility 
cannot  be  thrown  on  my  shoulders. 

June  27,  1862, 10  A.  M. — The  troops  on  the  other  side  are 
now  well  in  hand,  and  the  whole  army  so  concentrated  that  it 
can  take  advantage  of  the  first  mistake  made  by  the  enemy.  .  .  . 
White  House  yet  undisturbed.  Success  of  yesterday  complete. 

June  27,  1862,  12  M. — My  change  of  position  on  other  side 
just  in  time.  Heavy  attack  now  being  made  by  Jackson  and 
two  other  divisions.  Expect  attack  also  on  this  side. 

June  27,  1862,  3  P.  M. — We  have  been  fighting  nearly  all 
day  against  greatly  superior  numbers.  We  shall  endeavor  to 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  47 

hold  our  own,  and  if  compelled  to  fall  back,  shall  do  it  in  good 
order,  upon  James  River  if  possible.  Our  men  fight  like  veter 
ans,  and  will  do  all  that  men  can  do.  If  we  have  to  fall  back 
on  James  River,  supplies  should  be  passed  up  to  us,  under  pro 
tection  of  the  gunboats,  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

June  28,  1862,  12.20  A.  M. — I  now  know  the  full  history  of 
the  day.  On  this  side  of  the  river  (the  right  bank)  we  repulsed 
several  very  strong  attacks.  On  the  left  bank,  our  men  did  all 
that  men  could  do — all  that  soldiers  could  accomplish ;  but  they 
were  overwhelmed  by  vastly  superior  numbers,  even  after  I 
brought  my  last  reserves  into  action.  Had  I  twenty  thousand 
or  even  ten  thousand  fresh  troops  to  use  to-morrow,  I  could 
take  Richmond ;  but  I  have  not  a  man  in  reserve,  and  shall  be 
glad  to  cover  my  retreat  and  save  the  material  and  personnel  of 
the  army.  If  we  have  lost  the  day,  we  have  yet  preserved  our 
honor,  and  no  one  need  blush  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I 
have  lost  this  battle  because  my  force  was  too  small.  ...  I  still 
hope  to  retrieve  our  fortunes.  ...  I  know  that  a  few  thousand 
men  more  would  have  changed  this  battle  from  a  defeat  to  a 
victory. 

To  this  Mr.  Lincoln  replied  : 

June  28,  1862. —  .  .  .  Save  your  army  at  all  events.  .  .  . 

From  Haxall's  plantation  General  McClellan  telegraphed : 

July  1, 1862. —  .  .  .  My  men  are  completely  exhausted,  and  I 
dread  the  result  if  we  are  attacked  to-day  by  fresh  troops.  .  .  . 
I  now  pray  for  time.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Lincoln  to  General  McClellan  : 

July  1, 1862. — ...  If  you  are  not  strong  enough  to  face  the 
enemy,  you  must  find  a  place  of  security  and  wait,  rest  and 
repair.  Maintain  your  ground,  if  you  can,  but  save  the  army  at 
all  events,  even  if  you  fall  back  to  Fortress  Monroe. 

General  McClellan  to  President  Lincoln  : 

BERKELEY-HARBISON'S  BAR,  July  2, 1862,  5  p.  M. 

I  have  succeeded  in  getting  this  army  to  this  place,  on  the 
banks  of  James  River.  . 


48  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

I  have  not  yielded  an  inch  of  ground  unnecessarily,  but  have 
retired  to  prevent  the  superior  force  of  the  enemy  from  cutting 
me  off,  and  to  take  a  different  base  of  operations. 

In  the  testimony  of  General  McClellan  before  the  Com 
mittee  011  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  the  following  appears  : 

Question.  Did  you  suppose  the  enemy  to  be  your  superior 
in  strength  before  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  ? 

Answer.  My  recollection  is  that  I  did. 

Q.  And  did  you  suppose  at  that  time  that  you  would  be 
obliged  to  retreat  ? 

A.  It  was  a  contingency  I  thought  of.  But  my  impression 
is  that,  up  to  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill,  I  still  hoped 
that  we  should  be  able  to  hold  our  own.1 

Colonel  B.  S.  Alexander  testified  before  the  committee 
that— 

While  at  headquarters,  receiving  his  instructions  (to  proceed 
to  James  River  with  an  escort  to  communicate  with  the  gun 
boats,  and  order  supplies  to  be  brought  up  the  river),  he  was 
shown  a  printed  order,  not  then  issued,  directing  the  destruction 
of  the  baggage  of  officers  and  men,  and  the  tents,  camp-equipage, 
and  things  of  that  kind ;  appealing  to  the  army  to  submit  to 
this  privation,  as  it  would  be  only  temporary — "  only  for  a  few 
days."  He  remonstrated  with  General  McClellan  against  issu 
ing  such  an  order ;  that  it  would  have  a  bad  effect,  would  de 
moralize  the  army,  as  it  would  be  telling  them,  more  plainly 
than  they  could  be  told  in  any  other  way,  that  they  were  de 
feated,  and  running  for  their  lives.  The  order  was  not  issued, 
and  General  McClellan  testifies  that  he  has  no  recollection  of 
any  such  order.2 

From  these  extracts,  I  think  it  will  be  clear  to  the  can 
did  reader  that  the  retreat  to  James  River  was  a  compulsory 
one,  and  due  to  a  defeat  then  acknowledged  by  General 
McClellan  himself. 

The  fighting,  however,  was  not  invariably  attended  with 

1  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  I,  p.  25.     2  Ibid.,  Part  I.,  p.  434. 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  49 

success  to  the  Confederates ;  notably,  the  defense  of  Malvern 
Hill  by  the  Federals  was  in  favor  of  the  latter,  which  result 
was  as  much  due  to  the  mismanagement  of  the  Confederate 
troops  as  to  the  naturally  strong  position  occupied  by  the 
Federals  and  their  gallantry  in  its  defense. 

Considerable  delay  was  occasioned  in  the  pursuit,  from  the 
fact  that  the  ground  was  unknown  to  the  Confederate  com 
manders.  On  this  occasion  General  Magruder  took  the 
wrong  route,  and  had  to  be  recalled,  thereby  losing  much 
precious  time  ;  and,  when  after  serious  and  provoking  de 
lay  the  lines  were  formed  for  attack,  there  was  some  misun 
derstanding  of  the  orders  of  the  commanding  general,  and, 
instead  of  a  spirited,  united  advance  by  the  entire  line,  as 
contemplated,  the  divisions  were  moved  forward  at  different 
times,  each  attacking  independently,  and  each  in  turn  re 
pulsed.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
ground,  artillery  could  not  be  advantageously  placed  to  aid 
the  assaulting  columns ;  whereas  the  Federal  batteries,  strong 
ly  posted  and  most  handsomely  served,  contributed  in  a  very 
great  degree  to  the  successful  stand  made  by  McClellan's  re 
treating  army  at  Malvern  Hill. 

EFFECTIVE   STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES  IN  THE   SEVEN 
DAYS'  BATTLES. 

A  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  troops  under  General 
Johnston,  now  on  file  in  the  Archive-Office  of  the  War  De 
partment,  shows  that  on  the  21st  of  May,  1862,  he  had  pres 
ent  for  duty : 

Smith's  division :  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Whiting,  Hood,  Hamp 
ton,  Hatton,  and  Pettigrew 10,592 

Longstreet's  division :  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill,  Pickett, 

R.  H.  Anderson,  Wilcox,  Colston,  and  Pryor 13,816 

Magruder's  division :  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  McLaws,  Kershaw, 

Griffith,  Cobb,  Toombs,  and  D.  R.  Jones 15,680 

D.  H.  Hill's  division :  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Early,  Rodes,  Raines, 

Featherston,  and  "  the  commands  "  of  Colonels  Ward  and  Crump. .  11,151 

Cavalry  brigade 1,289 

Reserve  artillery , 1,160 


50          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

In  addition  to  the  troops  above  enumerated,  there  were 
two  brigades  subject  to  the  orders  of  General  Johnston,  then 
stationed  in  the  vicinity  of  Hanover  Junction :  one  under 
the  command  of  General  J.  E.  Anderson,  and  the  other  un 
der  the  command  of  General  Branch  ;  they  were  subsequently 
incorporated  into  the  division  of  General  A.  P..  Hill,  and 
participated  in  the  battles  around  Eichmond.  I  have  no 
official  data  to  determine  the  strength  of  these  two  brigades ; 
that  under  General  Branch  was  attacked  by  Porter's  corps 
of  McClellan's  army,  on  the  27th  of  May,  and  suffered  se 
verely.  General  McClellan  claims  to  have  captured  seven 
hundred  and  thirty  prisoners  and  to  have  killed  two  hun 
dred  of  Branch's  command  in  that  engagement.  General 
Anderson  informs  me  that  the  strength  of  his  brigade  in  the 
seven  days'  battles  was  between  two  thousand  and  twenty- 
three  hundred  effective,  and  agrees  with  me  in  estimating 
the  strength  of  the  two  brigades  at  that  time  at  four  thousand 
effective. 

Subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  return  of  the  army  around 
Eichmond  heretofore  given,  but  previous  to  the  battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  General  Johnston  was  reenf orced  by  General 
Huger's  division,  consisting  of  three  brigades,  under  Generals 
Mahone,  Armistead,  and  Wright.  In  the  bound  volume  of 
the  "  Eeports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia "  (vol.  i.,  pp.  371-385),  I  find  that  Mahone's 
strength  at  the  commencement  of  the  battles  around  Eich 
mond  was  eighteen  hundred ;  "Wright's,  two  thousand ;  Ar- 
mistead's,  twelve  hundred  and  eight,  present  for  duty.  Total 
of  Huger's  division,  five  thousand  and  eight  effective. 

If  the  strength  of  the  five  brigades  just  enumerated  be 
added  to  the  return  of  the  21st  of  May,  we  shall  have  sixty- 
two  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety-six  as  the  effective 
strength  of  the  army  under  General  Johnston  on  the  31st 
of  May,  1862.1 

1  As  my  purpose  is  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  General  Lee's  army  in  the 
battles  around  Richmond,  I  put  Huger's  strength  at  that  time  in  this  estimate. 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  51 

Deduct  the  losses  sustained  in  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines, 
as  shown  by  the  official  reports  of  casualties,  say  six  thousand 
and  eighty-four,1  and  we  have  fifty-six  thousand  six  hundred 
and  twelve  as  the  effective  strength  of  the  army  when  Gen 
eral  Lee  assumed  the  command. 

Previous  to  the  seven  days'  battles  the  following  re- 
enforcements  reached  General  Lee : 

Hipley^s  brigade,  officially  reported  as  twenty-three  hun 
dred  and  sixty-six  strong.2 

Holmes*s  command,  embracing  the  brigades  of  Ransom, 
Walker,  Daniel,  and  Wise,  and  a  small  force  of  artillery  and 
cavalry.  In  his  official  report,  General  Ransom  puts  five  of  his 
six  regiments  at  three  thousand  effective.3  Allowing  the  aver 
age  strength  of  the  reported  five  for  the  excluded  sixth,  viz., 
six  hundred,  and  it  would  give  thirty-six  hundred  as  his  total 
effective  strength.  In  General  Holmes's  report 4  he  states  the 
strength  of  Walker's  brigade  as  thirty-six  hundred  ;  that  of 
Daniel's,  as  fifteen  hundred  and  seventy ;  that  of  Wise,  as  seven 
hundred  and  fifty-two.  Besides  the  infantry,  there  were  six  bat 
teries  of  artillery  (four  hundred  and  forty-three  effective),  and 
a  battalion  of  cavalry  (one  hundred  and  thirty  strong).  The 
total  effective  of  Holmes's  command,  including  Ransom's  bri 
gade,  was,  therefore,  ten  thousand  and  ninety-five — say  ten  thou 
sand  men. 

Lawtorfs  brigade,  the  last  reinforcement  received,  was 
thirty-five  hundred  strong,  as  by  the  official  report  of  its  com 
mander.6 

The  result  would  be  the  same,  though  the  method  would  be  different,  if  I  took 
the  strength  of  the  three  brigades  on  the  21st  of  May  and  deducted  their  losses 
previous  to  the  battles  around  Richmond ;  as  I  have  not  this  information,  I 
adopt  the  other  method. 

1  Longstreet's  loss  was  four  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-one,  including 
that  sustained  by  D.  H.  Hill's  division. — "  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers," 
vol.  i.,  p.  415. 

G.  W.  Smith's  loss  was  twelve  hundred  and  thirty-three. — General  John 
ston's  "  Narrative,"  p.  140. 

2  "  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  under  Gen 
eral  Lee ;  published  by  Authority  of  the  Comfederate  Congress,"  vol.  i.,  p.  234. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  368.  4  Ibid.,  p.  151.  5  Ibid.,  p.  270. 


52  FOUR  YEARS   WITH  GENERAL   LEE. 

The  commands  just  enumerated  include  all  the  reen- 
forcements  received  by  General  Lee,  except  the  command  of 
General  Jackson,  brought  from  the  Valley.  This  consisted 
of  two  divisions,  viz. :  Jackson's  old  division,  embracing 
three  brigades,  commanded  respectively  by  General  "Win 
der  and  Colonels  Cunningham  and  Fulkerson  ;  and  Swell's 
division,  embracing  the  brigades  of  Elzey,  Trimble,  and  Sey 
mour.  These  two  divisions  were  very  much  reduced  by 
reason  of  the  active  campaign  in  the  Valley.  Of  Jackson's 
old  division,  we  have  the  effective  strength  of  one  of  its  three 
brigades,  before  it  marched  to  join  General  Lee,  viz.,  that 
under  "Winder,  which  was  officially  reported  eleven  hundred 
and  thirty-five  strong.1  Taking  this  as  an  average,  the  divis 
ion  had  an  effective  strength  of  thirty-four  hundred  and  five. 
Of  Swell's  division,  one  brigade — and  that  the  largest — viz., 
Elzey's,  numbered  twelve  hundred  and  ninety-three,3  when 
Jackson's  command  joined  General  Lee.  Taking  that  as  an 
average,  the  division  numbered  thirty-eight  hundred  and 
seventy-nine  effective.  Add  one  thousand  men  for  the  regi 
ment  of  cavalry,  and  the  artillery  which  accompanied  Gen 
eral  Jackson,  and  we  have  eight  thousand  two  hundred  and 
eighty-four  as  the  total  effective  of  his  command. 

For  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy,  two  brigades 
under  "Whiting — viz.,  his  own  and  Hood's — were  sent  to  the 
Valley  to  join  General  Jackson  just  before  he  moved  to  re- 
enforce  General  Lee.  For  the  same  reason,  General  Law- 
ton's  brigade,  on  reaching  Virginia  when  on  the  way  to  join 
General  Lee,  was  in  like  manner  diverted.  Having  already 
counted  these  brigades,  I  do  not  estimate  them  in  giving  the 
strength  of  General  Jackson's  command. 

We  have  now  seen  that  when  General  Lee  assumed  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  its  strength 
was  fifty-six  thousand  six  hundred  and  twelve  ;  and  that  he 
was  subsequently  reenforced  by  Eipley's  brigade,  numbering 

1  "  Report  of  Operations  around  Richmond,"  p.  70. 

8  Ibid.,  "  Early's  Report,"  p.  303  ;  and  Elzey's  "  Brigade  Casualties,"  p.  142. 


BATTLES   AROUND   RICHMOND.  53 

twenty-three  hundred  and  sixty-six  men ;  Holmes's  com 
mand,  ten  thousand  strong ;  Lawton's  brigade,  thirty-five 
hundred ;  and  Jackson's  two  divisions,  eight  thousand  two 
hundred  and  eighty-four :  making  the  total  of  reenforce- 
ments  received  twenty-four  thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty ; 
which  would  make  eighty  thousand  seven  hundred  and  sixty- 
two  as  the  effective  strength  of  the  army  under  General  Lee, 
in  the  seven  days'  battles  around  Richmond.1 

When  General  Lee  assumed  command  of  the  army  it  was 
organized  into  divisions  and  brigades,  as  follows : 

Long  streets  division — six  brigades,  viz. :  Pickett's,  R.  H. 
Anderson's,  Wilcox's,  Kemper's,  Pryor's,  and  Featherston's. 

A.  P.  HiWs  division — six  brigades,  viz. :  J.  R.  Anderson's, 
Gregg's,  Field's,  Fender's,  Branch's,  and  Archer's. 

D.  II.  HilVs  division — four  brigades,  viz. :  Rodes's,  G.  B. 
Anderson's,  Garland's,  and  Colquitt's. 

Magruder>s  command — six  brigades,  viz. :  Semmes's,  Ker- 
shaw's,  Griffith's,  Cobb's,  Toombs's,  and  D.  R.  Jones's.  These 
were  organized  into  three  divisions  of  two  brigades  each,  under 
Generals  Magruder,  McLaws,  and  D.  R.  Jones. 

Huger^s  division — three  brigades,  viz. :  Mahone's,  Armis- 
tead's,  and  Wright's. 

Whiting^s  division — two  brigades,  viz. :  his  own,  under 
Colonel  Law,  and  Hood's. 

In  all,  there  were  twenty-seven  brigades. 
The  army  under  General  Lee  in  the  battles  around  Rich 
mond  embraced  the  following  commands : 

Longstreetfs  division — six  brigades,  viz. :  Pickett's,  Ander 
son's,  Wilcox's,  Kemper's,  Pryor's,  and  Featherston's. 

A.  P.  Hill's  division  —  six  brigades,  viz. :  Anderson's, 
Gregg's,  Field's,  Fender's,  Branch's,  and  Archer's. 

D.  H.  HiWs  division — five  brigades,  viz. :  Rodes's,  Gar 
land's,  Anderson's,  Colquitt's,  and  Ripley's. 

1  General  Early,  in  a  very  exhaustive  article  on  this  subject,  published  in  the 
"Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,"  vol.  i.,  p.  407,  puts  General  Lee's 
strength  "  under  eighty  thousand  effective." 


54  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL   LEE. 

Magruder's  command — six   brigades,  viz. :  Semmes's,  Ker- 
shaw's,  Griffith's,  Cobb's,  Toombs's,  and  D.  R.  Jones's. 

Huger's  division — three  brigades,  viz. :    Mahone's,  Armis- 
tead's,  and  Wright's. 

Whiting's    division  —  two    brigades,   viz.  :    his   own   and 
Hood's. 

Jackson's  division — three  brigades,  viz. :    Winder's,    Cun 
ningham's,  and  Fulkerson's. 

EweWs  division — three  brigades,  viz. :  Elzey's,  Trimble's, 
and  Seymour's.    *  •>•> 

Holmfisls  'Command — four    brigades,  viz. :    Walker's,    Ran 
som's,  Daniel's,  amV^ise's. 

,-  3£$icton>s  Mgtide — unattached,    under   General    Jackson's 
commands  - -v' 


brigades. 

Lee  had  received,  then,  but  twelve  brigades  ad 
ditional' after  he  assumed  command  of  the  army.  These,  as 
has  already  been  shown,  were  Ripley's,  Walker's,  Bansom's, 
Daniel's,  Wise's,  Lawton's,  and  the  six  brought  by  General 
Jackson  from  the  Valley. 

By  reference  to  the  official  reports  of  the  division  com 
manders  of  the  operations  of  their  respective  commands  in 
the  battles  around  Richmond,  I  find  the  following  concern 
ing  the  number  of  troops  employed  in  those  operations : 

General  Holmes  puts  his  command,  exclusive  of  Ransom's 
brigade,  at  six  thousand  infantry  and  six  batteries  of  artillery 
numbering  four  hundred  and  forty-three  men;1  General  Ran 
som's  brigade,  as  already  shown,  numbered  thirty-six  hun 
dred  ; 2  thus  Holmes's  entire  command  amounted  to  ten  thou 
sand  men.  General  Magruder  reports  his  strength  as  thir 
teen  thousand.3  General  Huger's — excluding  Ransom's  brigade, 
temporarily  attached  and  already  estimated — as  shown  by  the 
reports  of  his  brigade  commanders,  was  five  thousand.4  Gen- 

1  "  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  vol.  i., 
p.  151. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  368.  8  Ibid.,  p.  190.  4  Ibid.,  pp.  371-385. 


BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND.  55 

eral  A.  P.  Hill  gives  his  strength  as  fourteen  thousand.1  Gen 
eral  D.  H.  Hill  puts  his  at  ten  thousand.2  General  Lawton 
gives  the  strength  of  his  brigade  as  thirty-five  hundred.3 
General  Longstreet  does  not  state  the  strength  of  his  divis 
ion,  but  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  his  chief  of  artillery,  quot 
ing  from  the  official  records  of  Longstreet's  command,  puts 
the  strength  of  the  division  in  the  seven  days'  battles  at  nine 
thousand  and  fifty-one.4  General  Whiting  does  not  give  his 
strength,  but  the  two  brigades  on  the  21st  of  May,  1862,  num 
bered  four  thousand  three  hundred  and  twen^fc5  they  lost  pretty 
heavily  at  Seven  Pines  or  Fair  Oaks, 
1862,  numbered  but  thirty-eight  hun! 
fair  to  estimate  them,  therefore,  on  tjie 
four  thousand.  General  Jackson  do< 
his  two  divisions,  but  I  have  already  ac 
to  prove  that  his  command,  excluding  Whiting 
not  exceed  eight  thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty  dftfr  Alfow- 
ing  four  thousand  for  the  cavalry  and  the  reserve  artillery — 
nearly  double  what  it  was  a  month  previous — and  there  results 
a  total  of  all  arms  of  eighty  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty- 
five.  This  confirms  the  estimate  obtained  by  my  first  method. 

It  appears  from  the  official  returns  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  (as  given  by  Mr.  Swinton,  in  his  history  of  that 
army),  that,  on  the  20th  of  June,  1862,  General  McClellan 
had  present  for  duty  one  hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  one 
hundred  and  two.7  Mr.  Swinton  also  states  that  General 
McClellan  reached  the  James  Eiver  with  "  between  eighty- 
five  and  ninety  thousand  men,"  and  that  the  Federal  loss,  in 
the  seven  days'  battles,  was  fifteen  thousand  two  hundred 
and  forty-nine ;  this  would  make  the  army  one  hundred  and 
five  thousand  strong  at  the  commencement  of  the  battles. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  173.  2  Ibid.,  p.  187.  3  Ibid.,  p.  270. 

4  "  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers." 

6  "  Return  of  the  Army  under  General  Johnston,"  Archive-Office,  United 
States  War  Department,  see  chapter  xiv. 

6  "  Return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  chapter  xiv! 

7  For  copy  of  "  Return  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  see  also  "  Report  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  I.,  p.  337. 


56  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

I  presume  that  the  difference  of  ten  thousand  between 
this  statement  and  the  official  returns  is  explained  by  the 
fact  that  no  account  is  taken  of  General  Dix's  corps  of  nine 
thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy-seven  effective,  stationed 
at  Fort  Monroe,  but  under  General  McClellan's  command  and 
embraced  in  the  returns  of  his  army.  The  force  under  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  however,  appears  to  shrink  as  we  study  this 
question,  for  the  same  author  says  (page  151),  "  On  the  north 
side  of  the  Chickahominy  thirty  thousand  Union  troops  were 
being  assailed  by  seventy  thousand  Confederates,  and  twenty- 
five  thousand  Confederates  on  the  south  side  held  in  check 
sixty  thousand  Union  troops."  The  entire  strength  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan's  army,  according  to  this  last  statement,  would 
be  but  ninety  thousand.  This  is  evidently  an  under-estimate 
of  the  Federal  strength ;  and  while  the  Confederate  force  on 
the  south  side,  as  here  given,  is  nearly  accurate,  that  on  the 
north  side  is  excessive  by  at  least  seventeen  thousand.  There 
remained  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  of  Lee's 
army,  the  commands  of  Holmes,  Magruder,  and  Huger; 
their  effective  strength  on  the  26th  of  June  was  about  twen 
ty-eight  thousand,  as  shown  by  the  reports  of  these  officers 
of  the  operations  of  their  commands  in  the  seven  days' 
battles. 

The  difference  between  this  and  eighty-one  thousand 
would  give  fifty-three  thousand  as  the  strength  of  the  Con 
federate  force — infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry — under  Gen 
eral  Lee,  operating  in  the  flank  movement  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Chickahominy.  If  we  adopt  as  correct  the  Confed 
erate  loss  as  given  by  Mr.  Swinton,  viz.,  nineteen  thousand, 
it  would  then  appear  that  when  McClellan  reached  the  river 
with  "  eighty-five  or  ninety  thousand  men,"  J  he  was  being 
pursued  by  General  Lee  with  but  sixty-two  thousand. 

1  See  General  McClellan's  testimony,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
Part  I,  p.  437. 


CHAPTEE  VI. 

General  Lee  manoeuvres  to  effect  the  Withdrawal  of  General  McClellan's  Army. 
— Jackson  engages  Pope  at  Cedar  Kun,  or  Slaughter's  Mountain. — Removal 
of  the  Federal  Army  from  James  River. — The  Second  Battle  of  Manassas. — 
The  First  Invasion. — Operations  in  Maryland. — McClellan  in  Possession  of 
Lee's  Order  of  Battle. — Boonesboro,  or  South  Mountain. — Capture  of  Har 
per's  Ferry  by  Jackson's  Forces. — Battle  of  Sharpsburg. — General  Lee  re 
tires  to  Virginia. — Incidents  illustrating  the  Devotion  to  Duty  and  Great 
Self-Control  of  the  Confederate  Leader. 

ALTHOUGH  defeated,  the  army  under  General  McClellan 
was  still  a  formidable  force,  and  was  being  constantly 
strengthened.  Its  proximity  to  the  Confederate  capital,  and 
its  unassailable  position,  the  facility  with  which  it  could  be 
transferred  across  James  River  for  operations  on  the  south 
side,  the  capacity  of  the  North  indefinitely  to  recruit  its 
ranks,  and  of  the  Government  to  repair  and  increase  its 
equipment,  rendered  the  situation  one  of  profound  solicitude, 
and  presented  to  the  Confederate  commander  the  alternative 
of  remaining  a  passive  observer  of  his  adversary's  movements, 
or  of  devising  a  campaign  which  would  compel  the  with 
drawal  of  the  hostile  army  from  its  position  of  constant 
menace. 

"With  a  just  conception  of  the  inordinate  fear  which  pos 
sessed  the  mind  of  the  Federal  civil  authorities  for  the  safety 
of  their  capital,  he  concluded  that  seriously  to  threaten  that 
city,  either  by  strategic  manoeuvres  or  by  a  decisive  blow 
struck  at  the  army  in  its  front,  would  be  the  surest  way  of 
effecting  the  removal  of  McClellan's  army  from  its  position 
on  James  River. 


58          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

With  this  view  he  sent  General  Jackson  in  advance  with 
his  two  divisions,  followed  by  that  of  A.  P.  Hill,  to  engage 
General  Pope,  who  commanded  the  Federal  army  in  North 
ern  Virginia,  intending,  as  soon  as  his  anticipations  of  the 
effect  of  this  move  were  realized,  to  follow  promptly  with 
the  bulk  of  his  army. 

In  vindication  of  his  sagacity,  information  was  soon  re 
ceived  of  the  transfer  of  troops  from  McClellan's  army  on 
James  River  to  Washington. 

Leaving  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  a  brigade  of  cav 
alry  at  Richmond,  he  now  moved  with  the  rest  of  the  army 
to  join  General  Jackson,  who  had  already  presented  a  rebel 
front  to  the  astonished  gaze  of  Major-General  John  Pope, 
unaccustomed  to  such  a  sight,  and  had  commenced  at  Cedar 
Run,  on  the  9th  of  August,  that  series  of  brilliant  manceuvres 
and  engagements  which  so  dazed  the  Federal  commander, 
and  so  startled  and  alarmed  the  authorities  at  Washington. 

These  movements  culminated  with  a  decisive  victory  for 
the  Confederates,  under  General  Lee,  over  the  army  under 
General  Pope,  on  the  plains  of  Manassas,  on  the  30th  of 
August.  In  the  series  of  engagements,  "  more  than  seven 
thousand  prisoners  were  taken,  in  addition  to  about  two 
thousand  wounded  left  in  our  hands.  Thirty  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  upward  of  twenty  thousand  stand  of  small-arms,  numer 
ous  colors,  and  a  large  amount  of  stores,  besides  those  taken 
by  General  Jackson  at  Manassas  Junction,  were  captured."  * 

Vanquished  at  Manassas,  General  Pope  next  essayed  to 
make  a  stand  in  the  fortified  lines  about  Centreville;  but 
another  detour  by  General  Jackson,  under  General  Lee's 
orders,  caused  a  further  retreat  in  the  direction  of  Wash 
ington,  and  in  the  early  days  of  September  the  Federal 
army — now  embracing  the  combined  forces  of  McClellan  and 
Pope — was  retired  within  the  line  of  fortifications  construct 
ed  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the  river,  for  the  protection  of  the 
Federal  capital. 

1  Extract  from  General  Lee's  "  Report,"  p.  24. 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  59 

Barely  three  months  had  elapsed  since  General  Lee  took 
the  field,  and,  behold  !  the  position  of  the  two  hostile  armies, 
with  relation  to  their  respective  seats  of  government,  was 
completely  reversed ;  fortunately  for  that  of  the  North,  a 
wide  and  impassable  river  lay  between  it  and  the  victorious 
army  of  the  South. 

With  the  battles  of  Cedar  Bun,  or  Slaughter's  Mountain, 
and  (second)  Manassas,  two  more  victories  were  recorded  for 
Confederate  arms,  and  another  Federal  general  was  added  to 
the  list  of  the  discomfited. 

The  career  of  General  Pope  was  as  brief  and  remarkable, 
when  contrasted  with  his  blustering  proclamations,  as  the 
movements  of  Generals  Lee  and  Jackson,  in  bringing  it  to  a 
grievous  termination,  were  audacious  and  brilliant. 

STRENGTH    OF    THE     OPPOSING    AEMIES    IN    THE    BATTLES    OF 
•   CEDAR  KUN   AND   (SECOND)   MANASSAS. 

The  field-return  of  the  u  Department  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia"  of  the  20th  of  July,  1862,  shows  a  total  "present 
for  duty"  in  that  department  of  sixty-nine  thousand  five 
hundred  and  fifty -nine.  Of  this  number  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  embraced  but  fifty-seven  thousand  three 
hundred  and  twenty-eight.  The  remaining  twelve  thou 
sand  two  hundred  and  thirty-one  were  serving  south  of 
James  River,  and  in  North  Carolina,  and  were  included  in 
the  departmental  returns,  because  that  section  of  country 
was  then  comprised  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  de 
partment  under  the  command  of  General  Lee.  This  return, 
however,  did  not  include  Jackson's  command,  consisting  of  his 
own  and  E well's  divisions,  then  near  Gordonsville.  The  move 
ments  of  these  two  divisions  doubtless  had  prevented  their 
making  the  formal  returns  usually  required.  Their  effective 
strength  could  not  have  exceeded  eight  thousand.1  Jackson  was 

1  This  estimate  allows  this  division  as  much  as  it  had  in  the  seven  days' 
battles. 


60  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

reenforced  by  A.  P.  Hill,  early  in  August,  whose  division  in 
the  field-return  of  the  20th  of  July,  mentioned  above,  showed, 
as  "  present  for  duty,"  ten  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty- 
three  ;  so  that,  with  this  reenf  orcement,  General  Jackson  had 
available  at  the  battle  of  Cedar  Run  eighteen  thousand  six 
hundred  and  twenty-three  men.  At  that  time  General  Pope 
had  available  the  three  corps  of  Banks,  McDowell,  and  Si- 
gel,  numbering  forty-three  thousand  men,  according  to  his 
statement ; l  but  only  Banks' s  corps  and  one  division  of  Mc 
Dowell's  corps  were  engaged. 

"When  General  Lee  moved  forward  to  join  General  Jack 
son  he  took  with  him  the  divisions  of  Longstreet,  D.  R. 
Jones,  Hood,  and  Anderson,  leaving  in  front  of  Richmond 
the  divisions  of  D.  H.  Hill  and  McLaws,  and  two  brigades 
under  J.  G.  Walker. 

A  portion  of  the  cavalry  under  General  Stuart  accompa 
nied  General  Lee,  leaving  a  brigade  under  General  Hamp 
ton  in  front  of  Richmond. 

The  total  present  for  duty  of  the  cavalry  arm  of  the  ser 
vice  on  the  20th  of  July  was  four  thousand  and  thirty-five ; 
probably  fifteen  hundred  remained  with  Hampton,  and 
twenty-five  hundred  accompanied  General  Lee.  The  pres 
ent  for  duty  in  the  artillery  of  the  same  date  was  thirty-two 
hundred  and  fifty-two ;  of  this  number  certainly  not  over 
twenty-five  hundred  accompanied  General  Lee. 

Besides  the  troops  embraced  in  the  return  of  the  20th  of 
July,  there  were  two  brigades  (Drayton's  and  Evans's)  re 
cently  arrived  from  South  Carolina,  which  joined  General 
Lee  previous  to  the  battle.  In  a  letter  dated  June  9,  1874, 
Major  Henry  E.  Young,  subsequently  on  the  staff  of  the 
commanding  general,  but  then  adjutant-general  of  Drayton's 
brigade,  and  also  of  the  division  composed  of  these  two  bri 
gades,  during  its  temporary  command  by  General  Drayton, 
states  that  the  strength  of  the  two  brigades  did  not  exceed 

1  General  Pope's  "  Report,"  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  II, 
Supplement,  p.  109. 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  61 

four  thousand  six  hundred  present  for  duty.1  Assuming  this 
estimate  to  be  correct,  and  taking  the  strength  of  the  other 
commands  as  given  on  the  return  of  the  20th  of  July,  we 
have  the  following  as  the  army  under  General  Lee  in  the 
series  of  engagements  that  terminated  with  the  second  battle 
of  Manassas : 

Jackson's  three  divisions,  as  heretofore  given 18,623 

Less  casualties  in  battle  of  Cedar  Run  (Jackson's  official  report) 1,314 

17,309 

Longstreet's  command — viz. :  his  own  division 8,486 

Hood's       "      3,852 

Jones's      "      3,713 

16,051 

Anderson's  division 6,117 

Drayton's  and  Evans's  brigades 4,600 

Total  infantry 44,077 

Cavalry  (as  estimated  above) 2,500 

Artillery  "  2,500 


Total  of  all  arms 49,077 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  General  Pope  had  un 
der  his  command  in  the  field  the  three  army-corps  of  Gener 
als  Sigel,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  numbering,  according  to 
the  official  returns,  forty-seven  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy-eight  effective,  as  follows :  First  Army-Corps  (Si- 
gel's),  eleven  thousand  four  hundred  and  ninety-eight  infan 
try  and  artillery;  Second  Army-Corps  (Banks's),  fourteen 
thousand  five  hundred  and  sixty-seven  infantry  and  artillery ; 
Third  Army-Corps  (McDowell's),  eighteen  thousand  five 
hundred  and  seventy-five  infantry  and  artillery ;  cavalry, 
eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-eight ;  total,  fifty- 
three  thousand  three  hundred  and  seventy-eight,  from  which 
deduct  detached  commands  and  cavalry  unfit  for  service  six 

1  General  Sorrel,  the  adjutant-general  of  Longstreet's  command,  puts  the 
strength  of  these  brigades  at  four  thousand  five  hundred  when  they  marched 
from  Gordonsville  in  1862,  just  previous  to  the  battle  of  Manassas.  They  were 
at  that  time  made  a  part  of  General  Longstreet's  command. 


62  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

thousand  five  hundred,  and  there  remains  forty-seven  thou 
sand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-eight  effective.1 

Only  Banks's  corps,  and  Kickett's  division  of  McDowell's 
corps,  were  engaged  at  the  battle  of  Cedar  Kun,  or  Slaughters 
Mountain.  General  Pope  estimates  his  loss  in  that  engage 
ment,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  at  eighteen  hundred.' 

General  Pope  then  received  the  following  reinforcements : 
on  the  14th  of  August,  Reno's  corps  of  Burnside's  army ; 
on  the  23d  of  August,  Reynolds's  division  of  Pennsylvania 
Reserves ;  and  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  August,  the  corps  of 
Heintzelman  and  Porter,  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

In  his  report,  General  Pope  puts  these  reenf  orcements  at 
twenty-eight  thousand  five  hundred,  as  follows :  Reno's  corps, 
eight  thousand ;  Reynolds's  division,  twenty-five  hundred ; 
Heintzelman's  and  Porter's  corps,  eighteen  thousand.8  This 
would  make  his  aggregate  effective  strength,  previous  to  the 
second  battle  of  Manassas,  seventy-six  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  seventy-eight ;  and,  deducting  the  losses  at  Cedar 
Run,  eighteen  hundred,  we  have  seventy-four  thousand  five 
hundred  and  seventy-eight  as  his  total  available  force  in  the 
series  of  engagements  which  terminated  with  his  defeat  near 
Groveton — (second)  Manassas — on  the  30th  of  August. 

In  this  enumeration  no  mention  is  made  of  Sturgis,  Cox, 
or  Franklin.  A  portion  of  Cox's  division  was  engaged  at 
Manassas  Junction,  on  the  27th  of  August;  and  Taylor's 
brigade  of  Franklin's  division  was  defeated  by  the  Confeder 
ates  later  on  the  same  day,  at  the  same  place. 

1  Official  return  of  the  Army  of  Yirginia  of  July  31,  1862  ;  General  Pope's 
"Report,"  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  II.,  Supplement,  p.  118. 
It  is  proper  to  state  that  General  Pope  disputes  the  correctness  of  the  return 
of  Banks's  corps.     In  regard  to  this  he  says  (p.  117):  "Although  I  several 
times  called  General  Bank's  attention  to  the  discrepancy  between  this  return 
and  the  force  he  afterward  stated  to  me  he  had  led  to  the  front,  that  discrep 
ancy  has  never  been  explained,  and  I  do  not  yet  understand  how  General 
Banks  could  have  been  so  greatly  mistaken  as  to  the  force  under  his  immedi 
ate  command." 

2  Pope's  "  Report,"  p.  122.  3  Ibid.,  pp.  122,  172. 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  63 

Although  I  have  adopted  General  Pope's  figures  (with 
the  exception  of  Banks' s  strength  already  referred  to,  where 
I  followed  the  official  return  of  General  Banks),  I  cannot 
reconcile  his  statement  of  the  reinforcements  received  with 
the  other  official  data  before  me.  He  estimates  the  troops 
received  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  previous  to  the 
battle,  viz.,  Heintzelman's  corps,  Porter's  corps,  and  Rey 
nolds' s  division,  at  twenty  thousand  five  hundred ;  he  also 
puts  the  combined  strength  of  Sumner's  and  Franklin's 
corps,  which  joined  him  after  the  battle,  at  nineteen  thou 
sand. 

He  thus  makes  it  appear  that  all  of  McClellan's  army, 
except  Keyes's  corps  and  Dix's  corps,  numbered  but  thirty- 
nine  thousand  five  hundred  men,  although  he  speaks  of  that 
army  as  the  "  ninety-one  thousand  veteran  troops  from  Har 
rison's  Landing."  The  two  corps  of  Keyes  and  Dix,  and  the 
cavalry,  could  hardly  account  for  the  difference  of  fifty-one 
thousand  five  hundred. 

On  the  20th  of  July,  1862,  less  than  one  month  before  the 
removal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula, 
the  official  return  1  of  that  army  showed  present  for  duty 
one  hundred  and  one  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety-one 
men,  as  follows : 

Engineer  brigade,  cavalry  division,  provost-guard,  etc 8,735 

Second  Corps,  General  Sumner 16,952 

Third  Corps,  General  Ileintzelman 16,276 

Fourth  Corps,  General  Keyes 14,490 

Fifth  Corps,  General  Porter 21,077 

Sixth  Corps,  General  Franklin 14,014 

Seventh  Corps,  General  Dix 9,997 

United  States  Signal  Corps 150 

101,691 

General  Dix  remained  at  Fortress  Monroe.  General 
Keyes  with  his  corps  covered  the  embarkation  at  Yorktown ; 
all  the  rest  were  moved  to  reenforce  General  Pope.  General 

1  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,' 


64  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

McClellan,  having  dispatched  Ms  corps  successively  at  and 
near  Fortress  Monroe,  followed  with  his  staff  on  the  23d  of 
August,  and  arrived  at  Aquia  Creek  the  next  day. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  combined  strength  of  the  Second 
and  Sixth  Corps  (Sumner's  and  Franklin's)  was  thirty  thou 
sand  nine  hundred  'and  sixty-six  previous  to  the  removal 
from  the  Peninsula  to  the  front  of  Washington.  "When 
these  two  corps  moved  out  to  join  General  Pope,  they  num 
bered  twenty-five  thousand  infantry,1  although  he  only  puts 
them  at  nineteen  thousand.  The  combined  strength  of  the 
Third  and  Fifth  Corps  (Heintzelman's  and  Porter's),  on  the 
20th  July,  was  thirty-seven  thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty- 
three  ;  and,  assuming  that  the  proportion  of  infantry  in  these 
corps  was  the  same  as  in  the  Second  and  Sixth,  their  strength 
at  Manassas  should  have  been  near  thirty  thousand.  Por 
ter's  corps  alone  embraced  between  twenty  and  thirty  regi 
ments,  and  eight  batteries  of  artillery,3  and  two  weeks  later, 
September  12th,  numbered  twenty  thousand.3 

McCall's  division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves  numbered  on 
the  15th  of  June,  1862,  nine  thousand  five  hundred  and 
fourteen  effective ;  *  its  losses  in  the  battles  around  Rich 
mond  were  officially  reported  at  three  thousand  and  seventy- 
four,5  so  that  it  must  have  numbered  about  six  thousand  five 
hundred  when  it  left  the  Peninsula  to  join  General  Pope, 
yet  the  latter  reports  this  division  but  twenty-five  hundred 
strong  when  it  reached  him. 

Mr.  Swinton,  the  author  previously  quoted,  who  enjoyed 

1  Sec  General  McClellan's  dispatches,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
Part  I.     "  Sumner  has  about  fourteen  thousand  infantry,  without  cavalry  or  ar 
tillery,  here  "  (August  28,  1862,  p.  461). 

"  Franklin  has  only  between  ten  thousand  and  eleven  thousand  ready  for 
duty"  (August  29,  1862,  p.  462). 

2  General   McDowell's  testimony,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
Part  II.,  Supplement,  p.  175. 

3  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  I.,  p.  39. 

4  Ibid.,  Part  L,  p.  345. 

5  From  official  report  of  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  "  The 
American  Conflict,"  p.  168. 


SECOND   BATTLE   OF  MANASSAS.  65 

unusual  facilities  for  obtaining  accurate  information  in  all 
matters  pertaining  to  the  Federal  army,  states  in  his  "  Cam 
paign  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  "  that  the  force  under  Gen 
eral  Pope,  before  he  received  any  reinforcements,  was  "  near 
fifty  thousand  men."  He  also  states  (p.  179)  that  McDow 
ell's  corps,  Sigel's  corps,  and  Reynolds's  (McCall's)  division 
of  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  on  the  28th  of  August,  made  to 
gether  "  a  force  of  forty  thousand  men."  If  we  add  to  this 
Banks's  corps,  Reno's  corps,  and  the  two  corps  of  Heintzel- 
man  and  Porter,  it  would  appear  that  on  the  28th  of  August 
General  Pope  must  have  had  an  available  force  of  seventy- 
five  or  eighty  thousand  men. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  August — the  decisive  day 
— after  deducting  the  losses  incurred  in  the  engagements  of 
the  27th,  28th,  and  29th,  General  Pope  reports  his  effective 
strength  as  follows  : l  McDowell's  corps,  including  Reynolds's 
division,  twelve  thousand ;  Sigel's  corps,  seven  thousand ; 
Reno's  corps,  seven  thousand;  Heintzelman's  corps,  seven 
thousand ;  Porter's  corps,  twelve  thousand ;  Banks's  corps, 
five  thousand :  total,  fifty  thousand.  At  no  time  in  his 
operations  against  General  Pope  had  General  Lee  so  many 
men. 

In  addition  to  the  troops  enumerated  above,  the  divisions 
of  Sturgis  and  Cox,  and  the  corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin, 
were  within  an  easy  march  of  General  Pope,  but  only  joined 
him  after  his  retreat  to  Centre ville.  Sturgis' s  division  num 
bered  ten  thousand ;  Cox's  division,  seven  thousand.2  I  have 
already  given  the  strength  of  Sumner's  and  Franklin's  corps. 
From  first  to  last  there  must  have  been,  according  to  the 
official  returns,  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  thou 
sand  men  in  front  of  Washington  to  resist  General  Lee's  ad 
vance.  General  Pope  puts  his  strength  on  the  1st  of  Sep 
tember  at  Centreville,  after  the  fighting  was  over,  at  sixty- 
three  thousand  men.  His  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  were 

1  General  Pope's  "  Report,"  p.  156.  2  Ibid.,  p.  139. 

5 


66  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

very  heavy,  but  his  "  missing  "  must  have  been  enormous  to 
account  for  this  difference.1 

Immediately  after  the  victory  of  second  Manassas,  the 
Potomac  was  crossed,  and  the  army  under  General  Lee 
entered  Maryland ;  Generals  D.  H.  Hill  and  McLaws,  who 
were  left  at  Richmond,  having  been  meanwhile  directed  to 
join  the  main  army. 

At  Frederick  City,  information  reached  General  Lee  of 
the  purpose  of  President  Davis  to  follow  in  the  rear  of 
and  join  the  army.  To  prevent  a  step  so  full  of  personal 
danger  to  the  President,  for  the  scouting  and  marauding 
parties  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  active  in  our  rear,  I  was 
dispatched  to  meet  him  and  dissuade  him  from  carrying  out 
such  intention ;  and  I  did  not  rejoin  the  army  until  the  night 
previous  to  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg. 

At  this  time  General  Lee  conceived  his  plan  of  operations, 
embracing  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  a  subsequent 
concentration  of  the  army  to  join  issue  in  a  grand  battle 
with  General  McClellan,  who  had  again  vaulted  into  the 
headquarters-saddle  of  the  Federal  army,  vacated  by  Gen 
eral  Pope. 

An  order  of  battle  was  issued,  stating  in  detail  the  posi 
tion  and  duty  assigned  to  each  command  of  the  army.  Gen 
eral  Jackson  was  to  undertake  the  reduction  and  capture  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  had  assigned  to  him  for  this  purpose  his 
own  two  divisions,  and  those  of  A.  P.  Hill,  Anderson,  and 
McLaws.  Longstreet's  two  divisions,  under  Jones  and  Hood, 
and  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  remained  to  hold  in  check  the 
army  under  McClellan  pending  Jackson's  operations. 

It  was  the  custom  to  send  copies  of  such  orders,  marked 
"  confidential,"  to  the  commanders  of  separate  corps  or  di- 

1  "It  is  proper  for  me  to  state  here,  and  I  do  it  with  regret  and  reluctance, 
that  at  least  one-half  of  this  great  diminution  of  our  forces  was  occasioned  by 
skulking  and  straggling  from  the  army.  The  troops  which  were  brought  into 
action  fought  with  gallantry  and  determination,  but  thousands  of  men  straggled 
away  from  their  commands,  and  were  not  in  any  action." — General  Pope's  "  Re 
port,"  p.  164. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  67 

visions  only,  and  to  place  the  address  of  such  separate  com 
mander  in  the  bottom  left-hand  corner  of  the  sheet  contain 
ing  the  order.  General  D.  H.  Hill  was  in  command  of  a  di 
vision  which  had  not  been  attached  to  nor  incorporated  with 
either  of  the  two  wings  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  A 
copy  of  the  order  was,  therefore,  in  the  usual  course,  sent  to 
him.  After  the  evacuation  of  Frederick  City  by  our  forces, 
a  copy  of  General  Lee's  order  was  found  in  a  deserted  camp 
by  a  soldier,  and  was  soon  in  the  hands  of  General  McClel- 
lan.  This  copy  of  the  order,  it  was  stated  at  the  time,  was 
addressed  to  "  General  D.  II.  Hill,  commanding  division." 
General  Hill  has  assured  me  that  it  could  not  have  been  his 
copy,  because  he  still  has  the  original  order  received  by  him 
in  his  possession.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  explain  how 
a  copy  addressed  to  General  D.  H.  Hill  was  thus  carelessly 
handled  and  lost.1 

But  what  an  advantage  did  this  fortuitous  event  give  the 
Federal  commander,  whose  heretofore  snail-like  movements 
were  wonderfully  accelerated  when  he  was  made  aware  of 
the  fact  of  the  division  of  our  army,  and  of  the  small  por 
tion  thereof  which  confronted  him  ! 2 

The  God  of  battles  alone  knows  what  would  have  occurred 
but  for  the  singular  accident  mentioned  ;  it  is  useless  to 
speculate  on  this  point,  but  certainly  the  loss  of  this  battle- 
order  constitutes  one  of  the  pivots  on  which  turned  the 
event  of  the  war. 

Notwithstanding  this  unfortunate  circumstance,  the  stub 
born  and  heroic  defense  of  the  South  Mountain  Pass  by 

1  Colonel  Tenable,  one  of  my  associates  on  the  staff  of  General  Lee,  says  in 
regard  to  this  matter:  "This  is  very  easily  explained.     One  copy  was  sent 
directly  to  Hill  from  headquarters.     General  Jackson  sent  him  a  copy,  as  he 
regarded  Hill  hi  his  command.    It  is  Jackson's  copy,  in  his  own  handwriting, 
which  General  Hill  has.     The  other  was  undoubtedly  left  carelessly  by  some 
one  at  Hill's  quarters." 

2  "  Upon  learning  the  contents  of  this  order,  I  at  once  gave  orders  for  a  vig 
orous  pursuit." — General  McClellan's  testimony,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,"  Part  L,  p.  440. 


68  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill,  and  Jackson's  complete  success 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  including  the  gallant  resistance  made  at 
Crampton's  Gap  by  portions  of  McLaws's  and  Anderson's 
commands *  against  the  assaults  of  Franklin's  corps,  enabled 
General  Lee  to  unite  his  forces  at  Sharpsburg  in  time  to 
give  battle,  on  the  17th  of  September,  to  his  old  adversary ; 
but  under  altogether  different  circumstances  from  such  as 
were  anticipated.  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill2  in  resisting 
the  assaults  of  the  bulk  of  McClellan's  army  had  suffered 
very  heavily.  Jackson  had  been  compelled,  after  consider 
able  fighting,  to  hasten  from  Harper's  Ferry  (which  place 
was  surrendered  to  him  on  the  15th),  by  forced  marches  of 
extraordinary  character,  to  join  General  Lee,  who  had  re 
mained  with  Longstreet.  The  route  from  Harper's  Ferry 
was  strewed  with  foot-sore  and  weary  men,  too  feeble  to  keep 
up  with  the  stronger  and  more  active  ;  and,  instead  of  going 
into  battle  with  full  ranks,  the  brigades  were  but  as  regi 
ments,  and  in  some  cases  no  stronger  than  a  full  company. 

After  the  affair  at  South  Mountain,  the  commands  of 
Longstreet  and  Hill  wrere  retired  to  Sharpsburg,  and  were 
confronted  on  the  15th.  by  McClellan's  army,  along  the  line 
of  Antietam  Creek,  but  were  not  seriously  attacked  until 
the  next  day. 

1  Cobb's  and  Semmes's  brigades  of  McLaws's  division,  and  Mahone's  brigade 
of  Anderson's  division. 

2  The  resistance  made  by  General  D.  H.  Hill  at  South  Mountain  deserves 
more  than  a  passing  notice.     On  the  14th  of  September,  with  the  brigades  of 
Rodes,  Garland,  Colquitt,  Anderson,  and  Ripley,  numbering  in  the  aggregate 
less  than  five  thousand  men,  for  six  or  seven  hours  he  successfully  resisted 
the  repeated   assaults  of  two  corps  of  the  army  under  General  McClellan 
(Burnside's  and  Hooker's),  fully  thirty  thousand  strong.     About  3  p.  M.  he  was 
reenforced  by  the  brigades  of  Drayton  and  Anderson,  numbering  nineteen 
hundred  men,  and  later  in  the  day  was  joined  by  General  Longstreet,  with  the 
brigades  of  Evans,  Pickett,  Kemper,  Jenkins,  Hood,  and  Whiting ;  only  four  of 
these,  however,  numbering  about  three  thousand  men,  became  seriously  engaged, 
and  they  not  until  dusk.     Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  a  force  of  less  than  ten 
thousand  men  held  McClellan  in  check  for  an  entire  day. — "  Reports  of  the  Op 
erations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  p.  112 ;  "  Report  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,"  Part  I,  p.  640. 


THE   MARYLAND   CAMPAIGN.  69 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  16th  General  McClellan  directed 
an  attack  by  Hooker's  corps  on  the  Confederate  left — 
Hood's  two  brigades — and  during  the  whole  of  the  lYth  the 
battle  was  waged,  with  varying  intensity,  along  the  entire 
line.  When  the  issue  was  first  joined,  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  16th,  General  Lee  had  with  him  less  than  eighteen  thou 
sand  men,1  consisting  of  the  commands  of  Longstreet  and  D. 
II.  Hill,  the  two  divisions  of  Jackson,  and  two  brigades 
under  "Walker.  Couriers  were  sent  to  the  rear  to  hurry  up 
the  divisions  of  A.  P.  Hill,  Anderson,  and  McLaws,  hasten 
ing  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  these  several  commands,  as 
they  reached  the  front  at  intervals  during  the  day,  on  the 
17th,  were  immediately  deployed  and  put  to  work.  Every 
man  was  engaged.  We  had  no  reserve. 

The  fighting  was  heaviest  and  most  continuous  on  the 
Confederate  left.  It  is  established  upon  indisputable  Fed 
eral  evidence  that  the  three  corps  of  Hooker,  Mansfield,  and 
Sumner,  were  completely  shattered  in  the  repeated  but  fruit 
less  efforts  to  turn  this  flank,  and  two  of  these  corps  were 
rendered  useless  for  further  aggressive  movements.2  The 

1  The  command  of  General  Longstreet  consisted  of  the  six  brigades  under 
General  D.  R.  Jones,  viz.,  Kemper,  Pickett,  Jenkins,  George  Anderson,  Dray- 
ton,  and  Toombs,  numbering,  according  to  General  Jones's  official  report,  twenty- 
four  hundred  and  thirty  men ;  two  brigades  under  General  Hood,  numbering 
twenty-three  hundred  and  thirty-two  effective  ;    and  Evans's  brigade,  fifteen 
hundred  strong ;  making  Longstreet's  total  effective  on  the  morning  of  the  16th 
of  September  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-two.  General  D.  H.  Hill  reports 
that  he  had  but  three  thousand  infantry  in  line  of  battle.     General  Jackson's 
command,  by  the  official  report  of  the  division  commanders,  is  shown  to  have 
been  but  five  thousand  strong.     The  command  of  General  Walker  consisted  of 
his  own  brigade  and  that  of  General  R.  Ransom.     I  am  informed  by  the  latter 
that  the  brigades  numbered  about  sixteen  hundred  effective  each,  making  thirty- 
two  hundred  for  the  two.     It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  total  effective  infantry  in 
line  of  battle  on  the  16th  was  but  seventeen  thousand  four  hundred  and  sixty-two. 

2  "  General  Hooker's  corps  was  dispersed ;  there  is  no  question  about  that. 
I  sent  one  of  my  staff-officers  to  find  where  they  were,  and  General  Ricketts, 
the  only  officer  we  could  find,  said  that  he  could  not  raise  three  hundred  men  of 
his  corps. 

"  There  were  some  troops  lying  down  on  the  left,  which  I  took  to  belong  to 


70  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

aggregate  strength  of  the  attacking  columns  at  this  point 
reached  forty  thousand  men,1  not  counting  the  two  divisions 
of  Franklin's  corps,  sent  at  a  late  hour  in  the  day  to  rescue 
the  Federal  right  from  the  impending  danger  of  being  itself 
destroyed ;  while  the  Confederates,  from  first  to  last,  had 
less  than  fourteen  thousand  men  on  this  flank,  consisting  of 
Jackson's  two  divisions,  McLaws's  division,  and  the  two  small 
divisions,  of  two  brigades  each,  under  Hood  and  Walker, 
with  which  to  resist  their  fierce  and  oft-repeated  assaults. 

As  a  wall  of  adamant  the  fourteen  thousand  received  the 
shock  of  the  forty  thousand ;  and  the  latter,  staggered  by 
the  blow,  reeled  and  recoiled  in  great  disorder. 

The  disproportion  in  the  centre  and  on  our  right  was  as 
great  as,  or  even  more  decided  than,  on  our  left. 

Indeed,  the  drawn  battle  of  Sharpsburg  was  as  forcible 
an  illustration  of  Southern  valor  and  determination  as  was 
furnished  during  the  whole  period  of  the  war,  when  the 
great  disparity  in  numbers  between  the  two  armies  is  con 
sidered. 

From  such  informal  reports  as  were  received  at  the  time, 
and  from  my  own  observation  and  knowledge,  I  estimated 
the  effective  strength  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Sharps- 
burg  at  thirty-seven  thousand  men — twenty-nine  thousand 
infantry  and  eight  thousand  cavalry  and  artillery. 

But  I  am  now  satisfied,  after  reference  to  the  official  re 
ports  of  the  Maryland  campaign,  published  by  authority  of 
the  Confederate  Congress,  that  my  estimate  was  excessive. 
Fortunately,  these  reports  are  explicit,  and  enable  me  to  de 
termine,  with  almost  absolute  certainty,  the  effective  strength 
of  the  army  in  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg.  From  them  the 
following  statement  of  strength  is  derived  : 

Mansfield's  command.  In  the  mean  time  General  Mansfield  had  been  killed, 
and  a  portion  of  his  corps  (formerly  Banks's)  had  also  been  thrown  into  con 
fusion." — General  Sumner's  testimony,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
Part  I,  p.  368. 

1  General  Sumner's  testimony,  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part 
I,  p.  368. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  71 

The  command  of  General  Jackson  embraced  the  division 
under  General  J.  E.  Jones  and  that  under  General  Lawton. 
After  General  Lawton  was  wounded,  the  command  of  the 
latter  division  devolved  upon  General  Early.  General  J.  E. 
Jones  reports  the  effective  strength  of  his  division  to  have 
been  sixteen  hundred1  when  the  battle  began.  General 
Early  reports  the  effective  strength  of  his  division  as  fol 
lows  :  Lawton's  brigade,  eleven  hundred  and  fifty ;  Hays' s 
brigade,  five  hundred  and  fifty;  Walker's  brigade,  seven 
hundred ;  and  his  own  brigade,  one  thousand :  total  effec 
tive  of  the  division,  thirty-four  hundred ; a  and  the  total 
effective  of  Jackson's  command  was,  therefore,  five  thou 
sand  men. 

The  command  of  General  Longstreet,  at  that  time,  em 
braced  the  six  brigades  under  General  D.  K.  Jones,  the  two 
brigades  under  General  Hood,  and  an  unattached  brigade 
under  General  K  G.  Evans.  His  other  three  brigades  were 
temporarily  detached,  under  General  E.  H.  Anderson. 

General  Jones  reports  his  strength  to  have  been  twenty- 
four  hundred  and  thirty  effective.8  The  strength  of  Hood's 
division  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  was  thirty- 
eight  hundred  and  fifty-two ; 4  General  Hood  puts  the  losses 
of  his  division  in  its  encounters  with  the  enemy  previous  to 
the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  at  fifteen  hundred  and  twenty;5 
this,  making  no  deduction  for  straggling,  would  make  his 
effective  in  that  engagement  but  twenty-three  hundred  and 
thirty-two.  General  Evans  states  that  his  brigade  numbered 
twenty-two  hundred  effective  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,6 
and  reports  his  loss  in  the  battles  about  Manassas  at  six  hun 
dred  and  thirty-one ; 7  his  brigade  was  also  engaged  at  South 
Mountain,  and  could  not  have  exceeded  fifteen  hundred 

1  "  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  p.  222. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  190-196.  3  Ibid.,  p.  219. 

4  "  Return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  of  the  20th  of  July,  1862," 
chapter  xiv. 

5  "Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  p.  214. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  290.  7  Ibid.,  p.  288. 


72          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

effective  at  Sharpsburg.  General  Longstreet's  command, 
therefore,  numbered  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-two 
effective.  General  D.  11.  Hill  in  his  report  puts  his  effective 
at  three  thousand *  on  the  morning  of  the  17th.  General  R. 
H.  Anderson's  division,  embracing  on  this  occasion  the 
brigades  of  Mahone,  Wright,  Armistead,  Wilcox,  Pryor,  and 
Featherston,  and  temporarily  assigned  to  General  D.  H.  Hill, 
is  stated  by  the  latter  to  have  been  three  or  four  thousand 
strong ; 2  call  it  thirty-five  hundred. 

General  A.  P.  Hill's  command  consisted  of  the  brigades 
of  Branch,  Gregg,  Archer,  Pender,  and  Brockenborough. 
He  states  the  strength  of  the  first  three  at  two  thousand ; 3 
and  allowing  the  average  of  seven  hundred  each  for  the 
other  two,  we  have  for  his  division  a  total  effective  of  thirty- 
four  hundred.  The  other  brigade  of  this  division  (Thomas's) 
was  left  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

The  division  of  General  McLaws  consisted  of  the  brigades 
of  Kershaw,  Barksdale,  Semmes,  and  Cobb.  He  reports  the 
effective  strength  of  the  four  brigades  to  have  been  twenty- 
eight  hundred  and  ninety-three.4 

There  remains  but  the  small  division  of  two  brigades 
under  General  J.  G.  Walker ;  General  Ransom  states  his 
effective  strength  at  sixteen  hundred 6 ;  General  Walker 
does  not  give  the  strength  of  his  brigade,  but  I  have  put 
it  at  sixteen  hundred,  on  the  authority  of  General  Ransom, 
who  says,  "  So  far  as  my  memory  serves  me,  my  brigade 
was  stronger  all  the  time  than  the  other  of  Walker's  di 
vision." 

With  the  exception  of  the  single  brigade  last  mentioned, 
the  following  recapitulation  is  established  upon  indisputable 
and  contemporaneous  authority,  being  nothing  less  than  the 
testimony  of  the  commanding  officers,  as  shown  by  their  offi 
cial  reports,  made  at  the  time  : 

1  "Reports  of  the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  p.  114. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  116.        3  Ibid.,  p.  129.        4  Ibid.,  p.  172.        6  Ibid.,  p.  291. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  73 

Longstreet's  command 6,262 

Jackson's  command 5,000 

D.  H.  Hill's  division 3,000 

R.  H.  Anderson's  division 3,500 

A.  P.  Hill's  division 3,400 

McLaws's  division 2,893 

J.  G.  Walker's  division 3,200 


Total  effective  infantry 27,255 

I  cannot  verify  the  estimate  made  for  the  cavalry  and 
artillery,  viz.,  eight  thousand ;  but  I  am  sure  it  is  rather  ex 
cessive  than  the  reverse. 

This  would  make  General  Lee's  entire  strength  thirty- 
five  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty-five. 

General  McClellan,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  he 
had  in  action,  in  the  same  engagement,  eighty-seven  thou 
sand  one  hundred  and  sixty-four  of  all  arms.1 

Those  thirty-five  thousand  Confederates  were  the  very 
flower  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  who,  with  in 
domitable  courage  and  inflexible  tenacity,  wrestled  for  the 
mastery,  in  the  ratio  of  one  to  three  of  their  adversaries ; 
and  with  consummate  skill  were  they  manoeuvred  and  shifted 
from  point  to  point,  as  different  parts  of  the  line  of  battle 
were  in  turn  assailed  with  greatest  impetuosity.  The  right 
was  called  upon  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  the  left ;  the  centre 
was  reduced  to  a  mere  shell  in  responding  to  the  demands 
for  assistance  from  the  right  and  left ;  and  A.  P.  Hill's  com 
mand,  the  last  to  arrive  from  Harper's  Ferry,  reached  the 
field  just  in  time  to  restore  the  wavering  right.  At  times 
it  appeared  as  if  disaster  was  inevitable,  but  succor  never 
failed,  and  night  found  Lee's  lines  unbroken  and  his  army 
still  defiant. 

The  weapon  used  was  admirably  tempered ;  but  much  as 
we  may  praise  the  blade,  we  should  not  forget  the  extraor 
dinary  skill  and  vigor  with  which  it  was  wielded  in  that 
memorable  engagement  by  the  great  Confederate  leader. 

1  Extract  from  General  McClellan's  "  Report,"  "  The  American  Conflict,"  p.  209. 


74  FOUR  TEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

The  army  of  General  McClellau  had  been  too  severely 
handled  and  was  too  badly  broken  to  justify  a  renewal  of 
the  attack.  In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  that  officer  said  ("  Report,"  Part  I.,  p. 
441) :  "  The  next  morning  (the  18th)  I  found  that  our  loss 
had  been  so  great,  and  there  was  so  much  disorganization 
in  some  of  the  commands,  that  I  did  not  consider  it  proper 
to  renew  the  attack  that  day,  especially  as  I  was  sure  of  the 
arrival  that  day  of  two  fresh  divisions,  amounting  to  about 
fifteen  thousand  men.  As  an  instance  of  the  condition  of 
some  of  the  troops  that  morning,  I  happen  to  recollect  the 
returns  of  the  First  Corps — General  Hooker's — made  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  by  which  there  were  about  thirty-five 
hundred  men  reported  present  for  duty.  Four  days  after 
that,  the  returns  of  the  same  corps  showed  thirteen  thou 
sand  five  hundred.  I  had  arranged,  however,  to  renew  the 
attack  at  daybreak  on  the  19th." 

The  18th  of  September,  the  day  after  the  battle,  passed 
therefore  without  any  serious  engagement.  General  Lee's 
army,  as  may  be  inferred,  was  in  no  condition  to  take  the 
offensive — and  on  the  night  of  that  day  it  recrossed  the 
Potomac  River  into  Yirginia.  A  force  sent  by  General 
McClellan  to  harass  the  Confederate  rear-guard  under  Gen 
eral  A.  P.  Hill,  who  had  but  two  thousand  muskets,  had  the 
temerity  to  cross  the  Potomac  in  pursuit.  Hill  promptly 
made  his  disposition  for  battle,  and  in  an  incredibly  short 
time  the  attacking  force  of  the  enemy  was  wellnigh  anni 
hilated  ;  such  as  were  not  killed,  captured,  or  drowned  in 
the  river  in  their  efforts  to  escape,  reached  the  Maryland 
side  in  an  utterly  disorganized  and  demoralized  condition.1 

After  these  events,  General  Lee  for  some  time  recruited 

1  "  A  simultaneous,  daring  charge  was  made,  and  the  enemy  driven  pell-mell 
into  the  river.  Then  commenced  the  most  terrible  slaughter  that  this  war  has 
yet  witnessed.  The  broad  surface  of  the  Potomac  was  blue  with  the  floating 
bodies  of  our  foe.  But  few  escaped  to  tell  the  tale.  By  their  own  account, 
they  lost  three  thousand  men  killed  and  drowned  from  one  brigade  alone. 
Some  two  hundred  prisoners  were  taken." — A.  P.  Hill's  "  Report." 


EETURN  TO  VIRGINIA.  75 

his  army  in  the  lower  Valley  of  Virginia  without  moles 
tation. 

STRENGTH   OF  THE  TWO   AKMIES   AFTER  THE   BATTLE. 

The  official  return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  of 
the  22d  of  September,  1862,  after  our  return  to  Virginia  and 
when  the  stragglers  left  behind  in  the  extraordinary  marches 
in  Maryland  had  rejoined  their  commands,  shows  present  for 
duty  thirty-six  thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  in 
fantry  and  artillery ;  the  cavalry,  of  which  there  is  no  report, 
would  perhaps  increase  these  figures  to  forty  thousand  of  all 
arms. 

The  return  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  of  the  20th  of 
September,  1862,  shows  present  for  duty,  at  that  date,  of  the 
commands  that  participated  in  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg, 
eighty-five  thousand  nine  hundred  and  thirty  of  all  arms,  as 
follows : * 

General  McClellan,  staff,  engineer  brigade,  etc 1,393 

First  Army-Corps,  General  Meade 12,237 

Second  Army-Corps,  General  Sumner 13,604 

Fifth  Army-Corps,  General  Porter , 19,477 

Sixth  Army-Corps,  General  Franklin 11,862 

Ninth  Army-Corps,  General  Burnside 10,734 

Twelfth  Army-Corps,  General  Williams 8,383 

Cavalry  corps,  General  Pleasanton 4,543 

Detached  commands  at  Frederick,  Williamsport,  and  Boones- 

boro 3,697 


85,930 

This  is  exclusive  of  Crouch's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  (seven  thousand  two  hundred  and  nineteen),  which 
reached  General  McClellan  after  the  battle.  The  Federal 
loss  at  Boonesboro  and  Antietam — or  Sharpsburg — was  four 
teen  thousand  seven  hundred  and  ninety-four.2 

1  See  official  return  from  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  United  States  Army, 
"  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  I.,  p.  492. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  42. 


76  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

Tidings  readied  General  Lee,  soon  after  his  return  to  Vir 
ginia,  of  the  serious  illness  of  one  of  his  daughters — the  darling 
of  his  flock.  For  several  day  s  apprehensions  were  entertained 
that  the  next  intelligence  would  be  of  her  death.  One  morn 
ing  the  mail  was  received,  and  the  private  letters  were  dis 
tributed  as  was  the  custom ;  but  no  one  knew  whether  any 
home  news  had  been  received  by  the  general.  At  the  usual 
hour  he  summoned  me  to  his  presence  to  know  if  there  were 
any  matters  of  army  routine  upon  which  his  judgment  and 
action  were  desired.  The  papers  containing  a  few  such  cases 
were  presented  to  him ;  he  reviewed  and  gave  his  orders  in 
regard  to  them.  I  then  left  him,  but  for  some  cause  returned 
in  a  few  moments,  and  with  my  accustomed  freedom  entered 
his  tent  without  announcement  or  ceremony,  when  I  was 
startled  and  shocked  to  see  him  overcome  with  grief,  an 
open  letter  in  his  hands.  That  letter  contained  the  sad  in 
telligence  of  his  daughter's  death. 

The  reader  will  probably  ask  why  this  incident  is  intro 
duced  here. 

Although  apparently  without  special  significance,  it  illus 
trates  one  of  the  noblest  traits  of  the  character  of  that  noble 
man.  He  was  the  father  of  a  tenderly-loved  daughter,  one 
who  appealed  with  peculiar  force  to  his  paternal  affection 
and  care,  and  whose  sweet  presence  he  was  to  know  no  more 
in  this  world ;  but  he  was  also  charged  with  the  command 
of  an  important  and  active  army,  to  whose  keeping  to  a  great 
extent  were  intrusted  the  safety  and  honor  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy.  Lee  the  man  must  give  way  to  Lee  the  patriot 
and  soldier.  His  army  demanded  his  first  thought  and  care ; 
to  his  men,  to  their  needs,  he  must  first  attend,  and  then  he 
could  surrender  himself  to  his  private,  personal  affairs.  Who 
can  tell  with  what  anguish  of  soul  he  endeavored  to  control 
himself,  and  to  maintain  a  calm  exterior,  and  who  can  esti 
mate  the  immense  effort  necessary  to  still  the  heart  filled 
to  overflowing  with  tenderest  emotions,  and  to  give  attention 
to  the  important  trusts  committed  to  him,  before  permitting 


RETURN  TO  VIRGINIA.  77 

the  more  selfish  indulgence  of  private  meditation,  grief,  and 
prayer  ?  Duty  first,  was  the  rule  of  his  life,  and  his  every 
thought,  word,  and  action,  was  made  to  square  with  duty's 
inexorable  demands. 

Scarcely  less  to  be  admired  than  his  sublime  devotion  to 
duty  was  his  remarkable  self-control.  General  Lee  was 
naturally  of  a  positive  temperament,  and  of  strong  passions ; 
and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  him  otherwise ;  but  he  held 
these  in  complete  subjection  to  his  will  and  conscience.  He 
was  not  one  of  those  invariably  amiable  men  whose  temper 
is  never  ruffled ;  but  when  we  consider  the  immense  burden 
which  rested  upon  him,  and  the  numberless  causes  for  an 
noyance  with  which  he  had  to  contend,  the  occasional  crop- 
ping-out  of  temper  which  we,  who  were  constantly  near  him, 
witnessed,  only  showed  how  great  was  his  habitual  self-com 
mand. 

He  had  a  great  dislike  to  reviewing  army  communica 
tions  :  this  was  so  thoroughly  appreciated  by  me  that  I  would 
never  present  a  paper  for  his  action,  unless  it  was  of  decided 
importance,  and  of  a  nature  to  demand  his  judgment  and  de 
cision.  On  one  occasion  when  an  audience  had  not  been 
asked  of  him  for  several  days,  it  became  necessary  to  have 
one.  The  few  papers  requiring  his  action  were  submitted. 
He  was  not  in  a  very  pleasant  mood ;  something  irritated 
him,  and  he  manifested  his  ill-humor  by  a  little  nervous 
twist  or  jerk  of  the  neck  and  head,  peculiar  to  himself,  ac 
companied  by  some  harshness  of  manner.  This  was  per 
ceived  by  me,  and  I  hastily  concluded  that  my  efforts  to  save 
him  annoyance  were  not  appreciated.  In  disposing  of  some 
case  of  a  vexatious  character,  matters  reached  a  climax  ;  he 
became  really  worried,  and,  forgetting  what  was  due  to  my 
superior,  I  petulantly  threw  the  paper  down  at  my  side  and 
gave  evident  signs  of  anger.  Then,  in  a  perfectly  calm  and 
measured  tone  of  voice,  he  said,  "  Colonel  Taylor,  when  I 
lose  my  temper,  don't  you  let  it  make  you  angry." 

Was  there  ever  a  more  gentle  and  considerate  and  yet  so 


78          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

positive  a  reproof  ?  How  magnanimous  in  the  great  soldier, 
and  yet  how  crushing  to  the  subordinate !  The  rash  and  dis 
respectful  conduct  of  the  latter  would  have  justified,  if  it  did 
not  demand,  summary  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  former. 
Instead  of  this,  the  first  man  of  his  day  and  generation,  great 
and  glorious  in  his  humility,  condescended  to  occupy  the 
same  plane  with  his  youthful  subaltern,  and  to  reason  with 
him  as  an  equal,  frankly  acknowledging  his  own  imperfec 
tions,  but  kindly  reminding  the  inferior  at  the  same  time  of 
his  duty  and  his  position. 


CHAPTEE  VII. 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg. — Federal  Army  One  Hundred  Thousand  strong :  Con- 
federate  Army  Seventy-eight  Thousand  strong. — Battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
— Federal  Army  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-two  Thousand  strong :  Confed 
erate  Army  Fifty-seven  Thousand  strong. 

IN  the  latter  part  of  October,  1862,  General  McClellan 
moved  his  army  to  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac,  east  of  the 
mountains.  On  the  4th  of  November  he  occupied  Ashby's 
Gap.  His  entire  army  was  now  concentrated  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Warrenton.  He  was  at  this  time  again  relieved 
of  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  General 
Burnside  was  appointed  to  succeed  him.  After  a  confer 
ence  with  General-in-chief  Halleck,  the  new  commander  de 
termined  by  a  rapid  movement  to  secure  possession  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  from  which  point  as  a  base  he  proposed  to  renew 
the  advance  upon  the  Confederate  capital.  General  Lee, 
whose  army  at  the  commencement  of  these  movements  was 
concentrated  in  the  lower  Yalley  of  Virginia,  had  not  been 
meanwhile  inactive.  Closely  scrutinizing  every  movement 
of  the  enemy,  he  seemed,  by  intuition,  to  divine  his  purpose, 
and  promptly  made  such  disposition  as  was  necessary  to  fore 
stall  him. 

When  General  Burnside's  intention  to  move  upon  Fred 
ericksburg  was  fully  developed,  General  Lee  ordered  Long- 
street  to  that  point,  and  directed  Jackson,  who  was  still  in 
the  Valley,  to  move  rapidly  on  Orange  Court-House. 

Sumner's  grand  division  led  the  van  of  the  Federal  army, 
and  its  advance  arrived  opposite  Fredericksburg  on  the  after- 


80  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL   LEE. 

noon  of  the  17th  of  ISTovember.  ISTo  serious  effort  was  made 
by  General  Sumner  to  cross  the  river  and  occupy  the  town, 
and  time  was  thus  afforded  for  the  advance  divisions  of  the 
Confederates  to  reach  the  point  threatened ;  so  that  when  the 
Federal  commander  arrived  opposite,  doubtless  to  his  sur 
prise  he  found  no  despicable  array  of  Confederate  bayonets 
prepared  to  dispute  his  passage  of  the  river.  With  his  entire 
army  he  soon  occupied  Stafford  Heights;  and,  casting  his 
eye  southward  beyond  the  level  plain  or  belt  which  skirts 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  he  saw  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  strongly  posted  upon  the  range  of  hills  overlooking 
the  intervening  plain.  Again  General  Lee  gave  "  check ! " 

The  nature  of  the  ground  rendered  it  an  easy  matter  for 
the  Federal  commander  to  control  the  southern  bank  of  the 
river.  On  the  llth  of  December  he  threw  a  force  across, 
and  occupied  the  town.  The  entire  army,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  one  corps,  under  General  Hooker,  followed,  and  by 
the  evening  of  the  12th  was  well  established  on  the  south 
side.1  As  the  fog  lifted  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the 
Confederates  beheld  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  drawn  up  in 
most  imposing  array,  fully  one  hundred  thousand  strong,2 
stretching  from  above  Fredericksburg  to  Deep  Run.  It  was 
a  grand  and  beautiful  sight ;  rarely  is  one  more  glorious 
vouchsafed  to  mortal  eye.  And  now,  as  the  command  is 
given  to  the  Federal  troops  to  advance,  a  new  interest,  a 
spirit  of  intense  excitement,  is  added  to  the  scene ;  and  as 
the  whole  line  of  blue — solid  and  regular,  bristling  with  the 
glittering  bayonets — moves  steadily  forward,  accompanied  by 
the  deafening  roar  of  the  artillery,  the  eye  taking  in  the 
whole  panorama  at  a  glance,  men  hold  their  breath,  and 
realize  that  wa»  is  indeed  as  glorious  as  it  is  terrible. 

1  Three  divisions  of  Hooker's  corps  followed  on  the  13th,  and  are  included 
in  the  estimate  of  the  Federal  strength. 

2  General  Burnside  testified  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  that  he  had  a  hundred  thousand  men  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  in 
action.—"  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  Part  I.,  p.  656. 


THE  BATTLE   OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  81 

The  Federal  soldiers  advanced  right  gallantly  to  the  des 
perate  work  assigned  them ;  time  and  again  was  the  assault 
renewed  on  the  right  and  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line, 
but  all  in  vain.  The  cool,  steady  veterans  of  Lee,  under  the 
protection  of  their  hastily-constructed  or  extemporized  works, 
made  terrible  havoc  in  the  ranks  of  the  assailing  columns  ; 
and  division  after  division  recoiled  from  the  terrible  shock, 
shattered,  discomfited,  and  demoralized.  Their  allotted  task 
exceeded  human  endeavor ;  and  no  shame  to  them  that,  after 
such  courageous  and  brilliant  conduct,  their  efforts  lacked 
success.  Less  than  twenty  thousand  Confederate  troops 
(about  one-fourth  of  the  army  under  General  Lee) 1  were 
actively  engaged.  It  was  certainly  the  most  easily  won  of 
all  the  grand  battles  of  the  war,  and  it  was,  indeed,  the  most 
exhilarating  and  inspiring  to  look  upon,  as  beheld  from  the 
summit  of  one  of  the  hills  occupied  by  our  troops,  where 
army  headquarters  were  temporarily  established. 

Contrary  to  the  expectation  of  General  Lee,  the  assault 
was  not  renewed,2  and,  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  General 
Burnside  retired  his  army  from  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
and  resumed  his  former  position  on  Stafford  Heights. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  about  a  proposition  having 
been  made  to  General  Lee  by  General  Jackson,  that  he  be 
allowed  to  make  a  night-attack  on  the  enemy  after  his  re 
pulse.  Some  of  the  features  of  this  alleged  proposition,  as 
published  some  years  ago,  are  so  absurd  as  to  carry  in  them- 

1  The  returns  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  show  that  on  the  10th  De 
cember,  1862,  General  Lee  had  present  for  duty  seventy-eight  thousand  two 
hundred  and  twenty-eight,  and,  on  the  20th  December,  seventy-five  thousand 
five  hundred  and  twenty-four  of  all  arms,  including  the  reserve  artillery,  parked 
some  distance  in  the  rear. 

2  "  The  attack  on  the  13th  had  been  so  easily  repulsed,  and  by  so  small  a 
part  of  our  army,  that  it  was  not  supposed  the  enemy  would  limit  his  efforts  to 
one  attempt,  which,  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  his  preparations  and  the  extent 
of  his  force,  seemed  to  be  comparatively  insignificant.     Believing,  therefore, 
that  he  would  attack  us,  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to  lose  the  advantages  of 
our  position,  and  expose  the  troops  to  the  fire  of  his  inaccessible  batteries  be 
yond  the  river,  by  advancing  against  him." — General  Lee's  "Report." 

6 


82  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

selves  evidence  of  their  fictitious  character.  I  can  only  say 
that  I  never  heard  of  any  such  proposition,  and  I  have  excel 
lent  authority  for  asserting,  as  I  do,  that  none  such  was  ever 
made. 

In  speaking  of  the  engagement,  General  Jackson  has  the 
following  in  his  official  report :  "  Repulsed  on  the  right,  left, 
and  centre,  the  enemy  soon  after  reformed  his  lines,  and 
gave  some  indications  of  a  purpose  to  renew  the  attack.  I 
waited  some  time  to  receive  it ;  but  he  making  no  forward 
movement,  I  determined,  if  prudent,  to  do  so  myself.  The 
artillery  of  the  enemy  was  so  judiciously  posted  as  to  make 
an  advance  of  our  troops  across  the  plain  very  hazardous ;  yet 
it  was  so  promising  of  good  results,  if  successfully  executed, 
as  to  induce  me  to  make  preparations  for  the  attempt.  In 
order  to  guard  against  disaster,  the  infantry  was  to  be  pre 
ceded  by  artillery,  and  the  movement  postponed  until  late  in 
the  evening,  so  that,  if  compelled  to  retire,  it  would  be  under 
the  cover  of  night.  Owing  to  unexpected  delay,  the  move 
ment  could  not  be  gotten  ready  until  late  in  the  evening. 
The  first  gun  had  hardly  moved  forward  from  the  wood  a 
hundred  yards,  when  the  enemy's  artillery  reopened,  and  so 
completely  swept  our  front  as  to  satisfy  me  that  the  proposed 
movement  should  be  abandoned."  In  this,  perhaps,  is  to  be 
found  the  explanation  of,  and  all  of  truth  there  is  in,  the 
report  referred  to. 

For  several  months  after  this  the  army  rested  in  winter- 
quarters,  and  nothing  of  special  interest  occurred,  save  an 
abortive  attempt  made  in  the  midst  of  winter  by  General 
Burnside  to  cross  the  river  at  United  States  Ford,  in  which 
attempt  he  was  completely  foiled  by  the  execrable  condition 
of  the  roads,  and  his  troops,  after  floundering  in  the  mud  for 
several  days,  returned  to  their  camps. 

The  Confederate  artillery,  or  a  large  portion  thereof, 
which  was  parked  in  the  rear,  near  the  railroad,  for  greater 
convenience  in  supplying  the  animals  with  food,  was  ordered 
forward  by  General  Jackson — General  Lee  being  in  Rich- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  $3 

mond  at  tlie  time — as  soon  as  intimation  of  the  purpose  of 
General  Burnside  was  disclosed,  and  was  much  damaged  in 
its  hasty  but  (as  events  proved)  unnecessary  efforts  to  get  to 
the  front.  General  Burnside  was  compelled  to  relinquish 
whatever  design  he  had  entertained,  and  quiet  was  again 
established  in  the  two  opposing  armies. 

Active  operations  were  resumed  in  the  spring.  General 
Hooker,  whose  turn  it  now  was,  under  Federal  dispensation, 
to  wrestle  with  General  Lee,  crossed  the  Rappahannock  in 
the  latter  part  of  April,  1863  ;  took  position  at  Chancellors- 
vine,  and  constructed  a  formidable  line  of  earthworks,  from 
which  secure  position  he  proposed  to  move  on  General  Lee's 
flank. 

Of  all  the  battles  fought  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  that  of  Chancellorsville  stands  first,  as  illustrating  the 
consummate  audacity  and  military  skill  of  commanders,  and 
the  valor  and  determination  of  the  men.  General  Lee,  with 
fifty-seven  thousand  troops  of  all  arms,  intrenched  along  the 
line  of  hills  south  of  the  Rappahannock,  near  Fredericks- 
burg,  was  confronted  by  General  Hooker,  with  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  thousand  strong, 
occupying  the  bluffs  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 

On  the  29th  of  April  the  Federal  commander  essayed  to 
put  into  execution  an  admirably-conceived  plan  of  operations, 
from  which  he  doubtless  concluded  that  he  could  compel 
either  the  evacuation  by  General  Lee  of  his  strongly-fortified 
position,  or  else  his  utter  discomfiture  when  unexpectedly 
and  vigorously  assailed  upon  his  left  flank  and  rear  by  the 
"  finest  army  on  the  planet " — really  more  than  twice  the 
size  of  his  own. 

A  formidable  force,  under  General  Sedgwick,  was  thrown 
across  the  river  below  Fredericksburg,  and  made  demonstra 
tions  of  an  intention  to  assail  the  Confederate  front.  Mean 
while,  with  great  celerity  and  secrecy,  General  Hooker,  with 
the  bulk  of  his  army,  crossed  at  the  upper  fords,  and,  in  an 
able  manner  and  wonderfully  short  time,  had  concentrated 


84          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

four  of  his  seven  army-corps,1  numbering  fifty-six  thousand 
men,  at  Chancellorsville,  about  ten  miles  west  of  Fredericks- 
burg.  His  purpose  was  now  fully  developed  to  General  Lee 
who,  instead  of  awaiting  its  further  prosecution,  immediately 
determined  on  the  movement  the  least  expected  by  his  oppo-, 
nent.  He  neither  proceeded  to  make  strong  his  left  against 
attack  from  the  direction  of  Chancellorsville,  nor  did  he 
move  southward,  so  as  to  put  his  army  between  that  of  Gen 
eral  Hooker  and  the  Confederate  capital ;  but,  leaving  Gen 
eral  Early,  with  about  nine  thousand  men,  to  take  care  of 
General  Sedgwick,  he  moved  with  the  remainder  of  his 
army,  numbering  forty-eight  thousand  men,  toward  Chancel 
lorsville.  As  soon  as  the  advance  of  the  enemy  was  encoun 
tered,  it  was  attacked  with  vigor,  and  very  soon  the  Federal 
army  was  on  the  defensive  in  its  apparently  impregnable 
position.  It  was  not  the  part  of  wisdom  to  attempt  to  storm 
this  stronghold ;  but  Sedgwick  would  certainly  soon  be  at 
work  in  the  rear,  and  Early,  with  his  inadequate  force,  could 
not  do  more  than  delay  and  harass  him.  It  was,  therefore, 
imperatively  necessary  to  strike — to  strike  boldly,  effectively, 
and  at  once.  There  could  be  no  delay.  Meanwhile  two 
more  army-corps  had  joined  General  Hooker,  who  now  had 
about  Chancellorsville  ninety -one  thousand  men — six  corps, 
except  one  division  of  the  Second  Corps  (Couch's),  which  had 
been  left  with  Sedgwick,  at  Fredericksburg.  It  was  a  criti 
cal  position  for  the  Confederate  commander,  but  his  confi 
dence  in  his  trusted  lieutenant  and  brave  men  was  such  that 
he  did  not  long  hesitate.  Encouraged  by  the  counsel  and 
confidence  of  General  Jackson,  he  determined  still  further 
to  divide  his  army ;  and  while  he,  with  the  divisions  of  An 
derson  and  McLaws,  less  than  fourteen  thousand  men, 
should  hold  the  enemy  in  his  front,  he  would  hurl  Jackson 
upon  his  flank  and  rear,  and  crush  and  crumble  him  as  be 
tween  the  upper  and  nether  millstone.  The  very  boldness 
of  the  movement  contributed  much  to  insure  its  success. 

1  Except  one  division. 


THE  BATTLE  OF   CHANCELLORSVILLE.  85 

This  battle  illustrates  most  admirably  the  peculiar  talent 
and  individual  excellence  of  Lee  and  Jackson.  For  quick 
ness  of  perception,  boldness  in  planning,  and  skill  in  direct 
ing,  General  Lee  had  no  superior :  for  celerity  in  his  move 
ments,  audacity  in  the  execution  of  bold  designs  and  impetu 
osity  in  attacking,  General  Jackson  had  not  his  peer. 

The  flank  movement  of  Jackson's  wing  was  attended 
with  extraordinary  success.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of 
May  he  struck  such  a  blow  to  the  enemy  on  their  extreme 
right  as  to  cause  dismay  and  demoralizatian  to  their  entire 
army ;  this  advantage  was  promptly  and  vigorously  followed 
up  the  next  day,  when  Generals  Lee  and  Stuart  (the  latter 
then  in  command  of  Jackson's  wing)  *  joined  elbows ;  and 
after  most  heroic  and  determined  effort,  their  now  united 
forces  finally  succeeded  in  storming  and  capturing  the  works 
of  the  enemy. 

Meantime  Sedgwick  had  forced  Early  out  of  the  heights 
at  Fredericksburg,  and  had  advanced  toward  Chancellors- 
vine,  thus  threatening  the  Confederate  rear.  General  Lee 
having  defeated  the  greater  force,  and  driven  it  from  its 
stronghold,  now  gathered  up  a  few  of  the  most  available  of 
his  victorious  brigades,  and  turned  upon  the  lesser. 

On  the  3d  of  May  Sedgwick's  force  was  encountered  in 
the  vicinity  of  Salem  Church,  and  its  further  progress  checked 
by  General  McLaws,  with  the  five  brigades  detached  by 
General  Lee  for  this  service — including  Wilcox's,  which  had 
been  stationed  at  Banks's  Ford.  On  the  next  day  General 
Anderson  was  sent  to  reenf  orce  McLaws  with  three  addition 
al  brigades.  Meanwhile,  General  Early  had  connected  with 
these  troops,  and  in  the  afternoon,  so  soon  as  dispositions 
could  be  made  for  attack,  Sedgwick's  lines  were  promptly 
assailed  and  broken — the  main  assault  being  made  on  the 
enemy's  left  by  Early 's  troops.  The  situation  was  now  a 

1  General  Jackson  fell  mortally  wounded  late  in  the  evening  of  the  2d ; 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  who  would  have  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Jackson's 
wing,  was  also  wounded,  and  General  Stuart  assumed  the  command. 


86          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

critical  one  for  the  Federal  lieutenant.  Darkness  came  to 
his  rescue,  and  on  the  night  of  the  4th  he  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  the  river. 

On  the  5th  General  Lee  concentrated  for  another  assault 
on  the  new  line  taken  up  by  General  Hooker ;  but  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th  it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy,  in 
General  Lee's  language,  "had  sought  safety  beyond  the 
Rappahannock,"  and  the  river  flowed  again  between  the 
hostile  hosts. 

Glorious  as  was  the  result  of  this  battle  to  the  Confeder 
ate  arms,  it  was  accompanied  by  a  calamity  in  the  contem 
plation  of  which  the  most  brilliant  victory  of  that  incompar 
able  army  must  ever  be  regarded  as  a  supreme  disaster.  The 
star  of  Confederate  destiny  reached  its  zenith  on  the  2d  day 
of  May,  when  Jackson  fell  wounded  at  the  head  of  his  vic 
torious  troops ;  it  began  to  set  on  the  10th  of  May,  when 
Jackson  was  no  more. 


STRENGTH   OF  THE   OPPOSING   AEMIES. 

In  confirmation  of  the  figures  just  given  as  representing 
the  strength  of  the  two  armies,  I  submit  the  following :  Gen 
eral  Longstreet  with  a  portion  of  his  corps  was  at  this  time 
operating  on  the  south  side  of  James  River,  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Suffolk.  Of  his  command  there  remained  with 
General  Lee  but  the  two  divisions  of  Generals  McLaws  and 
Anderson.  The  official  return  of  the  Army  of  ^Northern 
Virginia,  of  Slarch  31,  1863,  after  a  long  period  of  rest  and 
recruiting,  and  when  perhaps  the  several  commands  attained 
their  greatest  strength,  shows,  as  present  for  duty : 

Anderson's  and  McLaws's  divisions 15,649 

Jackson's  command 33,833 

Cavalry 6,509 

Reserve  artillery  (parked  in  rear) 1,621 

Total  of  all  arms 57,112 


THE   BATTLE   OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  87 

I  exclude  the  troops  serving  in  the  Valley  district — thirty- 
one  hundred  and  eighty-six — included  hi  the  departmental 
return,  but  not  available  at  Fredericksburg.  This  return  is 
the  nearest  to  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  of  all 
those  in  the  archive-office  at  Washington,  and  of  all  now  in 
existence  known  to  me.1  General  Early  had  with  him  at 
Fredericksburg  his  own  division,  and  one  brigade  of  another 
— in  all,  according  to  his  statement,  nine  thousand  men. 
General  Lee  remained  in  front  of  General  Hooker  at  Chan 
cellorsville  with  fourteen  thousand  men,  viz.,  the  two  di 
visions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  with  the  exception  of 
Barksdale's  brigade  left  with  General  Early ;  this  estimate 
includes  Wilcox's  brigade  at  Banks's  Ford.  General  Jackson 
had  with  him  in  his  flanking  movement  his  command,  less 
Early's  division,  in  round  numbers  say  twenty-six  thousand 
men.  General  Stuart  had  six  thousand  five  hundred  and 
nine  sabres  with  which  to  oppose  the  cavalry  column  of  the 
Federals,  numbering  twelve  thousand  men. 

In  regard  to  the  Federal  strength,  I  have  adopted  the 
figures  given  in  the  book  of  Mr.  Swinton,  confirmed  by  the 
evidence  given  before  the  Congressional  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  "War.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  Gen 
eral  Hooker,  consisted  of  seven  army-corps  and  a  body  of 
horse,  numbering  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  thousand a 
present  for  duty,  as  follows : 

1  On  the  20th  of  May,  1863,  two  weeks  after  the  battle,  and  when  Pickett's 
and  Hood's  divisions  had  rejoined  the  array,  the  total  infantry  force  numbered 
but  fifty-five  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-one  effective,  from  which  if  the 
strength  of  Pickett's  and  Hood's  divisions  is  deducted,  there  would  remain  forty- 
one  thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty-eight  as  the  strength  of  the  commands 
that  participated  in  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  on  the  20th  of  May. — See 
"Return  "  of  the  20th  of  May,  1863,  chapter  xiv. 

2  "  It "  (the  Army  of  the  Potomac)  "  numbered  one  hundred  and  twenty  thou 
sand  men,  infantry  and  artillery,  with  a  body  of  twelve  thousand  well-equipped 
cavalry,  and  a  powerful  artillery  force  of  above  four  hundred  guns." — Swinton's 
u  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.  269.     In  a  foot-note  Mr.  Swinton  thus  substantiates 
his  estimate  of  the  infantry  and  artillery :  "  This  estimate  is  approximate;  the 
data  are  as  follows  :  the  effective  of  the  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  Corps  was 


88         FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

The  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  Army-Corps 44,661 

The  Sixth  Army-Corps 22,000 

The  First  and  Third  Army-Corps 35,000 

The  Second  Army-Corps 18,000 

Total  infantry  and  artillery 119,661 

And  the  corps  of  cavalry 12,000 

Total  of  all  arms 131,661 

General  Sedgwiek's  force  at  Falmouth  and  Fredericks- 
burg  originally  consisted  of  the  First,  Third,  and  Sixth  Army- 
Corps,  and  one  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  numbered 
sixty-three  thousand  men,  though  only  a  portion  crossed  the 
river ;  it  was  subsequently  reduced  to  twenty-eight  thousand 
by  the  withdrawal  of  the  First  and  Third  Corps,  which 
joined  General  Hooker.  The  latter,  when  he  first  moved 
to  Chancellorsville,  had  with  him  the  Fifth,  Eleventh, 
Twelfth,  and  Second  Corps  (save  one  division  with  Sedg- 
wick),  numbering,  according  to  the  returns,  fifty-six  thousand 
men;  and  when  he  was  subsequently  joined  by  the  First  and 
Third  Corps — thirty-five  thousand  strong  (that  is,  previous 
to  the  assault  by  General  Lee  at  Chancellorsville) — he  must 
have  had  with  him  nearly  ninety  thousand  men.  It  has  al 
ready  been  shown  that  in  the  assault  General  Lee  had  but 
forty  thousand  men. 

In  this  comparative  statement  of  strength  I  have  fol 
lowed  the  official  returns  as  to  both  armies.  It  is  proper  to 
state  that  General  Hooker  in  his  testimony  before  the  Com 
mittee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (second  series,  vol.  i.,  p. 
120)  puts  the  effective  strength  of  the  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and 
Twelfth  Corps,  at  Chancellorsville,  at  thirty-six  thousand 

put  by  General  Hooker,  just  before  Chancellorsville,  at  forty-four  thousand  six 
hundred  and  sixty-one  ('  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,'  second  series,  vol. 
i.,  p.  120).  The  effective  of  the  Sixth  Corps  is  given  by  General  Sedgwick  (ibid., 
p.  95)  as  twenty-two  thousand  ;  and  the  effective  of  the  First  and  Third  Corps, 
by  the  same  authority,  was  thirty-five  thousand.  There  remains  the  Second 
Corps,  to  which  if  we  give  a  minimum  of  eighteen  thousand,  there  will  result 
the  aggregate  of  one  hundred  and  nineteen  thousand  six  hundred  and  sixty- 
one." 


THE  BATTLE   OF   CHANCELLORSVILLE.  89 

men.  He  explains  the  discrepancy  between  this  and  the 
strength  of  these  corps  on  the  30th  of  April,  viz.,  forty-four 
thousand  six  hundred  and  sixty-one,  by  stating  that  the  re 
turns  included  the  artillery,  and  that  the  greater  portion  of 
the  latter  did  not  march  with  the  corps ;  he  also  excludes 
heavy  detachments  left  with  the  trains,  "as  well  as  regi 
ments  left  behind  for  discharge"  (from  service?).  Now,  the 
same  necessity  existed  for  General  Lee  to  guard  his  trains ; 
and,  of  his  strength,  quite  as  large  a  proportion  of  the  artil 
lery  was  not  up.  None  of  the  reserve  artillery  which  I  have 
included  in  my  estimate  of  the  Confederate  strength  was 
engaged,  being  some  miles  in  rear  at  the  time.  But  even 
adopting  General  Hooker's  estimate  of  the  three  corps  men 
tioned,  then  adding  twelve  thousand  for  that  portion  of  the 
Second  which  joined  him  (all  but  Gibbon's  division),  and  the 
First  and  Third  Corps — thirty-five  thousand,  as  given  by 
General  Sedgwick — and  his  strength  at  Chancellorsville,  ex 
clusive  of  Pleasanton's  cavalry,  was  eighty-three  thousand. 
The  testimony  of  General  Hancock  and  General  Sedgwick 
confirms  this  estimate. 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 

The  Pennsylvania  Campaign. — The  Battle  of  Gettysburg. — Strength  of  the 
Opposing  Armies. 

FKOM  the  very  necessities  of  the  case,  the  general  theory 
upon  which  the  war  was  conducted  on  the  part  of  the  South 
was  one  of  defense.  The  great  superiority  of  the  North  in 
men  and  material  made  it  indispensable  for  the  South  to 
husband  its  resources  as  much  as  possible,  inasmuch  as  the 
hope  of  ultimate  success  which  the  latter  entertained,  rested 
rather  upon  the  dissatisfaction  and  pecuniary  distress  which 
a  prolonged  war  would  entail  upon  the  former — making  the 
people  weary  of  the  struggle — than  upon  any  expectation  of 
conquering  a  peace  by  actually  subduing  so  powerful  an  ad 
versary. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  judgment  of  General  Lee,  it  was  a 
part  of  a  true  defensive  policy  to  take  the  aggressive  when 
good  opportunity  offered;  and  by  delivering  an  effective 
blow  to  the  enemy,  not  only  to  inflict  upon  him  serious  loss, 
but  at  the  same  time  to  thwart  his  designs  of  invasion, 
derange  the  plan  of  campaign  contemplated  by  him,  and 
thus  prolong  the  conflict. 

The  Federal  army,  under  General  Hooker,  had  now  re- 
occupied  the  heights  opposite  Fredericksburg,  where  it  could 
not  be  attacked  except  at  a  disadvantage.  Instead  of  quietly 
awaiting  the  pleasure  of  the  Federal  commander  in  design 
ing  and  putting  into  execution  some  new  plan  of  campaign, 
General  Lee  determined  to  manoeuvre  to  draw  him  from  his 
impregnable  position  and  if  possible  to  remove  the  scene  of 


THE   PENNSYLVANIA   CAMPAIGN.  91 

hostilities  beyond  the  Potomac.  His  design  was  to  free  the 
State  of  Virginia,  for  a  time  at  least,  from  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  to  transfer  the  theatre  of  war  to  Northern  soil, 
and,  by  selecting  a  favorable  time  and  place  in  which  to 
receive  the  attack  which  his  adversary  would  be  compelled 
to  make  on  him,  to  take  the  reasonable  chances  of  defeating 
him  in  a  pitched  battle ;  knowing  full  well  that  to  obtain 
such  an  advantage  there  would  place  him  in  position  to 
attain  far  more  decisive  results  than  could  be  hoped  for 
from  a  like  advantage  gained  in  Virginia .  But  even  if  un 
able  to  attain  the  valuable  results  wrhich  might  be  expected 
to  follow  a  decided  advantage  gained  over  the  enemy  in 
Maryland  or  Pennsylvania,  it  was  thought  that  the  move 
ment  would  at  least  so  far  disturb  the  Federal  plan  for  the 
summer  campaign  as  to  prevent  its  execution  during  the 
season  for  active  operations.1 

In  pursuance  of  this  design,  early  in  the  month  of  June, 
General  Lee  moved  his  army  northward  by  way  of  Cul- 
peper,  ,and  thence  to  and  down  the  Valley  of  Virginia  to 
Winchester. 

The  army  had  now  been  reorganized  into  three  army- 
corps,  designated  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Corps,  and 
commanded  respectively  by  Lieutenant-Generals  Longstreet, 
Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill. 

The  Second  Corps  was  in  advance,  and  crossed  the 
branches  of  the  Shenandoah,  near  Front  Royal,  on  the  12th 
of  June.  Brushing  aside  the  force  of  the  enemy  under  Gen 
eral  Milroy,  that  occupied  the  lower  Valley — most  of  which 
was  captured  and  the  remnant  of  which  sought  refuge  in  the 
fortifications  at  Harper's  Ferry 3 — General  Ewell  crossed  the 

1  General  Lee's  "  Report." 

2  "  These  operations  resulted  in  the  expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  the  Valley, 
the  capture  of  four  thousand  prisoners,  with  a  corresponding  number  of  small- 
arms,  twenty-eight  pieces  of  superior  artillery,  including  those  taken  by  Gen 
eral  Rodes  and  General  Hays,  about  three  hundred  wagons  and  as  many  horses, 
together  with  a  considerable  quantity  of  ordnance,  commissary,  and  quarter 
master's  stores." — General  Lee's  "  Report  of  the  Pennsylvania  Campaign." 


92  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

Potomac  Hiver  with  liis  three  divisions  in  the  latter  part  of 
June,  and,  in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  General  Lee,  trav 
ersed  Maryland  and  advanced  into  Pennsylvania. 

General  A.  P.  Hill,  whose  corps  was  the  last  to  leave  the 
line  of  the  Eappahannock,  followed  with  his  three  divisions 
in  Swell's  rear.  General  Longstreet  covered  these  move 
ments  with  his  corps ;  then  moved  by  Ashby's  and  Snicker's 
Gaps  into  the  Valley  and  likewise  crossed  the  Potomac 
Eiver,  leaving  to  General  Stuart  the  task  of  holding  the 
gaps  of  the  Blue  Eidge  Mountains  with  his  corps  of  cavalry. 

The  Federal  commander  had  meanwhile  moved  his  army 
so  as  to  cover  Washington  City;  and,  as  soon  as  he  was 
thoroughly  informed,  by  Ewell's  rapid  advance,  of  the  real 
intention  of  his  adversary,  he  too  crossed  into  Maryland. 

On  the  27th  of  June  General  Lee  was  near  Chambers- 
burg  with  the  First  and  Third  Corps,  the  Second  being  still 
in  advance,  but  within  supporting  distance. 

With  the  exception  of  the  cavalry,  the  army  was  well  in 
hand.  The  absence  of  that  indispensable  arm  of  the  service 
was  most  seriously  felt  by  General  Lee.  He  had  directed 
General  Stuart  to  use  his  discretion  as  to  where  and  when 
to  cross  the  river — that  is,  he  was  to  cross  east  of  the  moun 
tains,  or  retire  through  the  mountain-passes  into  the  Valley 
and  cross  in  the  immediate  rear  of  the  infantry,  as  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  and  his  own  judgment  should  deter 
mine — but  he  was  expected  to  maintain  communication  with 
the  main  column,  and  especially  directed  to  keep  the  com 
manding  general  informed  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal 
army. 

The  army  continued  to  advance.  On  the  1st  of  July 
General  Lee  reached  Cashtown  and  stopped  to  confer  with 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  whose  corps  was  concentrating  at  that 
point,  and  who  reported  that  the  advance  of  Heth's  division 
had  encountered  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  near  Gettysburg. 
Instructions  had  been  sent  to  General  Heth  to  ascertain 
what  force  was  at  Gettysburg,  and,  if  he  found  infantry 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  93 

opposed  to  him,  to  report  the  fact  immediately,  without 
forcing  an  engagement. 

No  tidings  whatever  had  been  received  from  or  of  our 
cavalry  under  General  Stuart  since  crossing  the  river ;  and 
General  Lee  was  consequently  without  accurate  information 
of  the  movements  or  position  of  the  main  Federal  army.1 
An  army  without  cavalry  in  a  strange  and  hostile  country  is 
as  a  man  deprived  of  his  eyesight  and  beset  by  enemies ;  he 
may  be  never  so  brave  and  strong,  but  he  cannot  intelli 
gently  administer  a  single  effective  blow. 

The  sound  of  artillery  was  soon  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Gettysburg.  General  Hill  hastened  to  the  front.  General 
Lee  followed. 

On  arriving  at  the  scene  of  battle,  General  Lee  ascer 
tained  that  the  enemy's  infantry  and  artillery  were  present  in 
considerable  force.  Heth's  division  was  already  hotly  en 
gaged,  and  it  was  soon  evident  that  a  serious  engagement 
could  not  be  avoided. 

Orders  had  previously  been  sent  to  General  Ewell  to  re 
call  his  advanced  divisions,  and  to  concentrate  about  Cash- 
town.  While  en  route  for  that  point,  on  the  morning  of  the 
1st  of  July,  General  Ewell  learned  that  Hill's  corps  was  mov 
ing  toward  Gettysburg,  and,  on  arriving  at  Middletown,  he 

1 "  On  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  June  the  Third  Corps,  composed  of  the  divis 
ions  of  Major-Generals  Anderson,  Heth,  and  Pender,  and  five  battalions  of  artil 
lery,  under  command  of  Colonel  R.  L.  Walker,  was  encamped  on  the  road  from 
Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg,  near  the  village  of  Fayetteville.  I  was  directed 
to  move  on  this  road  in  the  direction  of  York,  and  to  cross  the  Susquehanna, 
menacing  the  communications  of  Harrisburg  with  Philadelphia,  and  to  coop 
erate  with  General  Ewell,  acting  as  circumstances  might  require.  Accordingly, 
on  the  29th  I  moved  General  Heth's  division  to  Cashtown,  some  eight  miles 
from  Gettysburg,  following  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  with  the  division  of  Gen 
eral  Pender,  and  directing  General  Anderson  to  move  in  the  same  direction  on 
the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July.  On  arriving  at  Cashtown  General  Heth,  who 
had  sent  forward  Pettigrew's  brigade  to  Gettysburg,  reported  that  Pettigrew 
had  encountered  the  enemy  at  Gettysburg,  principally  cavalry,  but  in  what 
force  he  could  not  determine.  A  courier  was  then  dispatched  with  this  informa 
tion  to  the  general  commanding." — Extract  from  A.  P.  Hill's  "  Report,"  "  South 
ern  Historical  Society  Papers,"  November,  1ST6. 


94  FOUR  YEARS  WITH   GENERAL  LEE. 

turned  the  head  of  his  column  in  that  direction.  When 
within  a  few  miles  of  the  town,  General  Rodes,  whose  divis 
ion  was  in  advance,  was  made  aware,  by  the  sharp  cannon 
ading,  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  force  at  Gettysburg, 
and  caused  immediate  preparations  for  battle  to  be  made. 

On  reaching  the  scene  of  conflict,  General  Rodes  made 
his  dispositions  to  assail  the  force  with  which  Hill's  troops 
were  engaged,  but  no  sooner  were  his  lines  formed  than  he 
perceived  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy  extending  their  right 
flank,  and  deploying  in  his  immediate  front.  With  this 
force  he  was  soon  actively  engaged.  The  contest  now  be 
came  sharp  and  earnest.  Neither  side  sought  or  expected  a 
general  engagement ;  and  yet,  brought  thus  unexpectedly  in 
the  presence  of  each  other,  found  a  conflict  unavoidable. 

The  battle  continued,  with  varying  success,  until  perhaps 
3  P.  M.,  when  General  Early,  of  Ewell's  corps,  reached  the 
field  with  his  division,  moved  in  on  Rodes's  left,  and  attacked 
the  enemy  with  his  accustomed  vigor  and  impetuosity.  This 
decided  the  contest.  The  enemy's  right  gave  way  under 
Early's  assault.  Fender's  division,  of  Hill's  corps,  had  mean 
while  been  advanced  to  relieve  that  of  Heth ;  and  Rodes, 
observing  the  effect  of  Early's  attack,  ordered  his  line  for 
ward.  There  resulted  a  general  and  irresistible  advance  of 
our  entire  line  ;  the  enemy  gave  way  at  all  points,  and  were 
driven  in  disorder  through  and  beyond  the  town  of  Gettys 
burg,  leaving  over  five  thousand  prisoners  in  our  hands. 

In  this  action  the  force  engaged  on  the  Confederate  side, 
as  already  stated,  consisted  of  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Fen- 
der,  of  Hill's  corps,  and  those  of  Early  and  Rodes,  of  Ewell's 
corps.  On  the  side  of  the  Federals  there  was  the  First 
Corps,  embracing  the  divisions  of  Wads  worth,  Doubleday, 
and  Robinson  ;  the  Eleventh  Corps,  embracing  the  divisions 
of  Schurz,  Barlow,  and  Steinwehr ;  and  the  cavalry  force 
under  General  Buford.  The  infantry  force  on  each  side  was 
about  the  same,1  and  the  preponderance  in  numbers  was  with 

1  The  four  divisions  of  Confederates  had  an  average  strength  of  six  thousand 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   CAMPAIGN.  95 

the  Federals,  to  the  extent  of  General  Buford's  cavalry 
command. 

General  Lee  witnessed  the  flight  of  the  Federals  through 
Gettysburg  and  up  the  hills  beyond.  He  then  directed  me 
to  go  to  General  Ewell  and  to  say  to  him  that,  from  the 
position  which  he  occupied,  he  could  see  the  enemy  retreat 
ing  over  those  hills,  without  organization  and  in  great  con 
fusion,  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  press  "  those  people  " 
in  order  to  secure  possession  of  the  heights,  and  that,  if  pos 
sible,  he  wished  him  to  do  this.  In  obedience  to  these  in 
structions,  I  proceeded  immediately  to  General  Ewell  and 
delivered  the  order  of  General  Lee ;  and,  after  receiving 
from  him  some  message  for  the  commanding  general  in  re 
gard  to  the  prisoners  captured,  returned  to  the  latter  and 
reported  that  his  order  had  been  delivered. 

General  Ewell  did  not  express  any  objection,  or  indicate 
the  existence  of  any  impediment,  to  the  execution  of  the 
order  conveyed  to  him,  but  left  the  impression  upon  my  mind 
that  it  would  be  executed.  In  the  exercise  of  that  discre 
tion,  however,  which  General  Lee  was  accustomed  to  accord 
to  his  lieutenants,  and  probably  because  of  an  undue  regard 
for  his  admonition,  given  early  in  the  day,  not  to  precipitate 
a  general  engagement,  General  Ewell  deemed  it  unwise  to 
make  the  pursuit.  The  troops  were  not  moved  forward, 
and  the  enemy  proceeded  to  occupy  and  fortify  the  po- 

when  General  Lee  started  on  this  campaign,  reduced  at  this  date  to  about  five 
thousand  five  hundred,  as  will  be  shown  later  in  this  narrative ;  making  the 
total  engaged  in  the  action  of  the  first  day  twenty-two  thousand.  It  could  not 
have  exceeded  twenty-four  thousand.  General  Butterfield,  chief  of  staff  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  testified  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  ("  Report,"  second  series,  p.  428)  that  on  the  10th  of  June  the  First 
Corps  had  eleven  thousand  three  hundred  and  fifty,  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  ten 
thousand  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven,  present  for  duty ;  and  that  previous  to 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg  the  First  Corps  was  increased  by  the  addition  of  Stan- 
nard's  Vermont  Brigade.  It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  First  and  Eleventh 
Corps,  at  the  time  of  the  engagement,  had  a  total  strength  of  from  twenty-two 
to  twenty-four  thousand.  Mr.  Swinton  puts  the  loss  sustained  by  these  two 
corps  at  "  near  ten  thousand  men." 


96          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

•sition  which  it  was  designed  that  General  Ewell  should 
seize. 

Major-General  Edward  Johnson,  whose  division  reached 
the  field  after  the  engagement,  and  formed  on  the  left  of 
Early,  in  a  conversation  had  with  me,  since  the  war,  about 
this  circumstance,  in  which  I  sought  an  explanation  of  our 
inaction  at  that  time,  assured  me  that  there  was  no  hinderance 
to  his  moving  forward ;  but  that,  after  getting  his  command 
in  line  of  battle,  and  before  it  became  seriously  engaged  or 
had  advanced  any  great  distance,  for  some  unexplained  rea 
son,  he  had  received  orders  to  halt.  This  was  after  General 
Lee's  message  was  delivered  to  General  Ewell. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  darkness  veiled 
the  scene  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day.  The  prevailing 
idea  with  General  Lee  was,  to  press  forward  without  delay  ; 
to  follow  up  promptly  and  vigorously  the  advantage  already 
gained.  Having  failed  to  reap  the  full  fruit  of  the  victory 
before  night,  his  mind  was  evidently  occupied  with  the  idea 
of  renewing  the  assault  upon  the  enemy's  right  with  the 
dawn  of  day  on  the  second.  The  divisions  of  Major-Gen 
erals  Early  and  Rodes,  of  Swell's  corps,  had  been  actively 
engaged,  and  had  sustained  some  loss,  but  were  still  in  ex 
cellent  condition,  and  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  the  prestige 
of  success  and  a  consequent  elation  of  spirit,  in  having  so 
gallantly  swept  the  enemy  from  their  front,  through  the 
town  of  Gettysburg,  and  compelled  him  to  seek  refuge  be 
hind  the  heights  beyond.  The  division  of  Major-General 
Edward  Johnson,  of  the  same  corps,  was  perfectly  fresh,  not 
having  been  engaged.  Anderson's  division,  of  Hill's  corps, 
was  also  now  up.  With  this  force  General  Lee  thought  that 
the  enemy's  position  could  be  assailed  with  every  prospect 
of  success  ;  but,  after  a  conference  with  the  corps  and  divis 
ion  commanders  on  our  left,  who  represented  that,  in  their 
judgment,  it  would  be  hazardous  to  attempt  to  storm  the 
strong  position  occupied  by  the  enemy,  with  troops  some 
what  fagged  by  the  marching  and  fighting  of  the  first  day; 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  97 

that  the  ground  in  their  immediate  front  furnished  greater 
obstacles  to  a  successful  assault  than  existed  at  other  points 
of  the  line,  and  that  it  could  be  reasonably  concluded,  since 
they  had  so  severely  handled  the  enemy  in  their  front,  that 
he  would  concentrate  and  fortify  with  special  reference  to 
resisting  a  further  advance  just  there,  he  determined  to  make 
the  main  attack  well  on  the  enemy's  left,  indulging  the  hope 
that  Longstreet's  corps  would  be  up  in  time  to  begin  the 
movement  at  an  early  hour  on  the  2d.  He  instructed  Gen 
eral  Ewell  to  be  prepared  to  cooperate  by  a  simultaneous  ad 
vance  by  his  corps.  General  Longstreet  was  unexpectedly 
detained,  however,  as  will  best  appear  from  the  following 
extract  from  his  report  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  In 
speaking  of  his  movements  on  the  1st  day  of  July^  he  says  : 

Our  march  on  this  day  was  greatly  delayed  by  Johnson's 
division,  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  came  into  the  road  from 
Shippensburg,  and  the  long  wagon-trains  that  followed  him. 
McLaws's  division,  however,  reached  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles 
from  Gettysburg,  a  little  after  dark,  and  Hood's  division  got 
within  nearly  the  same  distance  of  the  town  about  twelve  o'clock 
at  night.  Law's  brigade  was  ordered  forward  to  its  division  dur 
ing  the  day,  and  joined  about  noon  on  the  2d. 

Previous  to  his  joining  I  received  instructions  from  the 
commanding  general  to  move  with  the  portion  of  my  command 
that  was  up  around  to  gain  the  Emmettsburg  road  on  the  en 
emy's  left.  The  enemy,  having  been  driven  back  by  the  corps 
of  Lieutenant-Generals  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill  the  day  previous, 
had  taken  a  strong  position  extending  from  the  hill  at  the  cem 
etery  along  the  Emmettsburg  road. 

Fearing  that  my  force  was  too  weak  to  venture  to  make  an 
attack,  I  delayed  until  General  Law's  brigade  joined  its  divis 
ion.  As  soon  after  his  arrival  as  we  could  make  our  prepara 
tions,  the  movement  was  begun. 

Engineers,  sent  out  by  the  commanding  general  and  myself, 

guided  us  by  a  road  which  would  have  completely  disclosed  the 

move.     Some  delay  ensued  in  seeking  a  more  concealed  route. 

McLaws's  division  got  into  position  opposite  the  enemy's  left 

Y 


98          FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

about  4  P.  M.    Hood's  division  was  moved  on  farther  to  our  right, 
and  got  into  position,  partially  enveloping  the  enemy's  left. 

General  Longstreet  here  explains  the  cause  of  the  delay 
in  bringing  up  his  troops  on  the  first  day ;  but,  notwith 
standing  this,  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  (with  the 
exception  of  Law's  brigade)  encamped  within  four  miles  of 
Gettysburg  at  midnight  of  the  1st  of  July.  He  then  re 
ceived  instructions  to  move  with  the  portion  of  his  command 
that  was  then  up,  to  gain  the  Emmettsburg  road  on  the 
enemy's  left ;  but  fearing  that  his  force  was  too  weak  to 
venture  to  make  an  attack,  he  delayed  until  Law's  brigade 
joined  its  division,  about  noon  on  the  2d. 

In  this,  General  Longstreet  clearly  admits  that  he  as 
sumed  the  responsibility  of  postponing  the  execution  of  the 
orders  of  the  commanding  general.  Owing  to  the  causes 
assigned,  the  troops  were  not  in  position  to  attack  until  4 
p.  M.  One  can  imagine  what  was  going  on  in  the  Federal 
lines  meanwhile.  Round  Top,  the  key  to  their  position, 
which  was  not  occupied  in  the  morning,  they  now  held  in 
force,  and  another  corps  (Sedgwick's)  had  reached  the  field. 

Late  as  it  was,  the  original  plan  was  adhered  to.  The 
two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  gallantly  advanced,  forced 
the  enemy  back  a  considerable  distance,  and  captured  some 
trophies  and  prisoners. 

Swell's  divisions  were  ordered  forward,  and  likewise 
gained  additional  ground  and  trophies. 

On  Cemetery  Hill  the  attack  by  Early 's  leading  brigades 
was  made  with  vigor.  They  drove  the  enemy  back  into  the 
works  on  the  crest,  into  which  they  forced  their  way,  and 
seized  several  pieces  of  artillery ;  but  they  were  compelled 
to  relinquish  what  they  had  gained,  from  want  of  expected 
support  on  their  right,  and  retired  to  their  original  position, 
bringing  with  them  some  prisoners  and  four  stands  of  colors. 
In  explanation  of  this  lack  of  expected  support,  General 
Eodes,  who  was  on  General  Early's  right,  states  in  his  report 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   CAMPAIGN.  99 

that  after  lie  had  conferred  with  General  Early,  on  his  left, 
and  General  Lane,  on  his  right,  and  arranged  to  attack  in 
concert,  he  proceeded  at  once  to  make  the  necessary  prepara 
tions  ;  but  as  he  had  to  draw  his  troops  out  of  the  town  by 
the  flank,  change  the  direction  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  then 
traverse  a  distance  of  twelve  or  fourteen  hundred  yards, 
while  General  Early  had  to  move  only  half  that  distance, 
without  change  of  front,  it  resulted  that,  before  he  drove  in 
the  enemy's  skirmishers,  General  Early  had  attacked,  and 
been  compelled  to  withdraw. 

The  whole  affair  was  disjointed.  There  was  an  utter 
absence  of  accord  in  the  movements  of  the  several  com 
mands,  and  no  decisive  result  attended  the  operations  of  the 
second  day. 

It  is  generally  conceded  that  General  Longstreet,  011  this 
occasion,  was  fairly  chargeable  writh  tardiness,  and  I  have 
always  thought  that  his  conduct,  in  this  particular,  was  due 
to  a  lack  of  appreciation  on  his  part  of  the  circumstances 
which  created  an  urgent  and  peculiar  need  for  the  presence 
of  his  troops  at  the  front. 

As  soon  as  the  necessity  for  the  concentration  of  the 
army  was  precipitated  by  the  unexpected  encounter  on  the 
1st  of  July  with  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  near  Gettysburg, 
General  Longstreet  was  urged  to  hasten  his  march,  and  this, 
perhaps,  should  have  sufficed  to  cause  him  to  push  his 
divisions  on  toward  Gettysburg,  from  which  point  he  was 
distant  but  four  miles,  early  on  the  2d  ;  but  I  cannot  say  that 
he  was  notified,  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  of  the  attack  pro 
posed  to  be  made  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  and  the  part  his 
corps  was  to  take  therein.  Neither  do  I  think  it  just  to 
charge  that  he  was  alone  responsible  for  the  delay  in  attack 
ing  that  ensued  after  his  arrival  on  the  field.  I  well  remem 
ber  how  General  Lee  was  chafed  by  the  non-appearance  of 
the  troops,  until  he  finally  became  restless,  and  rode  back  to 
meet  General  Longstreet,  and  urge  him  forward  ;  but,  then, 
there  was  considerable  delay  in  putting  the  troops  to  work 


100  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

after  they  reached  the  field,  and  much  time  was  spent  in  dis 
cussing  what  was  to  be  done,  which,  perhaps,  could  not  be 
avoided.  At  any  rate,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  hold 
General  Longstreet  alone  accountable  for  this. 

Indeed,  great  injustice  has  been  done  him  in  the  charge 
that  he  had  orders  from  the  commanding  general  to  attack 
the  enemy  at  sunrise  on  the  2d  of  July,  and  that  he  dis 
obeyed  these  orders.  This  would  imply  that  he  was  in  posi 
tion  to  attack,  whereas  General  Lee  but  anticipated  his  early 
arrival  on  the  2d,  and  based  his  calculations  upon  it.  I  have 
shown  how  he  was  disappointed,  and  I  need  hardly  add  that 
the  delay  was  fatal.  In  this  connection,  I  submit  the  follow 
ing  correspondence : 

NEW  ORLEANS,  LA.,  April  20,  1875. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL  :  Upon  reading  an  address  by  Mr.  Pen- 
dleton,  published  in  the  December  number  of  the  Southern 
Magazine,  I  saw  for  the  first  time  that  General  Lee  had  ordered 
me  to  attack  the  left  of  the  Federal  army  at  "  sunrise,"  on  the 
second  day  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

It  occurs  to  me  that  if  General  Lee  had  any  such  idea  as  an 
attack  at  sunrise,  you  must  surely  be  advised  of  it.  Right  sure 
am  I  that  such  an  order  was  never  delivered  to  me,  and  it  is  not 
possible  for  me  to  believe  that  he  ever  entertained  an  idea  that 
I  was  to  attack  at  that  hour.  My  two  divisions,  nor  myself,  did 
not  reach  General  Lee  until  8  A.  M.  on  the  2d,  and  if  he  had 
intended  to  attack  at  sunrise  he  surely  would  have  expressed 
some  surprise,  or  made  some  allusion  to  his  orders. 

Please  do  me  the  favor  to  let  me  know  what  you  know  of 
this  sunrise  attack.  .  .  . 

I  remain  very  respectfully  and  truly  yours, 

JAMES  LONGSTREET. 
Colonel  W.  H.  TAYLOR,  Norfolk,  Virginia. 

NORFOLK,  VA.,  April  28, 1875. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  20th 
inst.  I  have  not  read  the  article  of  which  you  speak,  nor  have 
I  ever  seen  a  copy  of  General  Pendleton's  address ;  indeed,  I 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  101 

have  read  little  or  nothing  of  what  has  been  written  since  the 
war :  in  the  first  place,  because  I  could  not  spare  the  time ;  and, 
in  the  second,  because,  of  those  of  whose  writings  I  have  heard, 
I  deem  but  very  few  entitled  to  any  attention  whatever. 

I  can  only  say  that  I  never  before  heard  of  the  "  sunrise  at 
tack  "  you  were  to  have  made,  as  charged  by  General  Pendle- 
ton.  If  such  an  order  was  given  you,  I  never  knew  it,  or  it  has 
strangely  escaped  my  memory.  I  think  it  more  than  probable 
that,  if  General  Lee  had  had  your  troops  available  the  evening 
previous  to  the  day  of  which  you  speak,  he  would  have  ordered 
an  early  attack  /  but  this  does  not  touch  the  point  at  issue. 

I  regard  it  as  a  great  mistake  on  the  part  of  those  who,  per 
haps  because  of  political  differences,  now  undertake  to  criticise 
and  attack  your  war  record.  Such  conduct  is  most  ungenerous, 
and  I  am  sure  meets  the  disapprobation  of  all  good  Confeder 
ates  with  whom  I  have  the  pleasure  of  associating  in  the  daily 
walks  of  life. 

Yours  very  respectfully  and  truly, 

W.  H.  TAYLOR. 

General  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  New  Orleans. 

Since  the  date  of  this  correspondence,  several  communi 
cations  have  appeared  in  the  public  prints,  from  the  pen  of 
General  Longstreet,  in  reference  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 
He  claims  that  General  Lee  gave  battle  there  in  spite  of  his 
remonstrances.  Had  such  been  the  fact,  it  would  work  no 
discredit  to  General  Lee,  though  at  variance  with  his  usual 
propensity  to  defer  to  such  objections  on  the  part  of  his  lieu 
tenants  ;  but  I  never  heard  of  it  before,  neither  is  it  consistent 
with  General  Longstreet's  assertion  to  Mr.  Swinton,  since 
made,  that  at  the  time  in  question  "  the  Army  of  Northern 
Yirginia  was  in  condition  to  undertake  anything"  In  this 
opinion  he  but  expressed  the  sentiment  of  the  whole  army  ; 
an  overweening  confidence  possessed  us  all.  Now,  in  a 
retrospective  view  of  the  results  attained,  it  is  easy  to  con 
clude  that  it  would  have  been  well  not  to  have  attacked  the 
third  day.  But  did  we  accomplish  all  that  could  have  been 


102  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

reasonably  expected  ?  And  if  we  failed  to  attain  results 
reasonably  to  be  expected  of  an  army  in  condition  to  -under 
take  anything,  how  did  it  happen  ? 

General  Lee  determined  to  renew  the  attack  upon  the 
enemy's  position  on  the  3d  day  of  July.  In  his  report  of 
the  campaign,  in  speaking  of  the  operations  of  the  second 
day,  he  says : 

The  result  of  this  day's  operations  induced  the  belief  that, 
with  proper  concert  of  action,  and  with  the  increased  support 
that  the  positions  gained  on  the  right  would  enable  the  artillery 
to  render  the  assaulting  columns,  we  should  ultimately  succeed; 
and  it  was  accordingly  determined  to  continue  the  attack. 

The  general  plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet,  reenforced  by 
Pickett's  three  brigades,  which  arrived  near  the  battle-field  dur 
ing  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  was  ordered  to  attack  the  next 
morning ;  and  General  Ewell  was  directed  to  assail  the  enemy's 
right  at  the  same  time. 

General  Longstreet's  dispositions  were  not  completed  as 
early  as  was  expected ;  it  appears  that  he  was  delayed  by 
apprehensions  that  his  troops  would  be  taken  in  reverse  as 
they  advanced.  General  Ewell,  who  had  orders  to  cooperate 
with  General  Longstreet,  and  who  was,  of  course,  not  aware 
of  any  impediment  to  the  main  attack  arranged  to  be  made 
on  the  enemy's  left,  having  reenforced  General  Johnson, 
whose  division  was  upon  our  extreme  left  during  the  night 
of  the  2d,  ordered  him  forward  early  the  next  morning. 

In  obedience  to  these  instructions,  General  Johnson  be 
came  hotly  engaged  before  General  Ewell  could  be  informed 
of  the  halt  which  had  been  called  on  our  right. 

After  a  gallant  and  prolonged  struggle,  in  which  the  enemy 
was  forced  to  abandon  part  of  his  intrenchments,  General  John 
son  found  himself  unable  to  carry  the  strongly-fortified  crest  of 
the  hill.  The  projected  attack  on  the  enemy's  left  not  having 
been  made,  he  was  enabled  to  hold  his  right  with  a  force  largely 
superior  to  that  of  General  Johnson,  and  finally  to  threaten  his 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  103 

flank  and  rear,  rendering  it  necessary  for  him  to  retire  to  his 
original  position  about  1  p.  M.1 

General  Lee  then  had  a  conference  with  General  Long- 
street,  and  the  mode  of  attack  and  the  troops  to  make  it 
were  thoroughly  debated.  I  was  present,  and  understood  the 
arrangement  to  be  that  General  Longstreet  should  endeavor 
to  force  the  enemy's  lines  in  his  front.  That  front  was  held 
by  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws.  To  strengthen  him 
for  the  undertaking,  it  was  decided  to  reenforce  him  by  such 
troops  as  could  be  drawn  from  the  centre. 

Pickett's  division,  of  Longstreet's  corps,  was  then  up, 
fresh  and  available.  Heth's  division,  of  Hill's  corps,  was 
also  mentioned  as  available,  having  in  great  measure  recuper 
ated  since  its  active  engagement  of  the  first  day ; 3  so  also 
were  the  brigades  of  Lane  and  Scales,  of  Fender's  division, 
Hill's  corps;  and  as  our  extreme  right  was  comparatively 
safe,  being  well  posted,  and  not  at  all  threatened,  one  of  the 
divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  and  the  greater  portion  of 
the  other,  could  be  moved  out  of  the  lines  and  be  made  to 
take  part  in  the  attack.  Indeed,  it  was  designed  originally 
that  the  two  divisions  last  named,  reenforced  by  Pickett, 
should  make  the  attack  ;  and  it  was  only  because  of  the  ap 
prehensions  of  General  Longstreet  that  his  corps  was  not 
strong  enough  for  the  movement,  that  General  Hill  was 
called  on  to  reenforce  him. 

Orders  were  sent  to  General  Hill  to  place  Heth's  division 
and  two  brigades  of  Pender's  at  General  Longstreet's  dis 
posal,  and  to  be  prepared^BTgive  him  further  assistance  if 
requested.  ^^ 

The  assault  was  to  have  been  made  with  a  column  of  not 

1  Extract  from  General  Lee's  "  Report." 

3  NOTE  BY  COLONEL  VENABLE. — u  They  were  terribly  mistaken  about  Heth's 
division  in  this  planning.  It  had  not  recuperated,  having  suffered  more  than 
was  reported  on  the  first  day.  Heth  had  suffered  heavily  on  the  1st,  before 
Pender  and  Rodes  got  up.  He  had  gone  almost  into  Gettysburg.  Rodes  found 
dead  Mississippians  on  the  wooded  hill  just  above  the  town." — C.  S.  V. 


104  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

less  than  two  divisions,  and  the  remaining  divisions  were  to 
have  been  moved  forward  in  support  of  those  in  advance. 
This  was  the  result  of  the  conference  alluded  to  as  under 
stood  by  me. 

Lieutenant-General  A.  P.  Hill  appears  to  have  had  the 
same  impression,  for  he  says  in  his  report  of  the  operations 
of  his  corps  at  this  time :  "  I  was  directed  to  hold  my  line 
with  Anderson's  division  and  the  half  of  Fender's,  now  com 
manded  by  General  Lane,  and  to  order  Heth's  division,  com 
manded  by  Pettigrew,  and  Lane's  and  Scales's  brigades,  of 
Pender's  division,  to  report  to  Lieutenant-General  Longstreet 
as  a  support  to  his  corps,  in  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  lines." 

General  Longstreet  proceeded  at  once  to  make  the  dis 
positions  for  attack,  and  General  Lee  rode  along  the  portion 
of  the  line  held  by  A.  P.  Hill's  corps,  and  finally  took  posi 
tion  about  the  Confederate  centre,  on  an  elevated  point,  from 
which  he  could  survey  the  field  and  watch  the  result  of  the 
movement. 

After  a  heavy  artillery  fire  along  the  entire  line,  and  at 
a  given  signal,  the  movement  began,  but  the  plan  agreed  on 
was  not  carried  out.  The  only  troops  that  participated  in 
the  attack  were  the  divisions  of  Pickett  (First  Corps)  and 
Heth  (Third  Corps) — the  latter,  since  the  wounding  of  Gen 
eral  Heth,  commanded  by  General  Pettigrew — and  the  bri 
gades  of  Lane,  Scales,  and  "Wilcox.  The  two  divisions  were 
formed  in  advance — the  three  brigades  as  their  support. 
The  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  (First  Corps)  were  pas 
sive  spectators  of  the  movement. 

To  one  who  observed  the  charge,  it  appeared  that  Pet- 
tigrew's  line  was  not  a  continuation  of  that  of  Pickett,  but 
that  it  advanced  in  echelon.  It  would  seem  that  there  was 
some  confusion  in  forming  the  troops,  for  Captain  Louis  G. 
Young,  of  General  Pettigrew's  staff,  says  : 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  July,  General  Pettigrew,  com 
manding  Heth's  division,  was  instructed  to  report  .to  General 
Longstreet,  who  directed  him  to  form  in  the  rear  of  Pickett's  divi- 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  105 

sion,  and  sypport  his  advance  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  which  would 
be  commenced  as  soon  as  the  fire  from  our  artillery  should  have 
driven  the  enemy  from  his  guns  and  prepared  the  way  for  at 
tack.  And  I  presume  that  it  was  in  consequence  of  this  having 
been  the  first  plan  settled  on,  that  the  erroneous  report  was  cir 
culated  that  Heth's  division  was  assigned  the  duty  of  support 
ing  that  of  Pickett.  But  the  order  referred  to  was  counter 
manded  almost  as  soon  as  given,  and  General  Pettigrew  was  in 
structed  to  advance  upon  the  same  line  with  Pickett,  a  portion 
of  Pender's  division  acting  as  supports. 

"Wilcox's  brigade  was  ordered  to  support  Pickett's  right 
flank,  and  the  brigades  of  Lane  and  Scales  acted  as  supports 
to  Heth's  division. 

General  Lane,  in  Ins  report,  says  : 

General  Longstreet  ordered  me  to  form  in  rear  of  the  right 
of  Heth's  division,  commanded  by  General  Pettigrew.  Soon 
after  I  had  executed  this  order,  putting  Lowrance  on  the  right, 
I  was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  division  by  Major-General 
Trimble,  who  acted  under  the  same  orders  that  I  had  received. 
Heth's  division  was  much  longer  than  Lowrance's  brigade  and 
my  own,  which  constituted  its  only  support,  and  there  was,  con 
sequently,  no  second  line  in  rear  of  its  left. 

The  assaulting  column  really  consisted  of  Pickett's  di 
vision — two  brigades  in  front,  and  one  in  the  second  line  as 
a  support ' — with  the  brigade  of  "Wilcox  in  rear  of  its  right 
to  protect  that  flank ;  while  Heth's  division  moved  forward 
on  Pickett's  left  in  echelon,  or  with  the  alignment  so  imper 
fect  and  so  drooping  on  the  left  as  to  appear  in  echelon,2  with 
Lane's  and  Scales's  brigades  in  rear  of  its  right,  and  its  left 
without  reserve  or  support,  and  entirely  exposed. 

Thus  the  column  moved  forward.  It  is  needless  to  say  a 
word  here  of  the  heroic  conduct  of  Pickett's  division ;  that 

1  Pickett  had  but  three  brigades  at  Gettysburg :  Corse  had  been  left  with  his 
brigade  at  Hanover  Junction. 

2  "  It  was  formed  in  echelon  a  hundred  yards  in  rear." — C.  S.  VENABLE. 


106  FOUR  YEARS  WITH   GENERAL  LEE. 

charge  lias  already  passed  into  history  as  "  one  of  the  world's 
great  deeds  of  arms."  While,  doubtless,  many  brave  men  of 
other  commands  reached  the  crest  of  the  height,  this  was  the 
only  organized  body  that  entered  the  works  of  the  enemy.1 
Much  can  be  said  in  excuse  for  the  failure  of  the  other  com 
mands  to  fulfill  the  task  assigned  them.  As  a  general  rule, 
the  peculiarly  rough  and  wooded  character  of  the  country  in 
which  our  army  was  accustomed  to  operate,  and  which  in 
some  respects  was  unfavorable  for  the  manoeuvres  of  large 
armies,  was  of  decided  advantage  to  us  ;  for,  in  moving  upon 
the  enemy  through  bodies  of  woods,  or  in  a  broken,  rolling 
country,  not  only  was  the  enemy  at  a  loss  how  to  estimate 
our  strength,  but  our  own  men  were  not  impressed  with  that 
sense  of  insecurity  which  must  have  resulted  from  a  thor 
ough  knowledge  of  their  own  weakness. 

1 "  The  troops  moved  steadily  on  under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery, 
the  main  attack  being  directed  against  the  enemy's  left  centre.  His  batteries 
reopened  as  soon  as  they  appeared.  Our  own,  having  nearly  exhausted  their 
ammunition  in  the  protracted  cannonade  that  preceded  the  advance  of  the  in 
fantry,  were  unable  to  reply,  or  render  the  necessary  support  to  the  attacking 
party.  Owing  to  this  fact,  which  was  unknown  to  me  when  the  assault  took 
place,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  throw  a  strong  force  of  infantry  against  our 
left,  already  wavering  under  a  concentrated  fire  of  artillery  from  the  ridge  in 
front,  and  from  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  left.  It  finally  gave  way,  and  the  right, 
after  penetrating  the  enemy's  lines,  entering  his  advance-works,  and  capturing 
some  of  his  artillery,  was  attacked  simultaneously  in  front  and  on  both  flanks, 
and  driven  back  with  heavy  loss." — Extract  from  General  Lee's  "Report," 
"Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,"  July,  1876,  p.  44. 

In  justice  to  the  gallant  men  and  officers  of  Heth's  division,  I  here  append 
the  testimony  of  Captain  Louis  G.  Young,  aide  to  General  Pettigrew,  who,  in 
describing  the  part  taken  in  the  third  day's  fight  by  the  division,  says :  "  Under 
this  fire  from  artillery  and  musketry,  the  brigade  on  our  left,  reduced  almost  to 
a  line  of  skirmishers,  gave  way.  Pettigrew's  and  Archer's  brigades  advanced  a 
little  farther,  and  in  perfect  continuation  of  Pickett's  line,  which  arrived  at  the 
works  before  we  did,  only  because  they  jutted  out  in  his  front,  and  because  his 
had  to  move  over  a  considerably  shorter  distance.  The  right  of  the  line,  formed 
by  Archer's  and  Pettigrew's  brigades,  rested  on  the  works,  while  the  left  was, 
of  course,  farther  removed,  say  forty  to  sixty  yards.  Subjected  to  a  fire  even 
more  fatal  than  that  which  had  driven  back  the  brigade  on  our  left,  and  the  men 
listening  in  vain  for  the  cheering  commands  of  officers,  who  had,  alas !  fallen, 
our  brigade  gave  way  likewise,  and,  simultaneously  with  it,  the  whole  line." 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  107 

It  was  different  here.  The  charge  was  made  down  a 
gentle  slope,  and  then  up  to  the  enemy's  lines,  a  distance  of 
over  half  a  mile,  denuded  of  forests,  and  in  full  sight  of  the 
enemy,  and  perfect  range  of  their  artillery.  These  combined 
causes  produced  their  natural  effect  upon  Pettigrew's  division 
and  the  brigades  supporting  it,  caused  them  to  falter,  and 
finally  retire.  Then  Pickett's  division  continuing  the  charge 
without  supports,  and  in  the  sight  of  the  enemy,  was  not 
half  so  formidable  or  effective  as  it  would  have  been  had 
trees  or  hills  prevented  the  enemy  from  so  correctly  estimat 
ing  the  strength  of  the  attacking  column,  and  our  own  troops 
from  experiencing  that  sense  of  weakness  which  the  known 
absence  of  support  necessarily  produced.  In  spite  of  all  this, 
it  steadily  and  gallantly  advanced  to  its  allotted  task.  As 
the  three  brigades  under  Garnett,  Armistead,  and  Kemper, 
approach  the  enemy's  lines,  a  most  terrific  fire  of  artillery 
and  small-arms  is  concentrated  upon  them ;  but  they  swerve 
not — there  is  no  faltering;  steadily  moving  forward,  they 
rapidly  reduce  the  intervening  space,  and  close  with  their 
adversaries :  leaping  the  breastworks,  they  drive  back  the 
enemy,  and  plant  their  standards  on  the  captured  guns,  amid 
shouts  of  victory — dearly  won  and  short-lived  victory. 

No  more  could  be  exacted,  or  expected,  of  those  men  of 
brave  hearts  and  nerves  of  steel ;  but  where  are  the  supports 
to  reap  the  benefit  of  their  heroic  efforts,  and  gather  the 
fruits  of  a  victory  so  nobly  won  ?  "Was  that  but  a  forlorn 
hope,  on  whose  success,  not  only  in  penetrating  the  enemy's 
lines,  but  in  maintaining  its  hold  against  their  combined  and 
united  efforts  to  dislodge  it,  an  entire  army  was  to  wait  in 
quiet  observation?  "Was  it  designed  to  throw  these  few 
brigades — originally,  at  the  most,  but  two  divisions — upon 
the  fortified  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  while,  full  half  a  mile 
away,  seven-ninths  of  the  army  in  breathless  suspense,  in 
ardent  admiration  and  fearful  anxiety,  watched,  but  moved 
not  ?  I  maintain  that  such  was  not  the  design  of  the  com 
manding  general.  Had  the  veteran  divisions  of  Hood  and 


108         FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

McLaws  been  moved  forward,  as  was  planned,  in  support  of 
those  of  Pickett  and  Pettigrew,1  not  only  would  the  latter 
division,  in  all  probability,  have  gained  the  enemy's  works, 
as  did  that  of  Pickett,  but  these  two  would  have  been  enabled, 
with  the  aid  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  to  resist  all  efforts  of  the 
enemy  to  dislodge  them.  The  enemy  closing  in  on  Pickett's 
brigades,  concentrating  upon  that  small  band  of  heroes  the 
fire  of  every  gun  that  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them, 
soon  disintegrated  and  overpowered  them.  Such  as  were 
not  killed,  disabled,  and  made  captive,  fell  back  to  our  lines. 

It  appears  that  General  Longstreet  deemed  it  necessary 
to  defend  his  right  flank  and  rear  with  the  divisions  of  Mc 
Laws  and  Hood.  These  divisions,  as  before  stated,  consti 
tuted  all  of  the  Confederate  line  held  by  Longstreet's  troops, 
and  it  is  not  apparent  how  they  were  necessary  to  defend 
his  flank  and  rear.  The  nearest  infantry  force  of  the  enemy 
to  our  right  occupied  the  hills — Kound  Top  and  Little  Hound 
Top — and  the  only  force  that  could  be  said  to  have  threat 
ened  our  flank  and  rear  consisted  of  a  few  brigades  of  cav 
alry,  so  posted  as  to  protect  the  enemy's  left. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  here  to  undertake  to  establish  the 
wisdom  of  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  position  on  the  third 
day,  which  General  Longstreet  contends  was  opposed  by  his 
judgment,  and  of  which,  he  says,  he  would  have  stayed  the 
execution,  had  he  felt  that  he  had  the  privilege  so  to  do  ;  nor 
do  I  propose  to  discuss  the  necessities  of  his  position,  which 
he  represents  to  have  been  such  as  to  forbid  the  employment 
of  McLaws's  and  Hood's  divisions  in  the  attack ;  neither  do  I 
seek  any  other  than  a  just  explanation  of  the  causes  of  our 
failure  at  that  time ;  but  wrell  recalling  my  surprise  and  dis 
appointment  when  it  was  ascertained  that  only  Pickett's 
division  and  the  troops  from  Hill's  corps  had  taken  part  in 
the  movement,  and  with  positively  distinct  impressions  as 

1  "  As  they  were  ordered  to  do  by  General  Lee,  for  I  heard  him  give  the  orders 
when  arranging  the  fight ;  and  called  his  attention  to  it  long  afterward,  when 
there  was  discussion  about  it.  He  said,  '  I  know  it !  I  know  it ! ' " — Colonel  C. 
S.  VENABLE. 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA   CAMPAIGN.  109 

to  the  occurrences  just  related,  I  deem  it  proper  to  record 
them  for  confirmation  or  refutation  as  the  undisputed  facts 
of  the  case,  and  the  testimony  of  others,  may  determine.1 

1  The  following  correspondence  explains  itself,  and  is  submitted,  without 
comment,  in  connection  with  the  assertions  of  fact  just  made  : 

NORFOLK,  VA.,  January  29, 1877. 
General  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  New  Orleans. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  have  been  anxious  to  ascertain  definitely  the  relative 
strength  of  the  two  opposing  armies  during  the  war,  and,  after  devoting  my  odd 
moments  to  an  investigation  of  the  matter  for  a  long  time  past,  I  have  at  last 
iSucceeded  in  reaching  a  satisfactory  result.  In  putting  these  matters  in  shape, 
and  in  order  to  give  continuity  and  connection  to  the  notes,  I  have  touched  upon 
the  more  important  incidents  in  General  Lee's  career,  placing  on  record  my 
recollection  of  facts,  and  sustaining  myself  as  much  as  possible  by  the  contem 
poraneous  testimony  of  those  who  participated  in  the  several  events. 

In  regard  to  the  third  day's  operations  at  Gettysburg,  according  to  my  recol 
lection,  General  Lee  had  a  conference  with  you  as  to  the  attack  to  be  made 
that  day,  when  it  was  determined  that  an  assault  should  be  made  on  your  front, 
by  your  corps,  reenforced  by  Heth's  division  and  two  brigades  of  Fender's. 
My  recollection  is  distinct  in  that  all  of  your  divisions  were  to  take  part  in  the 
assault,  and  I  never  did  understand  why  Hood  and  McLaws  were  never 
ordered  forward.  Colonel  V enable  agrees  with  me  entirely  in  this  particular. 

I  write,  therefore,  to  say  that  if  you  differ  from  me,  or  care  to  present  any 
explanation  of  the  non-action  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  I  should  be  pleased  to  have 
any  statement  you  may  make  accompany  that  which  I  propose  to  present  in 
my  notes. 

My  desire  is  to  do  what  I  can  toward  eliminating  the  truth  from  the  mass  of 
contradictory  evidence  that  exists,  and  particularly  anxious  am  I  to  avoid  doing 
injustice  to  any  one,  especially  to  one  who  dealt  such  vigorous  blows  for  the 
South,  and  whom  I  learned,  during  the  war,  to  esteem  so  highly  as  yourself. 
Yours  respectfully,  W.  H.  TAYLOR. 


NEW  ORLEANS,  LA.,  February  2,  1S77. 
Colonel  W.  H.  TAYLOR,  Norfolk,  Va. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  I  have  your  esteemed  favor  of  the  29th  ult,  and  have  noted 
its  contents. 

In  reply  to  your  inquiry  for  a  statement  in  regard  to  the  supposed  orders  of 
General  Lee  in  reference  to  the  battle  of  the  third  day,  I  have  only  to  say  that 
General  Lee  gave  no  orders  for  placing  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood  in 
the  column  of  attack  on  that  day.  I  cannot,  therefore,  have  any  explanation  to 
make  at  this  time  why  these  divisions  were  not  in  that  column. 

In  putting  your  notes  upon  the  events  of  the  .war  together  for  publication,  it 
seems  to  me  that  care  should  be  had  that  undue  influences  should  not  give 
shape  or  tone  to  them.  Least  of  all  should  you  omit  items  that  you  may  deem 
essential  to  General  Lee's  vindication,  upon  account  of  kindly  feelings  that  may 
have  subsisted  between  us.  Nor  do  I  know  of  good  reasons  why  a  report  of 
your  views  upon  matters  of  public  history  should  interrupt  personal  relations. 

I  have  the  privilege  of  giving  my  account  afterward,  and  am  quite  willing  to 
have  a  minute  investigation  of  Gettysburg,  and  to  have  the  world  know  my  con 
nection  with  it  from  the  inception  of  the  campaign  to  its  close. 
I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  LOKGSTREET. 


110  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

After  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  works  on  the  3d  of 
July,  there  was  no  serious  fighting  at  Gettysburg.  The  4th 
passed  in  comparative  quiet.  Neither  army  evinced  any  dis 
position  to  assail  the  other.  Notwithstanding  the  brilliant 
achievements  of  Ewell  and  Hill  on  the  first  day,  and  the  de 
cided  advantage  gained  by  Longstreet  on  the  second,  the 
failure  of  the  operations  of  the  third  day,  involving,  as  they 
did,  but  two  divisions  of  the  army,  deprived  us  of  the  pres 
tige  of  our  previous  successes,  and  gave  a  shadow  of  right  to 
our  adversary's  claim  of  having  gained  a  victory.  Their 
exultation,  however,  should  be  tempered  with  moderation, 
when  we  consider  that,  after  one  day  of  absolute  quiet,  the 
Confederates  withdrew  from  their  front  without  serious 
molestation,  and  with  bridges  swept  away,  and  an  impas 
sable  river  in  rear,  stood  in  an  attitude  of  defiance  until  their 
line  of  retreat  could  be  rendered  practicable,  after  which 
they  safely  recrossed  into  Yirginia.  Then,  again,  so  serious 
was  the  loss  visited  upon  the  Federals  in  the  engagements 
of  the  first  and  second  days,  and  so  near  success  was  the 
effort  to  storm  their  position  on  the  third  day,  that  they  were 
themselves  undecided  as  to  whether  they  should  stand  or  re 
treat.  In  discussing  several  councils  or  conferences  held 
by  General  Meade  with  his  corps-commanders,  General 
Sickles  testified,  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  that  the  reason  the  Confederates  were  not  fol 
lowed  up  was  on  account  of  differences  of  opinion  whether 
or  not  the  Federals  should  themselves  retreat,  as  "  it  was  by 
no  means  clear,  in  the  judgment  of  the  corps-commanders,  or 
of  the  general  in  command,  whether  they  had  won  or  not." l 

EFFECTIVE   STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG 

CAMPAIGN. 

It  appears  from  the  official  returns  on  file  in  the  War 
Department,  that  on  the  31st  of  May,  1863,  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  numbered :  infantry,  fifty-four  thousand 

1  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  302, 1865. 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  HI 

three  hundred  and  fifty-six ;  cavalry,  nine  thousand  five  hun 
dred  and  thirty-six ;  and  artillery,  four  thousand  four  hun 
dred  and  sixty ;  of  all  arms,  sixty-eight  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  fifty-two  effective.  This  was  immediately  before 
the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  and  may  be  regarded  as  rep 
resenting  the  maximum  of  General  Lee's  army  in  the  Gettys 
burg  campaign. 

At  the  time  of  that  return  the  army  was  divided  into  but 
two  corps  or  wings,  one  under  Longstreet,  and  the  other — 
Jackson's  old  corps — under  A.  P.  Hill.  The  former  em 
braced  the  divisions  of  McLaws,  Anderson,  Pickett,  and 
Hood ;  and  the  latter  those  of  A.  P.  Hill,  Early,  Eodes,  and 
Johnson.  Immediately  after  the  date  of  this  return,  the 
army  was  reorganized  into  three  corps,  as  follows :  Long- 
street's  (First  Corps),  embracing  the  divisions  of  McLawrs, 
Pickett,  and  Hood ;  Swell's  (Second  Corps),  embracing  the 
divisions  of  Early,  Rodes,  and  Johnson ;  and  Hill's  (Third 
Corps),  embracing  the  divisions  of  Anderson,  Heth,  and 
Pender. 

The  last  two  divisions  of  Hill's  corps  were  formed  by 
adding  Pettigrew's  brigade,  which  joined  the  army  just  at 
that  time,  and  J.  K.  Davis's  brigade  (formed  for  him  by 
taking  scattered  Mississippi  regiments  from  mixed  brigades), 
to  the  six  which  constituted  A.  P.  Hill's  old  division,  and 
dividing  the  eight  into  two  divisions  of  four  brigades  each. 
The  army  remained  the  same  as  to  brigades,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  the  one  additional  under  General  Pettigrew.  Gen 
eral  Corse  was  left  with  his  brigade  of  Pickett's  division,  and 
a  North  Carolina  regiment,1  at  Hanover  Junction,  and  took 
no  part  in  the  Pennsylvania  campaign ;  his  command  offset 
the  brigade  brought  to  the  army  by  General  Pettigrew,  and 
I  therefore  assume  that  the  army  return  just  now  quoted 
shows  General  Lee's  maximum  strength  in  that  campaign. 

On  the  20th  of  July,  1863,  after  the  return  of  General 
Lee  to  Virginia,  his  army  numbered  forty-one  thousand 

1  The  Forty-fourth  North  Carolina,  of  Pettigrew's  brigade. 


112  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

three  hundred  and  eighty-eight  effective,  exclusive  of  the 
cavalry  corps,  of  which  no  report  is  made  in  the  return  of 
the  date  last  mentioned ;  allowing  seven  thousand  six  hun 
dred  and  twelve,  a  fair  estimate  for  the  cavalry,  the  effective 
total  of  the  army,  on  the  20th  of  July,  was  forty-nine  thou 
sand.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  General  Lee's  loss  in  the 
Pennsylvania  campaign  was  about  nineteen  thousand. 

Concerning  the  strength  of  the  Federal  army,  General 
Meade  testified  as  follows  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War  (second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  337) :  u  Including  all 
arms  of  the  service,  my  strength  was  a  little  under  one  hun 
dred  thousand  men — about  ninety-five  thousand.  I  think  Gen 
eral  Lee  had  about  ninety  thousand  infantry,  four  thousand 
to  five  thousand  artillery,  and  about  ten  thousand  cavalry." 
Again  he  testifies :  "  I  think  the  returns  showed  me,  when  I 
took  command  of  the  army,  amounted  to  about  one  hundred 
and  five  thousand  men :  included  in  those  were  the  eleven 
thousand  of  General  French."  In  this  latter  matter  the  evi 
dence  is  against  General  Meade.  General  Hooker,  on  the 
27th  of  June,  1863,  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck,  from 
Poolesville,  "  My  whole  force  of  enlisted  men  for  duty  will 
not  exceed  one  hundred  and  five  thousand  (105,000)."  This 
would  make  his  total  effective  (officers  and  men)  fully  one 
hundred  and  twelve  thousand.  This  dispatch x  was  received 
by  General  Halleck  at  9  A.  M.  On  reaching  Sandy  Hook, 
subsequently,  on  the  same  day,  General  Hooker  telegraphed 
as  follows  concerning  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  under 
General  French :  "  I  find  ten  thousand  men  here  in  condi 
tion  to  take  the  field.  Here  they  are  of  no  earthly  account. 
They  cannot  defend  a  ford  of  the  river ;  and,  as  far  as  Har 
per's  Ferry  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  of  it.  As  for  the 
fortifications,  the  work  of  the  troops,  they  remain  when  the 
troops  are  withdrawn.  ISTo  enemy  will  ever  take  possession 
of  them  for  them.  This  is  my  opinion.  All  the  public 
property  could  have  been  secured  to-night,  and  the  troops 

1  "Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  291, 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN.  113 

marched  to  where  they  could  have  been  of  some  service." 
This  dispatch  was  received  by  General  Halleck  at  2.55  p.  M.1 

It  is  evident  that  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  was  not 
embraced  in  the  returns  alluded  to  by  General  Hooker,  in 
his  first  dispatch.  Although  General  Halleck  refused  these 
troops  to  General  Hooker,  they  were  immediately  awarded 
to  General  Meade  on  his  assuming  command  when  General 
Hooker  was  relieved. 

Without  more  accurate  returns  of  the  two  armies  at  Get 
tysburg,  we  are  left  to  form  our  conclusions  as  to  their 
strength  from  the  data  given  above.  I  put  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  one  hundred  and  five  thousand,  and  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  sixty-two  thousand  of  all  arms — 
fifty  thousand  infantry,  eight  thousand  cavalry,  and  four 
thousand  artillery — and  believe  these  figures  very  nearly 
correct. 

In  this  estimate,  I  adopt  the  strength  of  the  Federal 
army  as  given  by  its  commander  on  the  2Yth  of  June,  but 
four  days  before  the  first  encounter  at  Gettysburg,  excluding 
all  consideration  of  the  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry,  although 
General  Meade,  on  assuming  command,  at  once  ordered  Gen 
eral  French  to  move  to  Frederick  with  seven  thousand  men, 
to  protect  his  communications,2  and  thus  made  available  a 
like  number  of  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who  would 
otherwise  have  been  detached  for  this  service. 

On  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  the  entire  cavalry  corps  is 
included.  That  portion  which  General  Stuart  accompanied 
made  a  complete  circuit  of  the  Federal  army,  and  only  joined 
General  Lee  on  the  evening  of  the  second  day;  and  the 
brigades  under  Generals  Jones  and  Robertson,  which  had 
been  left  to  guard  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Eidge,  did  not 
rejoin  the  army  until  the  3d  of  July ;  only  the  commands 
of  Generals  Imboden  and  Jenkins  had  been  with  the  army 
from  the  time  of  crossing  the  Potomac,  and  they  accom- 

1  "  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  292. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  335. 
8 


114         FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

panied  General  Ewell.  "General  Stuart  had  several  skir 
mishes  during  his  march,  and  at  Hanover  quite  a  severe  en 
gagement  took  place  with  a  strong  force  of  cavalry,  which 
was  finally  compelled  to  withdraw  from  the  town.  The  ranks 
of  the  cavalry  were  much  reduced  by  its  long  and  arduous 
march,  repeated  conflicts,  and  insufficient  supplies  of  food 
and  forage."  :  I  have  deducted  from  the  strength  of  Gen 
eral  Lee's  army,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  one  month 
previous  to  the  battle,  only  a  reasonable  allowance  for  losses 
by  sickness  and  straggling,  casualties  in  the  encounters  with 
the  enemy  under  General  Milroy  and  in  the  constant  skir 
mishing  of  the  cavalry  before  and  after  leaving  Virginia,  and 
the  detachments  left  to  guard  our  communications,  to  pro 
tect  captured  property,  and  to  escort  prisoners  taken  on  the 
Virginia  side  of  the  river. 

1  General  Lee's  "  Report  of  the  Pennsylvania  Campaign." 


CHAPTER  IX. 

General  Lee  retires  to  Virginia. — Affair  at  Bristoe  Station. — The  Tete-de-Pont. 
— Mine  Run. — General  Meade's  Advance  and  Retreat. — Dahlgren's  Raid. 

ON  the  5th  of  July  our  army  left  Gettysburg.  Owing 
to  the  swollen  condition  of  the  Potomac,  it  did  not  recross 
into  Virginia  until  the  13th  of  the  same  month ;  it  was  not, 
however,  seriously  annoyed  or  molested  in  the  interval, 
though  confidently  and  anxiously  expecting  to  be  attacked. 
In  consequence  of  Meade's  advance  into  Virginia  east  of  the 
mountains,  General  Lee  moved  his  army  so  as  to  confront 
him,  and  soon  established  his  line  of  defense  along  the  Rap- 
idan  River,  where  the  army  was  allowed  two  months  of  com 
parative  rest  and  quiet.  In  October  General  Lee  again 
advanced,  but  no  general  engagement  ensued.  The  follow 
ing  extracts  from  notes  taken  by  me  at  the  time  will  serve 
to  illustrate  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  movements  then 
made: 

BRISTOE  STATION,  October,  1863. 

On  Sunday  (llth)  we  continued  our  march  for  Culpeper 
Court-House,  where  the  enemy  had  been  in  position,  with  a 
view  of  reaching  bis  flank  or  forcing  him  to  retire.  On  ar 
riving  at  a  point  five  miles  from  the  Court-House,  we  learned 
that  Meade  had  taken  refuge  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock  River,  and  it  was  necessary  to  try  another  flank- 
movement.  On  Monday,  therefore,  we  started  for  Warrenton 
by  way  of  Warrenton  Springs.  On  reaching  the  river  near 
the  latter  point  onr  progress  was  opposed  by  the  enemy 
who  held  the  opposite  bank ;  but  we  very  soon  succeeded  in 


116  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

forcing  a  passage  at  the  ford.  We  camped  near  the  springs 
that  night,  and  passed  them  the  next  day  on  our  way  to  War- 
renton.  On  Wednesday  we  left  Warrenton  and  reached  this 
place  the  same  day.  Here  Hill's  advance  met  a  corps  of  the 
enemy  and  at  once  engaged  it.  Our  other  corps  came  up  in 
good  time,  and  we  should  have  punished  the  enemy  severely ; 
but  matters  were  not  properly  managed  and  they  all  escaped 
us,  and,  what  is  worse,  they  got  the  better  of  us  in  what  little 
fighting  there  was.  Our  people  were  not  put  into  battle  cor 
rectly,  too  few  of  one  corps  being  engaged,  and  the  other  not 
having  its  line  of  battle  in  the  proper  direction.  By  unpardon 
able  mismanagement  the  enemy  was  allowed  to  capture  five 
pieces  of  our  artillery.  There  was  no  earthly  excuse  for  it,  as 
all  our  troops  were  well  in  hand,  and  much  stronger  than  the 
enemy. 

The  next  morning  it  was  discovered  that  the  latter  had  re 
treated  toward  Centreville  and  taken  refuge  behind  his  fortifica 
tions.  For  the  past  two  days  we  have  been  destroying  this 
railroad,  which  is  highly  essential  to  the  Federals  in  their  "on 
to  Richmond ; "  and  from  present  indications  I  think  that  a  gen 
eral  engagement  is  improbable,  and  that  the  fighting  for  this 
season  is  pretty  much  over.  We  have  taken  about  fifteen  hun 
dred  prisoners,  forced  the  enemy  back  to  Alexandria  and  Cen 
treville  without  any  general  battle,  and  gained  from  him,  for  a 
time  at  least,  a  large  portion  of  our  State. 

CAMP  NEAR  BRANDY  STATION,  November  7,  1863. 

This  evening  the  enemy  advanced  upon  us  at  Kelly's  Ford  on 
the  Rappahannock  River,  and  also  at  Rappahannock  Station ; 
effected  a  crossing  at  the  former  place,  rushed  upon  our  men  (two 
brigades)  who  were  at  the  latter  place  defending  the  bridge, 
overwhelmed  and  captured  most  of  them.  Thus,  in  a  very  few 
words,  I  record  the  saddest  chapter  in  the  history  of  this  army. 
Twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  men  were  captured,  and  also  a  battery 
of  artillery  of  four  pieces. 

Reference  is  here  made  to  the  unfortunate  affair  of  the 
tete-de-pont  near  Rappahannock  bridge.  At  the  time,  great 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  H? 

chagrin  was  felt  at  the  disaster,  and  much  discussion  was  had 
as  to  the  responsibility  therefor. 

Some  maintained  that  the  place  was  naturally  strong,  and 
that,  with  the  aid  of  the  earthworks,  it  could  be  readily  de 
fended  ;  others  contended  that  the  works  were  of  but  little 
protection,  and  the  means  of  escape,  in  event  of  disaster,  in 
adequate.  I  cannot  do  better,  in  aiding  to  effect  a  deter 
mination  of  these  questions,  than  quote,  from  the  official 
reports  of  General  Lee  and  Major-General  Early,  the  views 
they  respectively  entertained. 

General  Lee  says : 

To  hold  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock  at  this  part  of  its 
course  it  was  deemed  advantageous  to  maintain  our  communi 
cation  with  the  north  bank,  to  threaten  any  flank-movement 
the  enemy  might  make  above  or  below,  and  thus  compel  him  to 
divide  his  forces,  when  it  was  hoped  that  an  opportunity  would 
be  presented  to  concentrate  on  one  or  the  other  part.  For  this 
purpose,  a  point  was  selected  a  short  distance  above  the  site  of 
the  railroad-bridge,  where  the  hills  on  each  side  of  the  river 
afforded  protection  to  our  pontoon-bridge,  and  increased  the 
means  of  defense.  The  enemy  had  previously  constructed  some 
small  earthworks  on  these  hills,  to  repel  an  attack  from  the 
south.  That  on  the  north  side  was  converted  into  a  ttte-de-pont, 
and  a  line  of  rifle-trenches  extended  along  the  crest  on  the  right 
and  left  to  the  river-bank.  The  works  on  the  south  side  were 
remodeled,  and  sunken  batteries  for  additional  guns  constructed 
on  an  adjacent  hill  to  the  left.  Higher  up  on  the  same  side 
and  east  of  the  railroad,  near  the  river-bank,  sunken  batteries 
for  two  guns,  and  rifle-pits,  were  arranged  to  command  the  rail 
road  embankment,  under  cover  of  which  the  enemy  might  ad 
vance.  The  works  were  slight,  but  were  deemed  adequate  to 
accomplish  the  object  for  which  they  were  intended.  The  pon 
toon-bridge  was  considered  a  sufficient  means  of  communication, 
as,  in  the  event  of  the  troops  north  of  the  river  being  compelled 
to  withdraw,  their  crossing  could  be  covered  by  the  artillery 
and  infantry  in  the  works  on  the  south  side.  Four  pieces  of 


118  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

artillery  were  placed  in  the  tete-de-pont  and  eight  others  in  the 
works  opposite. 

In  speaking  of  the  assault  by  the  enemy,  he  continues : 

As  soon,  however,  as  it  became  dark  enough  to  conceal  his 
movements,  the  enemy  advanced  in  overwhelming  numbers 
against  our  rifle-trenches  and  succeeded  in  carrying  them  in  the 
manner  described  in  the  reports  of  Generals  Early  and  Hays. 
It  would  appear  from  these  reports,  and  the  short  duration  of 
the  firing,  that  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  approach  very  near 
the  works  before  being  seen.  The  valley  in  our  front  aided  in 
concealing  his  advance  from  view,  and  a  strong  wind  effectually 
prevented  any  movements  from  being  heard.  It  was  essential 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  position,  under  these  circumstances, 
that  sharp-shooters  should  have  been  thrown  forward  to  give 
early  information  of  his  approach,  in  order  that  he  might  be 
subjected  to  fire  as  long  as  possible,  but  it  is  not  stated  that 
this  precaution  was  taken.  The  breaking  of  the  enemy's  first 
line  and  the  surrender  of  part  of  it,  as  described  in  the  reports, 
also  contributed  to  divert  attention  from  the  approach  of  the 
second  and  third,  and  enabled  them  to  press  into  the  works. 
The  darkness  of  the  night,  and  the  fear  of  injuring  our  own  men 
who  had  surrendered,  prevented  General  Early  from  using  the 
artillery  on  the  south  bank.  .  .  . 

The  suggestions  above  mentioned  afford  the  only  explana 
tion  I  am  able  to  give  of  this  unfortunate  affair,  as  the  courage 
and  good  conduct  of  the  troops  engaged  have  been  too  often 
tried  to  admit  of  any  question. 

The  loss  of  this  position  made  it  necessary  to  abandon  the 
design  of  attacking  the  force  that  had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford, 
and  the  army  was  withdrawn  to  the  only  tenable  line  between 
Culpeper  Court-House  and  the  Rappahannock,  where  it  re 
mained  during  the  succeeding  day.  The  position  not  being 
regarded  as  favorable,  it  returned  the  night  following  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Rapidan. 

General  Early,  whose  division  alternated  with  that  under 


OPERATIONS  ALONG  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.      H9 

General  Johnson  in  furnishing  a  garrison  for  the  works,  and 
whose  troops  were  on  duty  the  day  in  question,  says : 

The  works  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  were,  in  my  judg 
ment,  very  inadequate  and  not  judiciously  laid  out  or  con 
structed.  .  .  .  There  was  no  ditch  on  the  outside  of  the  work. 
...  I  had  myself  pointed  out  some  of  the  defects  of  the  works  to 
the  engineers  having  charge  of  them,  and  I  had  urged  the  neces 
sity  of  having  another  bridge  farther  up  the  stream.  The  fact  is, 
in  my  opinion,  the  position  was  susceptible  of  being  made  very 
strong,  but,  in  order  to  enable  a  small  force  to  hold  it  against  a 
large  attacking  force,  the  works  ought  to  have  been  entirely  in 
closed,  and  with  a  deep  ditch  on  the  outside,  so  that  an  attack 
ing  column  could  have  had  its  progress  checked.  But  the  works 
were  so  constructed  as  to  afford  no  obstacle  in  themselves  to  an 
attacking  enemy,  and  only  furnished  a  temporary  protection 
to  our  troops.  .  .  .  In  a  short  time  some  firing  of  musketry  at 
and  in  front  of  the  rifle-trenches  was  observed  from  the  flashes 
of  the  guns,  it  being  impossible  to  hear  the  report  by  reason  of 
the  wind,  though  the  distance  was  but  short.  After  this  firing 
had  continued  for  some  minutes  it  slackened  somewhat,  and, 
not  hearing  from  it,  we  were  of  opinion  that  it  was  from  and  at 
the  enemy's  skirmishers. 

The  works  were  quickly  overran,  and,  as  before  stated, 
the  greater  part  of  two  brigades  was  captured,  as  also  the 
four  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  tete-de-pont.  After  this  the 
pontoon-bridge  was  burned. 

CAMP  NEAR  BRANDT  STATION,  November  7,  1863. 

We  are  all  packed  up  and  will  move  to-night.  We  are  now 
in  the  line  of  outposts,  and  this  is  not  exactly  the  place  for  the 
commanding  general.  No  sleep  to-night,  and  to-morrow  an 
active,  stirring  Sunday.  How  singular  it  is  that  most  of  our 
battles  and  movements  occur  on  that  day,  when,  of  all  others, 
we  should  most  enjoy  quiet  and  be  most  reminded  of  peace  ! 

I  think  that  General  Meade  means  to  fight,  and  General  Lee 
will  accommodate  him,  but  on  ground  of  his  own  choosing. 


120         FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

The  movements  here  alluded  to  only  resulted  in  both 
armies  being  reestablished  in  their  old  lines  along  the  Rapi- 
dan  River,  without  an  engagement. 

CAMP  NEAR  ORANGE,  November  26, 1863. 

We  are  just  on  the  eve  of  another  move.  This  morning 
and  afternoon  all  the  indications  favor  the  supposition  that  the 
enemy  is  moving  down  the  river,  and  we  have  been  busy  pre 
paring  for  a  counter-move  in  the  same  direction.  Matters  seem 
to  be  drifting  toward  our  old  and  renowned  battle-fields,  Chan- 
cellorsville  and  Fredericksburg.  The  enemy  occupies  the  line 
of  the  Rapidan  on  the  north  side,  we  on  the  south  side.  He 
will  in  all  probability  move  to  Germania  Ford,  near  the  conflu 
ence  of  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan,  where  he  will 
cross.  Then,  as  we  will  be  advancing  in  that  direction,  there 
will  be  a  clash  somewhere  between  that  point  and  Fredericks- 
burg.  We  have  all  our  arrangements  made  to  move  before 
dawn  in  the  morning. 

CAMP  NEAR  ORANGE,  December,  1863. 

By  the  dawn  of  day  on  the  27th  of  last  month,  we  were 
many  miles  from  Orange  on  our  way  to  meet  Meade's  army, 
which  had  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan.  It  was 
intensely  cold.  We  left  camp  at  3  A.  M. — as  usual,  the  general 
was  ahead  of  every  one  else — and  we  arrived  at  Verdiersville 
without  any  army  whatever,  the  troops  not  having  progressed 
that  far.  During  the  morning  the  army  caught  up  with  us,  and 
we  proceeded  to  advance  toward  Fredericksburg.  In  the  after 
noon  we  first  met  the  enemy ;  on  the  right  there  was  a  little 
skirmishing;  on  the  left,  Johnson's  division  engaged  and  severe 
ly  chastised  a  corps  of  the  enemy ;  at  the  same  time  our  cavalry, 
under  General  Rosser,  attacked  and  destro}Ted  a  large  ordnance- 
train  in  the  enemy's  rear.  With  the  exception  of  one  other 
cavalry  affair,  no  more  fighting  of  any  consequence  occurred. 
On  Saturday  we  selected  our  position  on  the  line  of  Mine  Run, 
and  proceeded  to  fortify  it.  In  an  incredibly  short  time  (for  our 
men  work  now  like  beavers)  we  were  strongly  intrenched,  and 
ready  and  anxious  for  an  attack.  The  general  gave  his  atten 
tion  to  the  whole  line — directing  important  changes  here  and 


MINE  RUN.  121 

there ;  endeavoring  to  impress  the  officers  with  the  importance 
of  success  in  the  impending  engagement ;  and  presenting  a  fine 
example  of  untiring  energy  and  zeal.  He  was  busy  the  whole 
time. 

On  Sunday,  as  we  were  riding  down  the  lines,  attended  by 
General  Hill  with  his  staff  and  others,  we  came  upon  a  collec 
tion  of  men  engaged  in  divine  worship.  "We  had  been  riding  at 
a  pretty  fair  gait,  but  the  general  at  once  halted,  and  listened 
to  the  singing  of  the  men.  He  heard  the  entire  hymn,  and  as 
the  benediction  was  pronounced,  reverently  raised  his  hat  from 
his  head,  received  the  blessing,  and  then  continued  his  ride 
along  the  fortifications.  It  was  a  striking  scene,  and  one  well 
calculated  to  impress  solemnly  all  who  witnessed  it.  The  para 
pet  was  crowded  with  men ;  here  and  there  at  proper  intervals 
waved  the  battle-flags ;  and  from  many  dozen  embrasures 
frowned  the  now  silent  artillery.  This  all  looked  exceedingly 
warlike,  and  it  was  a  cheering  thing  to  see  that,  while  ready  for 
action,  our  men  did  not  forget  that,  to  secure  victory,  divine 
help  should  be  implored. 

On  Monday  we  confidently  looked  for  an  attack.  It  passed 
without  one.  The  enemy  was  in  our  immediate  front,  and  he, 
too,  had  intrenched.  This  looked  rather  queer,  to  see  two  large 
armies  face  to  face,  each  busily  constructing  works  for  defense. 

Tuesday  came  and  went  without  an  attack.  General  Lee 
had  now  become  impatient,  and,  seeing  how  reluctant  the  enemy 
was  to  bring  on  an  engagement,  he  determined  to  relieve  him  of 
further  embarrassment  by  becoming  the  aggressor,  and  forcing 
him  into  a  fight.  Consequently,  during  the  night  two  fine 
divisions  were  relieved  from  the  trenches  and  concentrated  on 
our  right,  ready  to  be  thrown  on  the  enemy's  left  flank  ;  other 
necessary  arrangements  for  a  grand  battle  were  completed 
before  morning. 

Information  received  during  the  night  indicated  some  activity 
in  the  enemy's  lines,  and  at  dawn  of  day  it  was  found  that  he 
had  fled,  and  was  fast  making  his  way  back  toward  the  river. 
Pursuit  was  immediately  ordered  and  made;  but  General  Meade 
had  too  much  the  advance  of  us,  and  reached  the  north  side  of 
the  Rapidan  before  we  could  overtake  him.  Both  armies  then 


122  FOUR  YEARS  WITH   GENERAL   LEE. 

retired  to  their  original  positions.  Undoubtedly-  we  were  most 
benefited  by  the  movement.  We  captured  about  seven  hun 
dred  prisoners,  four  hundred  mules  and  horses,  and  destroyed 
or  secured  one  hundred  and  twenty  or  one  hundred  and  thirty 
wagons ;  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  will  reach  per 
haps  one  thousand.  So,  all  things  considered,  we  may  be  said 
to  have  canceled  Bristoe  Station.  It  was  an  almost  bloodless 
victory ;  for  we  enjoy  all  the  moral  effects  of  a  victory,  without 
its  usual  and  distressing  losses.  General  Meade  expected  either 
to  take  us  unawares,  turn  our  flank,  and  force  us  from  behind 
the  fortifications  on  the  Rapidan,  or  6lse  he  concluded  that,  as 
soon  as  he  crossed,  General  Lee  would  retreat  to  Hanover  Junc 
tion  ;  but  our  general  is  not  so  easily  frightened  into  a  retreat, 
and  can  very  readily  change  his  front. 

Both  armies  remained  in  a  state  of  comparative  inaction 
during  the  months  of  January  and  February,  1864,  until  the 
28th  day  of  the  latter  month,  when  a  powerful  cavalry  ex 
pedition,  embracing  three  columns,  under  Kilpatrick,  Dahl- 
gren,  and  Ouster,  started  from  the  Federal  lines  with  the 
avowed  purpose  of  capturing  and  sacking  the  city  of  Kich- 
mond.  At  this  time  General  Lee  was  at  Eichmond.  The 
indications  of  the  advance  of  Ouster's  column  on  our  left, 
received  at  army  headquarters  on  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
were  confirmed  on  the  29th,  when  the  whole  movement  was 
fully  developed.  The  route  of  this  column  was  to  have  been 
via  Charlottesville,  at  which  point  there  was  no  Confederate 
force,  and  the  country  intervening  was  filled  with  our  artil 
lery  and  wagon  camps.  Upon  the  receipt  of  the  first  intelli' 
gence  of  this  movement  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  all  the 
trains  moving  in  the  direction  of  the  threatened  route  were 

o 

diverted.  On  the  29th  a  force  of  infantry  was  dispatched 
by  rail  to  Charlottesville;  but  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
operating  on  this  flank  was  effectually  checked  before  reach 
ing  that  place  by  our  horse-artillery  and  dismounted  cavalry. 
The  column  which  moved  upon  our  right,  under  Kilpat 
rick,  was  more  successful.  The  entire  Confederate  cavalry 


DAHLGREN'S   RAID.  123 

picket  stationed  at  Eley's  Ford  was  captured ;  and  this  col 
umn  of  the  enemy  reached  the  Central  Railroad  before  any 
intelligence  was  received  of  its  advance.  After  cutting  the 
road,  it  proceeded  toward  Richmond.  General  Lee  returned 
to  the  army  on  the  last  train,  which  passed  up  but  a  few 
hours  before  the  enemy  reached  the  road,  and  thus  barely 
escaped  capture.  The  fate  of  this  column,  and  especially  of 
that  portion  of  it  commanded  by  Colonel  Dahlgren,  is  well 
known.  The  results  were  most  disastrous  to  the  Federals, 
including  the  death  of  that  officer,  and  the  capture  of  his 
orders,  exposing  the  damaging  fact  of  the  intention  of  the 
enemy  to  pillage  and  burn  the  city  and  kill  the  most  promi 
nent  Confederate  officials. 

Early  in  April  General  Lee  was  directed  to  inquire  of 
General  Meade,  by  nag  of  truce,  if  he  or  his  Government 
sanctioned  what  Colonel  Dahlgren  had  proposed  and  ordered 
in  his  address  to  his  troops.  On  the  18th  of  April  a  reply  to 
this  communication  was  received,  to  the  effect  that  neither 
General  Meade,  General  Kilpatrick,  nor  the  authorities  at 
"Washington,  ordered  or  approved  the  burning  of  Richmond, 
the  killing  of  Mr.  Davis  and  his  cabinet,  or  anything  else 
not  rendered  necessary  by  military  causes  or  not  legitimate 
in  civilized  warfare.  General  Kilpatrick  stated  that  the 
photographic  copy  of  the  "  address  "  which  had  been  received 
through  General  Lee  was  a  fac-simile  of  an  address  which 
Colonel  Dahlgren  had  submitted  to  him  for  his  approval, 
and  which  he  had  approved  in  red  ink,  except  that  it  lacked 
that  approval  and  contained  the  objectionable  exhortations 
or  orders,  which  were  not  in  that  submitted  to  him.  The 
disclaimer  of  General  Meade  was  most  candid  and  emphatic. 

Information  was  received,  about  the  latter  part  of  April, 
of  the  advance  of  the  Ninth  (Federal)  Corps  from  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Annapolis  to  reenforce  General  Grant,  who  had 
now  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


CHAPTER  X. 

General  Grant  in  Command  of  the  Federal  Army  of  the  Potomac. — His  Advance. 
— From  the  Wilderness  to  Petersburg. — Strength  of  the  Two  Armies. 

BY  reference  to  the  official  returns  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,1 1  find  that  on  the  20th  of  April,  1864,  the 
Second  Corps  reported  seventeen  thousand  and  seventy-nine 
and  the  Third  Corps  twenty-two  thousand  one  hundred  and 
ninety-nine  present  for  duty ;  there  were  also  two  unattached 
commands — viz.,  the  Maryland  line  and  the  Provost  Guard, 
numbering  together  eleven  hundred  and  twenty-five  effective. 
Two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  had  but  recently  arrived 
from  Tennessee,  and  were  not  embraced  in  this  return.  I 
am  without  certain  information  as  to  their  strength  at  that 
time.  When  the  First  Corps  was  detached  for  service  in 
Tennessee,  the  effective  strength  of  its  three  divisions  was 
fourteen  thousand  six  hundred  and  sixty-eight  (see  return  of 
August  31, 1863).  After  the  hard  service  in  the  "West,  I  am 
sure  that  the  two  divisions  under  Generals  Field  and  Ker- 
shaw,  when  they  rejoined  the  army,  could  not  have  exceeded 
ten  thousand  effective.  "With  this  liberal  estimate,  it  appears 
that  General  Lee's  total  infantry  force  was  fifty  thousand 
four  hundred  and  three;  to  which  if  we  add  the  cavalry 
corps,  eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and  twenty-seven,  and 
the  artillery  corps,  four  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty- 
four,  as  given  in  the  same  return,  we  have  a  total  present  for 
duty,  of  all  arms,  of  sixty-three  thousand  nine  hundred  and 

1  Now  on  file  in  the  Archive-Office,  War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


IN  THE  WILDERNESS.  125 

eighty-four — in  round  numbers  say  sixty-four  thousand  men 
—under  General  Lee,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of 
1864. 

The  official  return  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  of  the  1st 
of  May,  1864,  shows  present  for  duty  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty  men  of  all  arms ; 
to  which  if  we  add  the  Ninth  Corps,  not  embraced  in  this 
return,  but  which  joined  General  Grant  before  he  commenced 
active  operations,  and  which  numbered,  according  to  official 
returns,  twenty  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty,  we  have 
a  total  of  one  hundred  and  forty-one  thousand  one  hundred 
and  sixty  men  of  all  arms  under  General  Grant  at  the  open 
ing  of  the  campaign.1 

I  have  given  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  armies  at 
the  outset  of  this  campaign,  in  order  that  the  reader,  in  fol 
lowing  the  course  of  events,  may  have  a  proper  appreciation 
of  the  difficulties  which  beset  General  Lee  in  the  task  of 
thwarting  the  designs  of  so  formidable  an  adversary,  and 
realize  the  extent  to  which  his  brilliant  genius  made  amends 
for  paucity  of  numbers,  and  proved  more  than  a  match  for 
brute  force,  as  illustrated  in  the  hammering  policy  of  General 
Grant. 

If  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men  are  made  to 
grapple  in  a  death-struggle  with  sixty  thousand  men,  of  the 
former  twenty  thousand  should  survive  the  total  annihilation 
of  the  latter,  even  though  the  price  exacted  for  such  destruc 
tion  be  in  the  ratio  of  two  for  one.  Behold  the  theory  of 
the  Federal  commander  and  an  epitome  of  his  conception  of 
strategy,  as  exemplified  on  the  sanguinary  field  extending 
from  the  Wilderness  to  James  River  ! 

On  the  4th  day  of  May  General  Grant  opened  the  cam 
paign  by  crossing  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan  River, 
with  the  intention  of  placing  his  army  between  that  of  Gen 
eral  Lee  and  Richmond,  his  objective  point. 

1  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  "  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the 
First  Session  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress,"  vol.  i.,  1865-'66,  pp.  3-5,  55. 


126  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

General  Lee  was  fully  aware  of  the  great  disparity  in  the 
strength  of  the  two  armies,  and  of  the  efforts  that  had  been 
made,  under  General  Grant's  direction,  to  increase  the  effi 
ciency  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  every  possible  means, 
and  it  was  doubtless  expected  that  he  would  hesitate  to  give 
battle  against  such  fearful  odds,  and  proceed  to  manoeuvre 
to  avoid  a  general  engagement,  and,  by  "  masterly  retreat," 
retard  the  progress  of  his  adversary. 

The  Federal  commanders  should  by  this  time  have  learned 
to  expect,  with  moral  certainty,  that,  just  as  soon  as  they 
emerged  from  their  own  lines,  there  was  an  arm  uplifted 
that  would  inevitably  fall  upon  them  with  the  speed  of  light 
ning  and  with  tremendous  power. 

So  soon  as  the  real  design  of  General  Grant  was  disclosed, 
General  Lee  advanced  to  attack  him.  It  was,  indeed,  a  bold 
movement ;  but,  strange  to  relate,  it  appears  not  to  have 
been  expected  by  the  enemy.  Moving  down  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Rapidan,  the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia  soon 
encountered  its  old  adversary,  under  its  new  commander,  in 
the  Wilderness,  and,  without  parley  or  delay,  grappled  it, 
and  took  the  initiative  in  what  was  destined  to  be  a  pro 
longed  and  bitter  struggle. 

General  Grant,  who  had  started  for  a  march,  found  it 
necessary  to  concentrate  for  battle.  Much  hard  fighting  en 
sued  :  for  two  days  there  was  a  murderous  wrestle ;  severe 
and  rapid  blows  were  given  and  received  in  turn,  until  sheer 
exhaustion  called  a  truce,  with  the  advantage  on  the  Confed 
erate  side.  Notably  was  this  the  case  in  a  brilliant  assault 
made  by  General  Longstreet  on  the  Federal  left  on  the  6th 
of  May ;  and  in  a  turning  movement  on  their  right  on  the 
same  day,  executed  by  a  portion  of  General  Swell's  (Second) 
corps — the  brigades  of  Gordon,  Johnston,  and  Pegram — 
doubling  up  that  flank  and  forcing  it  back  a  considerable 
distance. 

Mention  should  also  be  made  of  the  stubborn  and  heroic 
resistance,  on  the  5th  of  May,  by  the  divisions  of  Heth  and 


IX  THE  WILDERNESS.  127 

Wilcox  of  Hill's  (Third)  corps — fifteen  thousand  strong l — 
against  the  repeated  and  desperate  assaults  of  five  divisions 
of  the  enemy — the  four  divisions  of  Hancock's  corps  and  one 
of  Sedgwick's — numbering  about  forty-five  thousand  men,  in 
which  the  Confederates  completely  foiled  their  adversaries, 
and  inflicted  upon  them  most  serious  loss.2 

The  Third  Division  of  Hill's  (Third)  corps,  tinder  General 
Anderson,  and  the  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  (First)  corps, 
did  not  reach  the  scene  of  conflict  until  dawn  of  day  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th.  Simultaneously  the  attack  on  Hill  was 
renewed  with  great  vigor.  In  addition  to  the  force  which 
he  had  so  successfully  resisted  the  previous  day,  a  fresh 
division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  under, General  Wadsworthj  had 
secured  position  on  his  Bank,  and  cooperated  with  the  column 
assaulting  in  front.  After  a  short  contest,  the  divisions  of 
Heth  and  Wilcox,  who  had  expected  to  be  relieved,  and  were 
not  prepared  for  the  enemy's  assault,  were  overpowered  and 
compelled  to  retire,  just  as  the  advance  of  Longstreet's  col 
umn  reached  the  ground.  The  defeated  divisions  were  in 
considerable  disorder,  and  the  condition  of  affairs  was  exceed 
ingly  critical.  General  Lee  fully  appreciated  the  impending 
crisis,  and,  dashing  amid  the  fugitives,  personally  called  upon 
the  men  to  rally.  General  Longstreet,  taking  in  the  situation 
at  a  glance,  was  prompt  to  act — immediately  caused  his 
divisions  to  be  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  and  gallantly  ad 
vanced  to  recover  the  lost  ground. 

The  soldiers,  seeing  General  Lee's  manifest  purpose  to 
advance  with  them,  and  realizing  the  great  danger  in  which 
he  then  was,  called  upon  him  in  a  beseeching  manner  to  "  go 

^  {JLt*  > 

"  Return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  April  20,  1864,  chap.  xiv. 
2  The  troops  engaged  in  this  assault  were,  Getty's  division  (four  brigades)  of  \y'  J""    ^ 
the  Sixth  Corps ;  Hancock's  corps — viz.,  Birney's  division  (two  brigades),  Mott's  C'~*( 
division  (two  brigades),  Gibbon's  division  (three  brigades),  and  Barlow's  division  ) 
(four  brigades) :  in  all,  fifteen  brigades.     The  Army  of  the  Potomac  embraced' 
but  thirty-two  brigades,  and  numbered  near  one  hundred  thousand  infantry.     I 
therefore  estimate  that  the  fifteen  brigades  here  engaged  numbered  forty-five 
thousand  men. — (See  Swinton's  "  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  pp.  425,  426.) 


128  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

to  the  rear,"  promising  that  they  would  soon  have  matters 
rectified,  and  begging  him  to  retire  from  a  position  in  which 
his  life  was  so  exposed.  The  general  was  evidently  touched 
and  gratified  at  this  manifestation  of  interest  and  anxiety  on 
the  part  of  his  brave  men,  and  waved  them  on,  with  some 
words  of  cheer.  Their  advance  under  such  circumstances 
was  simply  irresistible ;  every  man  felt  that  the  eye  of  the 
commanding  general  was  upon  him,  and  was  proud  of  the 
opportunity  of  showing  him  that  his  trust  in  his  men  was 
not  misplaced.  The  Federal  advance  was  checked,  and  the 
Confederate  lines  reestablished. 

Not  content  with  this,  as  soon  as  the  proper  dispositions 
could  be  made,  General  Longstreet,  as  before  mentioned, 
took  the  offensive,  and  assailed,  with  great  impetuosity,  the 
force  which  had  overwhelmed  Hill's  divisions.  The  Fed 
erals  were  in  turn  soon  compelled  to  yield  all  the  ground 
heretofore  gained,  and,  upon  being  further  pressed,  to  fall 
back  for  shelter  to  a  line  of  works  some  distance  in  rear  of 
the  line,  held  by  them  the  day  previous,  and  which  had  been 
constructed  for  the  protection  of  the  Brock  Road,  along 
which  one  of  their  columns  advanced  on  the  4th  of  May. 

So  far,  complete  success  had  crowned  General  Longstreet's 
movement.  The  necessary  orders  were  given  by  him  to  fol 
low  up  the  advantage  gained,  and  dispositions  were  made  to 
press  the  dismayed  and  fleeing  enemy.  Surely  a  decisive 
victory  was  now  to  be  vouchsafed  the  Confederate  arms, 
when,  lo  !  by  an  accident  truly  calamitous  in  its  results,  the 
Confederates  were  deprived  of  their  leader.  General  Long- 
street,  with  his  stafe,  was  advancing  along  the  road  at  the 
head  of  Jenkins's  brigade,  when  the  latter— mistaken  for  a 
body  of  the  enemy  by  a  portion  of  the  flanking  column, 
which  continued  its  advance  through  the  woods — was  fired 
into.  General  Longstreet  was  seriously  wounded,  and  Gen 
eral  Jenkins  fell  dead.  The  forward  movement  was  checked, 
and  thus  was  time  afforded  the  Federals  in  which  to  rally, 
reenforce,  and  reform,  behind  their  intrenchments.  Thus, 


IN  THE   WILDERNESS.  129 

by  a  strange  fatality,  a  second  time  was  Lee's  lieutenant 
stricken  down  in  the  tangled  mazes  of  the  Wilderness,  when 
in  the  full  tide  of  victory,  and  that  not  by  hostile  hand  ! 

In  these  encounters  in  the  Wilderness  the  Confederates 
inflicted  severe  losses  upon  the  enemy,  and,  besides  gaining 
ground,  captured  prisoners,  artillery,  and  other  trophies.  As 
can  be  well  understood,  these  results  were  attained,  however, 
at  serious  cost  to  General  Lee,  who,  constrained  to  spare  his 
men  as  much  as  possible,  hesitated  to  assail  the  enemy  in  his 
intrenched  position,  and  hopefully  awaited  attack.  General 
Grant  did  not  again  assume  the  aggressive,  and  so  the  Yth 
passed  in  comparative  quiet. 

General  Grant,  in  pursuance  of  his  original  design,  then 
attempted,  by  a  rapid  flank  movement,  to  secure  possession  of 
Spottsylvania  Court-House  ;  but  General  Lee,  on  the  night  of 
the  7th,  anticipated  his  purpose,  and  detached  a  portion  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  under  command  of  General  E.  H.  Ander 
son,  to  move  at  once  to  that  point.  The  van  of  the  opposing 
forces,  each  making  for  the  same  goal,  arrived  almost  simul 
taneously  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  at  the  Court-House. 
The  Federals,  a  little  in  advance,  drove  back  the  Confederate 
cavalry,  but  were  in  turn  quickly  dispossessed  of  the  strategic 
point  by  the  opportune  arrival  of  Anderson's  infantry.  The 
two  armies  then  swung  round,  each  forming  on  its  advanced 
guard  as  a  nucleus,  and  on  the  9th  confronted  each  other  in 
line  of  battle. 

General  Lee  was  still  between  his  adversary  and  Rich 
mond.  These  movements  were  necessarily  made  with  great 
rapidity,  and  the  several  commands,  as  they  moved  into  line, 
proceeded  at  once  to  fortify  in  the  positions  in  which  they 
found  themselves,  without  due  regard  to  a  perfect  alignment, 
and  ignoring  to  a  certain  extent  natural  advantages  and  dis 
advantages.  The  line  of  defense,  as  thus  originally  con 
structed,  was  consequently  imperfect,  and  at  some  points 
quite  vulnerable. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  by  a  spirited  dash,  the  enemy  made 
9 


130  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

a  lodgment  on  the  left  of  General  Ewell,  obtaining  tempo 
rary  possession  of  a  portion  of  the  lines  and  a  battery  of 
artillery.  It  was  there  again  that  General  Lee  started  for  the 
breach,  with  the  purpose  of  leading  the  troops  in  the  effort 
to  regain  the  lost  ground,  when  his  staff  and  other  officers 
surrounded  him  and  urged  him  to  desist,  imploring  him  not 
thus  to  expose  himself  to  an  almost  certain  death.  To  their 
expostulations  he  replied  that  he  would  relinquish  his  pur 
pose  if  they  would  see  to  it  that  the  lines  were  reestablished 
—that  that  "  must  be  done."  And  it  was  done !  The 
enemy  was  quickly  made  to  relinquish  his  temporary  advan 
tage,  and  both  guns  and  ground  were  recovered. 

Upon  an  examination  of  the  lines,  General  Lee  had  de 
tected  the  weakness  of  that  portion  known  as  "  the  salient," 
to  the  right  of  the  point  assailed  on  the  10th,  to  which  I  have 
just  alluded,  and  occupied  by  the  division  of  General  Edward 
Johnson  (Swell's  corps),  and  had  directed  a  second  line  to  be 
constructed  across  its  base,  to  which  he  proposed  to  move 
back  the  troops  occupying  the  angle.  These  arrangements 
were  not  quite  completed,  when  he  thought  he  saw  cause  to 
suspect  another  flank-movement  by  General  Grant,  and,  on 
the  night  of  the  llth,  ordered  most  of  the  artillery  at  this 
portion  of  the  lines  to  be  withdrawn,  so  as  to  be  available  to 
take  part  in  a  counter-movement.  Toward  the  dawn  of  day, 
on  the  12th,  General  Johnson  discovered  indications  of  an 
impending  assault  upon  his  front.  He  sent  immediate  orders 
for  the  return  of  his  artillery,  and  caused  other  preparations 
for  defense  to  be  made ;  but  the  enemy,  who  could  advance 
without  discovery  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  works 
under  cover  of  a  body  of  woods,  had  massed  there  a  large 
force,  and,  with  the  advent  of  the  first  rays  of  morning  light, 
by  a  spirited  assault,  quickly  overran  that  portion  of  the  lines 
before  the  artillery  could  be  put  in  position,  and  captured 
most  of  the  division,  including  its  brave  commander.  The 
army  was  thus  cut  in  twain,  and  the  situation  was  one  well 
calculated  to  test  the  skill  of  its  commander  and  the  nerve 


SPOTTSYLVANIA. 

and  courage  of  the  men.  Dispositions  were  immediately 
made  to  repair  the  breach,  and  troops  were  moved  up  from 
the  right  and  left  to  dispute  the  further  progress  of  the  as 
saulting  column.  Then  occurred  the  most  remarkable  mus 
ketry-tire  of  the  war :  from  the  sides  of  the  salient,  in  the 
possession  of  the  Federals,  and  the  new  line,  forming  the 
base  of  the  triangle,  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  poured 
forth,  from  continuous  lines  of  hissing  fire,  an  incessant,  ter 
rific  hail  of  deadly  missiles.  ~No  living  man  nor  thing  could 
stand  in  the  doomed  space  embraced  within  those  angry 
lines ;  even  large  trees  were  felled — their  trunks  cut  in  twain 
by  the  bullets  of  small-arms.  Never  did  the  troops  on  either 
side  display  greater  valor  and  determination.  Intense  and 
bitter  was  the  struggle.  The  Confederates,  moving  up  to 
fill  the  gap,  fell  with  tremendous  power  upon  the  Federal 
mass,  caused  it  to  recoil  somewhat,  closed  with  it  in  a  hand- 
to-hand  conflict,  but  failed  to  dislodge  it ;  while  the  Federal 
assault,  wThich  threatened  such  serious  consequences,  was 
effectually  checked,  and  the  advantage  to  the  enemy  result 
ing  therefrom  was  limited  to  the  possession  of  the  narrow 
space  of  the  salient  and  the  capture  of  the  force  which  had 
occupied  it.  The  loss  of  this  fine  body  of  troops  was  serious 
ly  felt  by  General  Lee  ;  but  sadly  reduced  though  his  army 
was,  by  this  and  a  week's  incessant  fighting,  such  was  the 
metal  of  what  remained  that  his  lines,  thus  forcibly  rectified, 
proved  thereafter  impregnable. 

Several  days  of  comparative  quiet  ensued.  The  army 
under  General  Grant  was  at  this  time  heavily  reenforced 
from  Washington.  In  his  official  report  of  this  campaign  he 
says,  "  The  13th,  14th,  15th,  16th,  17th,  and  18th  (of  May), 
were  consumed  in  manoeuvring  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements  from  Washington."  1  In  numerical  strength 
his  army  so  much  exceeded  that  under  General  Lee  that, 
after  covering  the  entire  Confederate  front  with  double  lines 

1  General  Grant's  "  Report,"  "  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the  Thirty- 
ninth  Congress,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  1106. 


132  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

of  battle,  lie  had  in  reserve  a  large  force  with  which  to  extend 
his  flank,  and  compel  a  corresponding  movement  on  the  part 
of  his  adversary,  in  order  to  keep  between  him  and  his  covet 
ed  prize — the  capital  of  the  Confederacy. 

On  the  18th  another  assault  was  directed  against  the 
Confederate  lines,  but  it  produced  no  impression.  J^o  effort 
was  made  after  this — the  task  was  a  hopeless  one,  and  was 
reluctantly  relinquished. 

On  the  night  of  the  20th,  General  Grant  started  on  an 
other  flank -movement  in  the  direction  of  Bowling  Green. 
General  Lee  in  order  to  intercept  him  moved  to  Hanover 
Junction. 

I  again  make  one  or  two  extracts  from  notes  taken  at  the 
time,  as  illustrating  the  spirit  of  the  army  and  the  character 
of  the  work  it  was  called  on  to  perform : 

CAMP  AT  HANOVER  JUNCTION,  May  23, 1864:. 

....  For  the  first  time  since  the  4th  of  the  month  we 
were  on  yesterday  spared  the  sight  of  the  enemy.  On  the  day 
before  it  was  discovered  that  he  was  leaving  our  front  and  mov 
ing  toward  Bowling  Green.  He  dared  not,  as  we  prayed  he 
would,  attack  us  again  at  Spottsylvania.  With  several  rivers 
between  his  army  and  ours,  he  could  move  to  Bowling  Green 
and  below  without  any  danger  of  our  intercepting  him.  He 
would  thus  get  some  miles  nearer  Richmond,  in  a  geographical 
sense,  but  in  reality  be  as  far  from  that  city  as  ever,  because 
this  army  will  still  confront  him,  let  him  change  his  base  as 
often  as  he  pleases.  To  counteract  his  new  design,  our  army 
was  put  in  motion  for  this  place.  The  enemy  had  the  start  of 
us,  but  by  excellent  marching  we  have  again  placed  him  in  our 
front.  It  is  probable  that  he  will  make  still  another  move  to 
our  right,  and  land  somewhere  near  West  Point. 

This  would  of  course  necessitate  our  moving  between  that 
point  and  Richmond.  Why  General  Grant  did  not  carry  his 
army  to  his  new  base  without  incurring  the  heavy  losses  he  has 
sustained  in  battle,  I  cannot  say.  If  Fredericksburg  was  his 
destination,  he  could  have  attained  possession  of  it  without  the 


HANOVER  JUNCTION".  133 

loss  of  a  hundred  men.  The  same  can  be  said  of  West  Point. 
After  his  discomfiture  in  the  Wilderness,  he  started  for  Spott- 
svlvania  Court-House,  hoping  to  reach  there  before  General  Lee. 
There  were  but  few  indications  of  his  intended  departure  from 
our  front  at  that  time  to  most  of  us,  but  General  Lee  seemed  to 
divine  his  intention,  and  sent  a  corps  to  Spottsylvania  just  in 
time  to  meet  the  enemy  at  that  place.  We  engaged  them  and 
beat  them  back,  thereby  securing  the  Court-House.  In  com 
menting  upon  this,  the  Northern  papers  say  that  we  retreat 
ed  and  that  Grant  pursued  us  ;  while  the  truth  is,  General 
Grant  was  completely  outgeneraled.  No  doubt  the  entire 
North  is  this  day  rejoicing  over  our  retreat  to  this  point ;  yet 
the  battle-field  was  left  in  our  possession,  and  we  marched  here 
without  any  molestation  whatever.  This  does  not  look  like  a 
retreat.  Our  army  is  in  excellent  condition  ;  its  morale  as  good 
as  when  we  met  Grant — two  weeks  since — for  the  first  time. 
He  will  feel  us  again  before  he  reaches  his  prize.  His  losses 
have  been  already  fearfully  large.  Our  list  of  casualties  is  a 
sad  one  to  contemplate,  but  does  not  compare  with  his  terrible 
record  of  killed  and  wounded  :  he  does  not  pretend  to  bury 
his  dead,  leaves  his  wounded  without  proper  attendance,  and 
seems  entirely  reckless  as  regards  the  lives  of  his  men.  This, 
and  his  remarkable  pertinacity,  constitute  his  sole  claim  to  su 
periority  over  his  predecessors.  He  certainly  holds  on  longer 
than  any  of  them.  He  alone,  of  all,  would  have  remained  this 
side  of  the  Rapidan  after  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness. 

The  gage  of  battle  proffered  by  General  Lee  at  Hanover 
Junction  was  declined  by  General  Grant,  who,  in  order  to 
extricate  his  army  from  a  position  of  some  embarrassment, 
about  the  26th  of  May,  recrossed  to  the  north  side  of  the 
North  Anna  River,  and  made  another  detour  to  the  east. 
General  Lee  moved  upon  a  parallel  line.  If  his  army  had 
been  of  even  reasonable  proportions  in  comparison  with  that 
of  his  adversary,  his  movement  would  have  been  of  another 
character,  and  one  of  the  two  wings  of  the  Federal  army 
would  have  been  assailed  while  on  the  south  side  of  the 
river. 


134:  FOUR  YEARS   WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

On  the  30th  of  May  General  Lee  was  in  line  of  battle, 
with  his  left  at  Atlee's  Station. 

CAMP  AT  ATLEE'S  STATION,   early  Morning,  May  30,  1864. 

....  We  are  confronting  General  Grant,  and  only  waiting 
to  have  him  located — to  have  his  position  well  developed — 
before  this  army  is  let  loose  at  its  old  opponent.  On  yesterday 
afternoon  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  advancing  toward  us,  and 
this  morning  I  confidently  expected  to  hear  the  firing  of  small- 
arms  before  this  hour.  .  .  .  We  have  now  had  three  weeks  of 
constant  fighting,  marching,  and  watching.  .  .  . 

The  general  has  been  somewhat  indisposed,  and  could  at 
tend  to  nothing  except  what  was  absolutely  necessary  for  him 
to  know  and  act  upon.  .  .  .  He  is  now  improving. 

The  indisposition  of  General  Lee  here  alluded  to  was 
more  serious  than  was  generally  supposed.  Those  near  him 
were  very  apprehensive  lest  he  should  be  compelled  to  give 
up.  To  quote  the  words  of  one  of  his  greatest  admirers  and 
most  trusted  friends,  Lieutenant-General  Early  : 

One  of  his  three  corps  commanders  had  been  disabled  by 
wounds  at  the  Wilderness,  and  another  was  too  sick  to  com 
mand  his  corps,  while  he  himself  was  suffering  from  a  most  an 
noying  and  weakening  disease.  In  fact,  nothing  but  his  own 
determined  will  enabled  him  to  keep  the  field  at  all  ;  and  it  was 
there  rendered  more  manifest  than  ever  that  he  was  the  head 
and  front,  the  very  life  and  soul  of  his  army. 

After  feeling  the  Confederate  position,  attack  was  de 
clined  by  the  enemy.  By  another  gyratory  movement  of  the 
kind  so  persistently  pursued  by  General  Grant  in  this  cam 
paign,  the  two  armies  again  gravitated  east,  and  were  soon 
(June  3d)  face  to  face  on  the  historic  field  of  Cold  Harbor. 
Here,  gallant  but  fruitless  efforts  were  made  by  General 
Grant  to  pierce  or  drive  back  the  army  under  General  Lee. 
The  Confederates  were  protected  by  temporary  earthworks, 
and  while  under  cover  of  these  were  gallantly  assailed  by 


COLD  HARBOR.  135 

the  Federals.  But  in  vain  :  the  assault  was  repulsed  along 
the  whole  line,  and  the  carnage  on  the  Federal  side  was 
frightful.  I  well  recall  having  received  a  report  after  the 
assault  from  General  Hoke — whose  division  reached  the  army 
just  previous  to  this  battle — to  the  effect  that  the  ground  in 
his  entire  front,  over  which  the  enemy  had  charged,  was 
literally  covered  with  their  dead  and  wounded ;  and  that  up 
to  that  time  he  had  not  had  a  single  man  killed.  ISTo  won 
der  that,  when  the  command  was  given  to  renew  the  assault, 
the  Federal  soldiers  sullenly  and  silently  declined  to  advance.1 
After  some  disingenuous  proposals,  General  Grant  finally 
asked  a  truce  to  enable  him  to  bury  his  dead.  Soon  after 
this  he  abandoned  his  chosen  line  of  operations,  and  moved 
his  army  to  the  south  side  of  James  Kiver.  The  struggle 
from  the  Wilderness  to  this  point  covered  a  period  of  over 
one  month ;  during  which  time  there  had  been  an  almost 
daily  encounter  of  hostile  arms,  and  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  had  placed  hors  de  combat  of  the  army  under  Gen 
eral  Grant  a  number  equal  to  its  entire  numerical  strength  at 
the  commencement  of  the  campaign,  and,  notwithstanding  its 
own  heavy  losses  and  the  reinforcements  received  by  the 
enemy,  still  presented  an  impregnable  front  to  its  opponent, 
and  constituted  an  insuperable  barrier  to  General  Grant's 
"  On  to  Eichmond ! " 

After  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  surprise  and  capture 
Petersburg — which  was  prevented  by  the  skill  of  Generals 
Beauregard  and  Wise,  and  the  bravery  of  the  troops,  consist 
ing  in  part  of  militia  and  home-guards — and  a  futile  endeav 
or  to  seize  the  Richmond  &  Petersburg  Railroad,  General 
Grant  concentrated  his  army  south  of  the  Appomattox  River. 
General  Lee,  whom  he  had  not  been  able  to  defeat  in  the 

1  "  The  order  was  issued  through  these  officers  to  their  subordinate  command 
ers,  and  from  them  descended  through  the  wonted  channels  ;  but  no  man  stirred, 
and  the  immobile  lines  pronounced  a  verdict,  silent,  yet  emphatic,  against  fur 
ther  slaughter.  The  loss  on  the  Union  side  in  this  sanguinary  action  was  over 
thirteen  thousand,  while  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  it  is  doubtful  whether 
it  reached  that  many  hundreds." — (Swinton,  "  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.  487.) 


136  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

open  field,  was  still  in  his  way,  and  the  siege  of  Petersburg 
was  begun. 

General  Lee  was  compelled  about  this  time  to  detach 
General  Early,  with  the  Second  Corps,  to  check  the  advance 
of  the  Federal  force  under  General  Hunter  that  was  moving 
up  the  Yalley,  laying  waste  as  it  advanced  and  threatening 
our  communications  with  the  interior  via  Lynchburg.  It 
will  be  well  understood  that  he  could  not  spare  any  portion 
of  his  army,  already  greatly  inferior  in  numerical  strength 
to  its  opponent,  but  no  other  troops  were  available. 

It  has  been  seen  that,  at  the  commencement  of  this  ex 
traordinary  campaign,  the  effective  strength  of  the  army  un 
der  General  Lee  was  sixty-four  thousand  men,  and  that 
under  General  Grant  one  hundred  and  forty-one  thousand 
one  hundred  and  sixty  men.  The  only  reinforcements  re 
ceived  by  General  Lee  were  as  follows :  Near  Hanover  Junc 
tion  he  was  joined  by  a  small  force  under  General  Breckin- 
ridge,  from  Southwestern  Yirginia,  twenty-two  hundred 
strong,  and  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  (First)  corps, 
which  had  been  on  detached  service  in  North  Carolina ; 
Hoke's  brigade  of  Early's  division,  twelve  hundred  strong, 
which  had  been  on  detached  duty  at  the  Junction,  here  also 
rejoined  its  division ;  and  at  Cold  Harbor  General  Lee  re 
ceived  the  division  of  General  Hoke,  also  just  from  North 
Carolina — the  two  divisions  (Pickett's  and  Hoke's)  number 
ing  eleven  thousand  men.1  The  aggregate  of  these  reinforce 
ments  (fourteen  thousand  four  hundred  men)  added  to  Gen 
eral  Lee's  original  strength  would  give  seventy-eight  thou- 

1  The  "  Monthly  Return  of  General  Lee's  Army,"  of  the  30th  of  June,  1864, 
shows  that  at  that  date  Pickett's  division  numbered  four  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  eighty-four,  and  Hoke's  division  five  thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
six,  making  together  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and  seventy  effective.  Hoke 
was  engaged  at  Cold  Harbor,  but  suffered  little  loss  ;  Pickett  lost  a  few  hundred 
men  in  his  assault  on  the  enemy's  lines  between  the  James  and  Appomattox 
Rivers  on  the  16th  of  June.  The  joint  loss  of  the  two  divisions  did  not  ex 
ceed  eight  hundred  men  between  the  time  they  joined  General  Lee  and  the  date 
of  the  return  quoted. 


COLD  HARBOR.  137 

sand  four  hundred  as  the  aggregate  of  all  troops  engaged 
under  him  from  the  "Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor. 

When  at  Spottsylvania  Court-House  General  Grant  was 
reenforced  from  Washington,  but  I  can  only  conjecture  to 
what  extent.  The  Secretary  of  "War  states  that  "  the  chief 
part  of  the  force  designed  to  guard  the  Middle  Department 
and  the  Department  of  Washington  was  called  forward  to 
the  front"  1  at  this  time.  The  same  authority  puts  the  effec 
tive  strength  of  these  two  departments  on  the  1st  of  May  at 
forty-seven  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty-one  men,2  of 
which  the  chief  part — let  us  say,  thirty-five  thousand — was 
sent  to  the  aid  of  General  Grant.  At  Cold  Harbor  he  was 
joined  by  General  W.  F.  Smith  with  four  divisions,  taken 
from  the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps,  numbering  sixteen 
thousand  men.3  Adding  these  reinforcements  to  General 
Grant's  original  strength,  we  have  one  hundred  and  ninety- 
two  thousand  one  hundred  and  sixty  men  as  the  aggregate 
of  the  troops  employed  by  him  in  his  operations  from  the 
Rapidan  to  the  James. 

The  Federal  loss  in  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  Spott 
sylvania,  North  Anna,  and  Cold  Harbor,  is  put  at  "  above 
sixty  thousand  men "  by  Mr.  Swinton  in  his  history  of  the 
"  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

1  "  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  First  Session,  Thirty-ninth  Congress," 
vol.  i.,  1865-'66,  p.  7. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  5,  6. 

3  Swinton,  "  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.  482. 


CHAPTEE  XI. 

Siege  of  Petersburg. — General  Lee's  Views  as  to  the  Kemoval  of  General  John 
ston  from  the  Command  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee. — Movements  of  Sher 
man's  Army. — Inevitable  Result  of  the  Persistent  Effort  to  hold  Petersburg 
and  Richmond. 

HAVING  failed  to  obtain  possession  of  Petersburg  by  sur 
prise,  and  General  Lee  being  now  well  established  in  his  line 
of  defense,  General  Grant  determined  upon  the  method  of 
slow  approaches,  and  proceeded  to  invest  the  city  and  its 
brave  defenders  by  a  line  of  earthworks  and  mines.  While 
with  his  constantly-increasing  numbers  General  Grant  under 
took  to  tighten  the  ligature  thus  applied  to  the  carotid  artery 
of  the  Confederacy,  General  Sherman  was  sent  upon  his  des 
olating  expedition  through  the  States  of  Georgia  and  South 
Carolina  to  add  the  policy  of  starvation  to  that  of  attrition 
inaugurated  a  few  months  previous.  After  this  manner  it 
was  proposed  to  exhaust  and  wear  out  the  people  who  could 
not  be  beaten  in  a  trial  of  arms.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of 
my  undertaking  to  record,  in  detail,  the  events  and  incidents 
of  that  ten  months'  siege.  Reduced  in  numbers  as  was  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  limited  as  it  was  in  sup 
plies  of  all  kinds,  it  nevertheless  dealt  many  vigorous  and 
destructive  blows  to  its  adversary,  and  contributed  much  to 
its  already  imperishable  renown.  I  note  as  especially  wor 
thy  of  mention  the  recapture  of  our  lines,  after  the  explo 
sion  of  the  Federal  mine  at  the  "  Crater,"  by  the  troops  un 
der  General  Mahone,  and  the  many  brilliant  sorties  made 
under  the  direction  of  that  gallant  soldier  upon  the  Federal 


SIEGE   OF  PETERSBURG.  139 

left  near  the  Weldon  road;  the  very  successful  attack  on 
Hancock,  at  Reams's  Station,  by  Heth's  division  and  a  por 
tion  of  Wilcox's,  on  the  25th  of  August,  under  the  direction 
of  General  A.  P.  Hill ;  as  also  the  bold  and  successful  ex 
ploits  of  our  cavalry  under  General  Hampton;  the  final 
charge  made  upon  the  Federal  lines  by  General  Gordon's 
troops,  on  the  25th  of  March  ;  and,  last  but  not  least,  the 
heroic  defense  of  Fort  Gregg,  on  the  2d  of  April,  by  a 
mixed  command  of  infantry  and  dismounted  artillery- 
drivers  armed  with  muskets. 

In  chronological  order  it  is  well  here  to  mention  a  mat 
ter  about  which  there  has  been  some  misapprehension  in  the 
public  mind.  Reference  is  made  to  the  part  taken  by  Gen 
eral  Lee  in  the  removal  of  General  Johnston  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee.  In  the  early  part  of  July 
a  telegram  was  received  by  General  Lee  from  the  President, 
stating  that  a  heavy  pressure  was  being  brought  to  bear 
upon  him  for  the  removal  of  General  Johnston,  asking  his 
views  in  regard  to  it,  and  what  he  thought  of  the  appoint 
ment  of  General  Hood  to  the  command  of  that  army.  The 
reply  of  General  Lee  was,  in  substance,  that,  while  he  re 
garded  General  Hood  as  a  most  capable  and  deserving  offi 
cer,  he  could  not  recommend  the  change  proposed ;  and  that, 
in  his  judgment,  it  would  be  unwise,  under  the  circumstances 
then  existing,  to  make  any  change  in  commanders.  The 
telegraphic  communication  between  the  President  and  Gen 
eral  Lee  was  conducted  in  cipher  in  all  matters  of  impor 
tance.  The  duty  of  interpreting  these  dispatches  and  put 
ting  them  into  cipher  devolved  upon  me,  and  their  contents 
were  more  positively  and  permanently  impressed  upon  my 
memory  than  would  have  been  the  case  in  the  mere  reading 
or  copying  of  an  ordinary  message. 

Conscious  that  it  would  be  unbecoming  on  my  part  to 
express  any  opinion  concerning  the  order  of  the  President 
directing  the  change  alluded  to,  I  touch  upon  this  delicate 
matter  only  as  it  concerns  General  Lee,  and  not  with  the  de- 


140  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

sire  of  adding  a  feather's  weight  to  the  arguments  for  or 
against  the  wisdom  or  propriety  of  the  order  relieving  Gen 
eral  Johnston  of  command,  save  that  which  my  former  com 
rades  in  arms  will  attach  to  the  opinion  of  General  Lee. 

Reverting  to  the  notes  from  which  I  have  previously 
quoted,  I  append  additional  extracts,  whose  only  value,  if 
any  they  have,  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  they  were  writ 
ten  by  one  who  was  brought  into  daily  and  intimate  relations 
with  General  Lee,  and  whose  position  made  him  thoroughly 
informed  as  to  all  matters  of  routine  in  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  ;  and,  therefore,  their  tone  may  be  regarded  as 
in  some  measure  indicative  of  the  spirit  and  temper  of  that 
army ;  and  the  intimations  of  contemplated  changes  or  prob 
able  movements  therein  made,  as  the  reflex  of  the  views  and 
opinions  of  General  Lee  as  to  what  was  regarded  as  expedi 
ent  or  probable : 

NEAR  PETERSBURG,  V A.,  August  28, 1864. 

We  have  had  some  irregular  but  quite  severe  fighting  dur 
ing  the  past  two  weeks,  and  in  summing  up  the  result  there  is 
a  decided  balance  in  our  favor.  Still,  the  enemy  retains  pos 
session  of  the  Weldon  Railroad.  To  do  this,  however,  has  cost 
General  Grant  about  twelve  thousand  men. 

NORTH  SIDE  JAMES  RIVER,  October  27, 1864. 

There  are  indications  of  a  general  movement.  The  enemy 
is  in  motion  at  all  points.  We  may  have  to  move  any  moment. 
General  Hill,  at  Petersburg,  reports  the  enemy  making  a  general 
advance  on  his  right.  General  Longstreet  here  reports  a  dem 
onstration  along  his  entire  line,  and  there  is  some  activity  on 
the  river  and  between  the  James  and  Appomattox.  The  gen 
eral  has  gone  to  the  lines  alone. 

NORTH  SIDE,  November  1,  1864. 

The  general  informed  me  last  night  that  he  wished  to  go  to 
Petersburg,  and,  as  he  would  probably  remain  a  week  or  more, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  take  everything  along  with  us.  He 
has  gone  ahead,  and  will  take  a  ride  by  Pickett's  line. 


SIEGE   OF  PETERSBURG.  141 

PETERSBURG,  VA.,  November  7,  1864. 

On  leaving  the  north  side  the  general  left  it  to  me  to  select 
an  abiding-place  for  our  party  here.  I,  of  course,  selected  a 
place  where  I  thought  he  would  be  comfortable,  although  I 
firmly  believe  he  concluded  that  I  was  thinking  more  of  myself 
than  of  him.  I  took  possession  of  a  vacant  house  and  had  his 
room  prepared,  with  a  cheerful  fire,  and  everything  made  as 
cozy  as  possible.  It  was  entirely  too  pleasant  for  him,  for  he  is 
never  so  uncomfortable  as  when  comfortable.  A  day  or  two 
after  our  arrival  he  informed  me  that  he  desired  to  visit  the  cav 
alry-lines,  and  thought  it  best  to  move  our  camp  down.  So  we 
packed  up  bag  and  baggage — books  and  records — and  moved  to 
a  point  about  eight  miles  distant,  pitched  our  tents,  and  con 
cluded  that  we  were  fixed  for  some  days  at  least.  The  next 
morning,  however,  the  general  concluded  that  we  had  better  re 
turn.  So  back  I  came  to  Petersburg,  and  as  I  could  find  no 
better  place — nor  a  worse  one  that  was  suitable — I  returned  to 
the  house  we  had  vacated,  where  we  are  now  comfortably  estab 
lished.  This  is  the  first  time  we  have  been  quartered  in  a  house. 

NEAR  PETERSBURG,  VA.,  November  27,  1864. 

While  General  Lee  was  in  Richmond,  I  concluded  to  move 
headquarters,  as  a  party  that  proposed  to  occupy  the  house  as 
soon  as  we  should  vacate  had  given  a  gentle  hint  by  sending  to 
inquire  "  when  General  Lee  would  leave  the  house."  The  only 
other  house  available  was  one  two  miles  from  the  city,  kindly 
offered  by  the  owner,  Mr.  Turnbull.  So  here  we  are  at  "  Edge 
Hill."  I  am  finely  fixed  in  the  parlor  with  piano,  sofas,  rock 
ing-chairs,  and  pictures  ;  capital  surroundings  for  a  winter  cam 
paign.  After  locating  the  general  and  my  associates  of  the 
staff,  I  concluded  that  I  would  have  to  occupy  one  of  the  miser 
able  little  back-rooms,  but  the  gentleman  of  the  house  sug 
gested  that  I  should  take  the  parlor.  I  think  that  the  general 
was  pleased  with  his  room,  and  on  entering  mine  he  remarked: 
"  Ah  !  you  are  finely  fixed.  Couldn't  you  find  any  other  room  ?  " 
"  No,"  I  replied,  "  but  this  will  do.  I  can  make  myself  tolerably 
comfortable  here."  He  was  struck  dumb  with  amazement  at 
my  impudence,  and  soon  vanished. 


142         FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

EDGE  HILL,  December  4, 1864. 

Since  the  affair  at  Stony  Creek  we  have  had  perfect  quiet  on 
our  lines.  The  Sixth  Corps,  which  has  been  with  Sheridan  in 
General  Early's  front,  has  started  for  City  Point — so  we  are  in 
formed  by  telegraph.  General  Gracie,  who  showed  such  tact  in 
getting  General  Lee  to  descend  from  a  dangerous  position,  was 
killed  near  the  lines  a  day  or  so  ago.  He  was  an  excellent 
officer,  had  passed  through  many  hard-fought  battles,  escaped 
numberless  dangers,  and  was  finally  killed  while  quietly  viewing 
the  enemy  from  a  point  where  no  one  dreamed  of  danger.  I 
have  just  received  a  telegram  from  General  Ewell  reporting 
great  commotion  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  this 
evening.  Movements  tend  to  Fort  Harrison. 

EDGE  HILL,  December  12,  1864. 

"We  have  had  much  excitement  during  the  past  week;  nor 
has  the  end  yet  come.  Couriers  were  arriving  during  the  whole 
of  last  night — and  what  a  bitter  cold  night  it  was  !  So  far  the 
enemy  have  accomplished  but  little.  The  whole  movement 
seems  to  have  been  a  grand  raid  on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  and, 
although  the  bridge  was  saved  by  the  valor  of  our  troops,  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  destroying  about  ten  miles  of  the  road. 
There  were  other  movements  along  the  lines,  but  in  results  they 
were  trifling.  Last  night  another  advance  was  reported,  but  it 
was  probably  only  reinforcements  going  to  the  rescue  of  the 
first  column. 

EDGE  HILL,  December  18,  1864. 

We  have  had  comparative  quiet  since  the  recent  affair  on 
the  Weldon  road.  It  is  difficult  to  anticipate  events  now,  but 
it  appears  more  probable  that  the  vicinity  of  "Wilmington^ 
North  Carolina,  will  be  the  scene  of  the  next  engagement  than 
either  Petersburg  or  Richmond. 

EDGE  HILL,  February  5,  1865. 

Instead  of  a  quiet  Sunday,  we  have  had  one  of  considerable 
excitement:  the  indications  are  that  General  Grant  is  once  more 
moving  on  us.  It  is  not  positively  known  whether  or  not  he 
has  been  reenforced  by  General  Thomas,  but,  all  things  consid- 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  143 

ered,  it  is  better  that  we  should  fight  now  than  later.  The 
present  movement  is  probably  a  raid  upon  our  railroads — the 
South  Side  and  the  Richmond  &  Danville.  We  are  sanguine, 
and  never  expect  anything  but  success;  but  the  approaching 
spring  campaign  will  be  a  trying  one.  Sherman  may  occasion 
us  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  and  it  may  be  necessary  to  make 
very  important  changes  in  the  campaign,  and  for  this  army 
to  change  its  position. 

EDGE  HILL,  February  6, 1865. 

After  all,  yesterday's  excitement  resulted  in  but  little.  The 
enemy  have  not  gone  after  our  railroads,  having  been  checked 
at  Dinwiddie  Court-House.  They  have  extended  their  lines 
somewhat,  but  as  yet  show  no  disposition  to  attack  in  force. 
Richmond  is  doubtless  much  excited  over  the  return  of  the  Peace 
Commission  and  the  result  of  its  mission.  Our  people  now 
know  what  they  have  to  expect. 

EDGE  HILL,  February  20, 1865. 

Truly  matters  are  becoming  serious  and  exciting.  If  some 
body  doesn't  arrest  Sherman's  march,  where  will  he  stop  ?  They 
are  trying  to  corner  this  old  army,  but  like  a  brave  lion  brought 
to  bay  at  last  it  is  determined  to  resist  to  the  death,  and  if  die 
it  must  to  die  game.  We  are  to  have  some  hard  knocks,  we  are 
to  experience  much  that  is  dispiriting,  but  if  our  men  are  true 
(and  I  really  believe  that  most  of  them  are)  we  will  make  our 
way  successfully  through  the  dark  clouds  that  now  surround 
us.  Our  people  must  make  up  their  minds  to  see  Richmond  go, 
but  must  not  lose  spirit,  must  not  give  up.  The  general  left 
but  a  few  moments  ago.  My  orders  are  to  be  in  marching 
order,  to  lose  no  time,  to  begin  my  preparations  to-morrow. 
These  instructions  apply  to  army  headquarters  only.  The  army 
will  retain  its  position  still  a  time  longer,  but  the  general-in- 
chief  may  soon  bid  it  a  temporary  adieu  and  repair  to  another 
scene  of  excitement. 

EDGE  HILL,  February  24,  1865. 

Now  that  General  Johnston  has  been,  placed  in  command  of 
his  old  army  by  General  Lee,  it  is  not  probable  that  the  latter 
will  go  to  South  Carolina — at  any  rate  not  immediately.  .  .  . 
It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  our  condition  at  this  time  is  a  criti- 


144  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

cal  one;  but,  although  it  is  a  crisis  in  our  affairs,  it  is  the  same 
with  the  enemy.  Suppose  we  were  to  concentrate  on  Sherman 
and  crush  him,  would  not  the  aspect  of  affairs  be  entirely 
changed  ?  Well,  that  is  not  beyond  the  range  of  possibility. 
Much  depends  on  the  check  given  to  Sherman's  career.  Rich 
mond  may  be  lost  to  us — and  Sherman  may  be  overwhelmed. 
The  defeat  of  Sherman  would  restore  Richmond.  To  be  rid  of 
him  would  more  than  compensate  for  such  temporary  sacrifice. 
The  rumors  in  Richmond  are  great  exaggerations  of  facts. 
Some  of  our  weaker  men  have  deserted  their  colors,  but  the  de 
sertion  is  not  so  great  as  reported.  We  are  getting  something 
to  eat,  and  most  of  our  brave  fellows  are  in  good  heart,  although 
grieved  to  hear  of  despondency  behind  them.  All  at  home 
should  send  words  of  cheer  and  encouragement  to  the  army. 

EDGE  HILL,  March  5, 1865. 

I  do  not,  cannot,  yet  despair;  but  it  is  evident  that  there 
has  been  a  rapid,  radical  change  in  the  tone  of  public  sentiment, 
in  which  some  of  our  officials  participate.  Some  high  in  au 
thority  tell  us  that  the  people  are  tired,  that  they  are  not  sup 
ported  by  the  people,  and  that  public  sentiment  has  undergone 
a  change.  Claiming  to  be  prompted  by  a  desire  to  prevent  the 
further  effusion  of  blood,  these  talk  of  terms  and  reconstruc 
tion.  I  do  not  think  our  military  situation  hopeless  by  any 
means;  but  I  confess  matters  are  far  worse  than  I  ever  ex 
pected  to  see  them. 

EDGE  HILL,  Marcli  23, 1865. 

The  dread  contingency  of  which  some  intimation  has  been 
given  is  near  at  hand.  No  one  can  say  what  the  next  iveeTc  may 
bring  forth,  although  the  calamity  may  be  deferred  a  while 
longer.  Now  is  the  hour  when  we  must  show  of  what  stuff  we 
are  made.  It  would  be  worse  than  useless  to  indulge  in  repin- 
ings  and  regrets,  which  could  only  impair  our  efficiency  and 
tend  to  dishearten  those  who  look  to  us  for  protection. 

EDGE  HILL,  March  27, 18C5. 

Matters  have  not  improved  since  the  23d;  there  is  no  cause 
for  hope  now  which  did  not  exist  then.  The  probable  contin- 


SIEGE   OF  PETERSBURG.  145 

gency  is  a  foregone  conclusion.  There  appears  to  be  an  unac 
countable  apathy  and  listlessness  in  high  places.  It  would  be 
better  to  face  the  misfortune  bravely,  and  prepare  for  it  in  an 
ticipation.  There  seems  to  be  no  preparation  for  the  removal 
of  the  several  departments  of  the  government;  when  the  press 
ure  is  upon  us  it  may  be  impracticable.  I  say  nothing  of  our 
fight;  it  was  gallantly  done,  as  far  as  it  went.  [Allusion  is  here 
made  to  the  attack  made  on  the  Federal  lines  by  a  portion  of 
Gordon's  command.] 

It  is  a  very  simple  matter  to  trace,  through  the  dates 
here  given,  the  steady  progress  toward  the  inevitable  doom 
which,  sooner  or  later,  awaited  the  Confederates  in  their 
inflexible  purpose  to  hold  the  city  of  Richmond. 

General  Lee  was  opposed  to  that  policy  winch  desig 
nated  certain  points  as  indispensable  to  be  held,  except  so 
far  and  so  long  as  they  possessed  strategic  value  to  the  ar 
mies  operating  in  the  field.  He  maintained  that  the  deter 
mination  to  retain  possession  of  such,  under  all  circumstances 
and  at  any  cost,  caused  a  fallacious  value  to  attach  to  suc 
cess  in  such  endeavor,  and,  in  event  of  failure,  entailed  a 
moral  loss  on  us,  and  assured  an  elation  to  the  enemy  alto 
gether  disproportionate  to  the  material  benefit  to  be  derived 
from  continued  possession ;  not  that  he  would  not  have 
made  an  earnest  effort  to  save  such  points  as  Yicksburg 
and  Richmond  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
—especially  the  latter,  which  had  a  real  value,  strategical 
ly  considered  ;  but  when  it  came  to  a  siege,  to  settle  down 
behind  intrenchments  and  permit  the  gradual  and  complete 
circumvallation  of  the  place  besieged,  by  an  adversary  with 
unlimited  resources  of  men  and  material,  he  preferred  to 
move  out,  to  manoeuvre,  to  concentrate,  and  to  fight. 

His  policy  at  Petersburg  would  have  been  to  unite 
the  greater  portion  of  his  army  —  before  it  wasted  away 
from  incessant  battle  and  from  desertion1 — with  that  under 

1  A  few  words  in  regard  to  this  desertion :  The  condition  of  affairs  through- 
10 


146  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

General  Johnston,  and  to  fall  upon  General  Sherman  with 
the  hope  of  destroying  him,  and  then,  with  the  united 
armies,  to  return  to  confront  General  Grant.  Having  the 
interior  line,  he  could  move  to  accomplish  such  purpose 
much  more  quickly  than  his  adversary  could  to  thwart  it. 
Such  a  policy  involved  the  giving  up  of  Richmond,  it  is 
true  ;  but  that  which  was  pursued  involved  the  same  thing 
writh  a  certainty  more  absolute,  and  left  Sherman  to  over 
whelm  Johnston,  and  at  the  same  time  to  destroy  the  gran 
aries  of  the  Confederacy,  from  which  Lee's  army  was  sup 
plied. 

In  my  opinion,  as  a  general  rule,  the  Administration  was 
in  perfect  accord  with  General  Lee  in  all  his  designs,  and 
gave  a  hearty  cooperation  in  all  his  movements ;  but  I  think 
the  exception  was  furnished  in  the  persistent  effort  to  hold 
Richmond  and  Petersburg,  after  it  became  evident  that  it 
could  be  but  a  question  of  time,  and  would  probably  involve 
the  complete  exhaustion  of  the  principal  army  of  the  Con 
federacy. 

If  it  shall  be  the  verdict  of  posterity  that  General  Lee 
in  any  respect  fell  short  of  perfection  as  a  military  leader,  it 
may  perhaps  be  claimed  :  first,  that  he  was  too  careful  of 
the  personal  feelings  of  his  subordinate  commanders,  too 
fearful  of  wounding  their  pride,  and  too  solicitous  for  their 
reputation.  Probably  it  was  this  that  caused  him  sometimes 
to  continue  in  command  those  of  whose  fitness  for  their 
position  he  was  not  convinced,  and  often  led  him,  either 
avowedly  or  tacitly,  to  assume  responsibility  for  mishaps 

out  the  South  at  that  period  was  truly  deplorable.  Hundreds  of  letters  ad 
dressed  to  soldiers  were  intercepted  and  sent  to  army  headquarters,  in  which 
mothers,  wives,  and  sisters,  told  of  their  inability  to  respond  to  the  appeals  of 
hungry  children  for  bread,  or  to  provide  proper  care  and  remedies  for  the 
sick ;  and,  in  the  name  of  all  that  was  dear,  appealed  to  the  men  to  come 
home  and  rescue  them  from  the  ills  which  they  suffered  and  the  starvation 
which  threatened  them.  Surely  never  was  devotion  to  one's  country  and  to 
one's  duty  more  sorely  tested  than  was  the  case  with  the  soldiers  of  Lee's 
army  during  the  last  year  of  the  war. 


SIEGE   OF  PETERSBURG.  147 

clearly  attributable  to  the  inefficiency,  neglect,  or  careless 
ness,  of  others.  I  have  heard  him  express  the  wish  that 
General  A  had  the  command  of  a  certain  division  instead 
of  Genera]  B,  when  General  A  was  a  brigadier  in  Major- 
General  B's  division,  and  a  recommendation  from  the 
general  to  the  department  would  doubtless  have  procured 
the  change.  The  world  already  knows  how  prone  he  was 
at  all  times  to  take  upon  his  own  shoulders  the  respon 
sibility  for  failure  or  mishap,  and  thus  shield  those  from 
censure  who  had  really  failed  to  execute  his  orders  or 
designs. 

In  the  next  place  it  may  be  said  that  he  was  too  law- 
abiding,  too  subordinate  to  his  superiors  in  civil  authority 
— those  who  managed  the  governmental  machinery.  Brought 
up  in  the  school  of  the  soldier  he  had  early  imbibed  the 
idea  that  discipline  was  essential  in  the  military  life,  and 
that  subordination  was  the  key-stone  of  discipline.  Obedi 
ence  to  orders  wTas,  in  his  judgment,  the  cardinal  principle 
with  all  good  soldiers  of  every  grade.  As  a  rule,  no  one 
can  deny  the  correctness  of  this  view ;  but  those  were  ex 
traordinary  times,  and,  in  some  matters,  ordinary  rules  were 
extraordinary  evils.  General  Lee  should  have  been  supreme 
in  all  matters  touching  the  movements  and  discipline  of  his 
army,  whereas,  under  the  law  and  the  regulations  of  the 
Department  of  War  made  in  conformity  thereto,  he  had  not 
even  the  power  to  confer  promotion  on  the  field  of  battle, 
and  thus  to  recognize  and  reward  meritorious  conduct ;  and 
in  matters  concerning  the  movements  of  his  army  he  was  of 
course  under  authority,  and  more  or  less  controlled  by  politi 
cal  considerations.  Perhaps  it  could  not  be  otherwise  under 
our  peculiar  form  of  government,  but  it  would  never  be  pos 
sible  to  get  the  full  measure  of  a  man's  capacity  for  military 
affairs  wrho  was  thus  trammeled. 

A  month  or  two  before  the  close  of  the  war  the  scope 
of  General  Lee's  authority  was  enlarged,  and  he  was  made 
general-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy ;  but 


148  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

the  end  was  then  near  at  hand,  and  the  affairs  of  the  South 
hopeless. 

The  traits  of  character  alluded  to,  excessive  generosity 
and  perfect  subordination,  while  they  adorned  the  life  of 
General  Lee,  are  not  compatible  with  the  generally  accepted 
notions  of  perfection  in  a  revolutionary  leader. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Evacuation  of  Petersburg. — General  Lee's  Retreat  up  James  River. — Appo- 
mattox. — Surrender. — General  Lee  goes  to  Richmond. 

ON  the  first  day  of  April  General  Grant  directed  a  heavy 
movement  against  the  Confederate  right  near  Five  Forks  ; 
this  necessitated  the  concentration  of  every  available  man  at 
that  point  to  resist  the  Federal  advance,  and  a  consequent 
stretching  out  of  our  line,  already  so  sadly  attenuated  that 
at  some  places  it  consisted  of  but  one  man  to  every  seven 
yards — nothing  more  than  a  skirmish-line.  It  was  without 
serious  resistance,  therefore,  that  on  the  2d  of  April  the 
Federals  obtained  possession  of  a  portion  of  the  lines  be 
tween  Hatcher's  Run  and  the  city.  Indeed,  we  had  so  few 
men  to  contest  the  matter  with  them  that  they  were  within 
our  lines  before  it  was  reported  to  General  Lee  or  General 
Hill.  From  the  point  occupied  by  these  officers,  detached 
squads  of  men  were  observed  advancing  toward  us  in  the 
plateau  beyond  ;  it  was  impossible  to  say  whether  they  were 
our  men  or  the  enemy;  and  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  solv 
ing  this  doubt  and  ascertaining  the  actual  condition  of  affairs 
in  that  locality,  that  General  A.  P.  Hill  rode  toward  these 
detachments,  by  the  fire  from  one  of  which  he  was  shot  dead 
from  his  horse. 

Under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  the  Federal  army 
now  made  a  general  advance.  It  was  apparent  that  our 
position  could  be  no  longer  maintained.  General  Lee  com 
municated  to  the  authorities  at  Richmond  his  intention  of 


150  FOUR  YEARS  WITH   GENERAL   LEE. 

evacuating  his  lines  that  night,  for  which  emergency  they 
should  have  been  prepared. 

During  the  whole  day  he  was  engaged  in  issuing  orders 
and  sending  dispatches  by  couriers  and  by  telegraph,  in 
preparation  for  this  event.  Early  in  the  forenoon,  while 
the  telegraph-operator  was  working  his  instrument  at  head 
quarters,  under  the  supervision  of  the  staff-officer  charged 
with  the  duty  of  transmitting  these  orders,  a  shell  came 
crashing  through  the  house,  and  the  operator  declared  him 
self  unable  longer  to  work  his  instrument.  He  was  ordered 
to  detach  it,  and  as  the  staff-officer  and  the  operator  emerged 
from  the  house,  they  with  difficulty  escaped  capture  at  the 
hands  of  the  Federal  infantry,  which  just  then  advanced 
upon  and  drove  away  the  battery  of  artillery  which  had 
been  placed  in  position  around  the  house  to  assist  in  delay 
ing  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  The  comfortable  dwelling 
of  Mr.  Turnbull,  occupied  by  General  Lee  as  his  headquar 
ters,  and  thus  hastily  evacuated  by  the  rear-guard  of  his 
military  family,  was  soon  enveloped  in  flames.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  fire  was  accidental ;  by  General  Lee  it  was 
then  thought  and  feared  to  have  been  by  design.  One  of 
the  many  arguments  always  advanced  by  him  why  he  should 
not  occupy  a  house  was,  that,  in  event  of  its  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  the  very  fact  of  its  having  been  occu 
pied  by  him  might  possibly  cause  its  destruction ;  and,  as 
before  stated,  it  was  only  during  the  last  year  of  the  war, 
when  his  health  was  somewhat  impaired,  that  one  of  his 
staff  had  the  temerity,  011  the  occasion  of  one  of  the  gen 
eral's  visits  to  Richmond,  to  turn  in  his  tent  to  the  quarter 
master's  department,  and  move  his  effects  into  a  house, 
which  he  was  thus  almost  compelled  to  occupy. 

After  a  gallant  resistance  our  forces  were  retired  to  the 
second  or  inner  line  of  defense  around  the  city  of  Peters 
burg,  and  there  maintained  their  ground  till  nightfall.  By 
the  dawn  of  day  next  morning  the  lines  had  been  evacuated, 
and  the  gallant  but  sadly-reduced  Army  of  Northern  Yir- 


GENERAL  LEE'S  RETREAT.  151 

ginia  had  made  good  way  in  its  retreat  westwardly  toward 
Amelia  Court-House.  The  intention  was  to  take  the  direc 
tion  of  Danville,  and  turn  to  our  advantage  the  good  line 
for  resistance  offered  by  the  Dan  and  Staunton  Rivers. 
The  activity  of  the  Federal  cavalry  and  the  want  of  sup 
plies  compelled  a  different  course,  and  the  retreat  was  con 
tinued  up  the  South  Side  Railroad  toward  Lynchburg. 

Despite  the  great  numerical  superiority  of  the  Federals 
and  their  immense  resources,  General  Lee  managed  to  check 
their  pursuit  from  time  to  time,  and  t'o  continue  his  retreat 
for  seven  days,  until,  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  April, 
our  advance  under  General  Gordon  was  confronted  by  the 
enemy  in  the  neighborhood  of  Appomattox  Court-House. 
The  returns  from  the  various  commands  made  that  morning 
showed  an  aggregate  of  eight  thousand  muskets  in  line  of 
battle. 

On  the  previous  evening  I  became  separated  from  Gen 
eral  Lee  in  the  execution  of  his  orders  in  regard  to  the  park 
ing  of  our  trains  in  places  of  safety,  and  did  not  rejoin  him 
until  the  morning  of  the  9th.  After  making  my  report  the 
general  said  to  me,1  "  Well,  colonel,  what  are  we  to  do  ? " 

In  reply,  a  fear  was  expressed  that  it  would  be  necessary 
to  abandon  the  trains,  which  had  already  occasioned  us  such 
great  embarrassment ;  and  the  hope  was  indulged  that,  re 
lieved  of  this  burden,  the  army  could  make  good  its  escape. 

"  Yes,"  said  the  general,  "  perhaps  we  could  ;  but  I  have 
had  a  conference  with  these  gentlemen  around  me,  and  they 
agree  that  the  time  has  come  for  capitulation." 

"Well,  sir,"  I  said,  "I  can  only  speak  for  myself;  to 
me  any  other  fate  is  preferable — 

"  Such  is  my  individual  way  of  thinking,"  interrupted 
the  general. 

1  General  Lee  frequently  thus  addressed  those  around  him — not  that  he  at 
tached  any  importance  to  or  expected  any  aid  from  what  might  be  said  in  re 
ply  ;  but,  in  giving  expression  to  that  which  occupied  his  own  mind — thinking 
aloud,  so  to  speak — he  at  the  same  time  drew  from  others  such  information  as 
they  might  possess,  or  such  views  as  they  might  entertain. 


152  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

"  But,"  I  immediately  added,  "  of  course,  general,  it  is 
different  with  you.  You  have  to  think  of  these  brave  men 
and  decide  not  only  for  yourself,  but  for  them." 

"  Yes,"  he  replied ;  "  it  would  be  useless  and  therefore 
cruel  to  provoke  the  further  effusion  of  blood,  and  I  have 
arranged  to  meet  General  Grant  with  a  view  to  surrender, 
and  wish  you  to  accompany  me." 

Shortly  after  this  the  general,  accompanied  by  Colonel 
Marshall  and  myself,  started  back  in  the  direction  from 
which  we  had  come,  to  meet  General  Grant  as  had  been 
arranged. 

"We  continued  some  distance  without  meeting  any  one 
after  passing  our  lines ;  but  finally  came  upon  a  staff-officer 
sent  by  General  Grant's  order  to  say  to  General  Lee  that  he 
had  been  prevented  from  meeting  him  at  that  point,  and  to 
request  that  he  would  meet  him  upon  the  other  road.  Gen 
eral  Lee  then  retraced  his  steps,  and,  proceeding  toward 
our  front  in  the  direction  of  Appomattox  Court-House,  dis 
mounted  at  a  convenient  place  to  await  General  Grant's 
communication.  Very  soon  a  Federal  officer,  accompanied 
by  one  of  General  Gordon's  staff,  rode  up  to  where  General 
Lee  was  seated  in  a  small  orchard  on  the  road-side.  This 
proved  to  be  General  Forsythe,  of  General  Sheridan's  staff, 
who  was  sent  by  General  Sheridan  to  say  that,  as  he  had 
doubt  as  to  his  authority  to  recognize  the  informal  truce 
which  had  been  agreed  upon  between  General  Gordon  and 
himself,  he  desired  to  communicate  with  General  Meade  on 
the  subject,  and  wished  permission  to  pass  through  our  lines 
as  the  shortest  route.  I  was  assigned  to  the  duty  of  escort 
ing  General  Forsythe  through  our  lines  and  back.  This 
was  scarcely  accomplished,  when  General  Babcock  rode  up 
and  announced  to  General  Lee  that  General  Grant  was  pre 
pared  to  meet  him  at  the  front. 

I  shrank  from  this  interview,  and  while  I  could  not  then, 
and  cannot  now,  justify  my  conduct,  I  availed  myself  of  the 
excuse  of  having  taken  the  two  rides  through  the  extent  of 


SURRENDER  AT  APPOMATTOX.  153 

our  lines  and  to  those  of  the  enemy,  already  mentioned,  and 
did  not  accompany  my  chief  in  this  trying  ordeal. 

The  scene  witnessed  upon  the  return  of  General  Lee 
was  one  certain  to  impress  itself  indelibly  upon  the  memory ; 
it  can  be  vividly  recalled  now,  after  the  lapse  of  many  years, 
but  no  description  can  do  it  justice.  The  men  crowded 
around  him,  eager  to  shake  him  by  the  hand  ;  eyes  that  had 
been  so  often  illumined  with  the  fire  of  patriotism  and  true 
courage,  that  had  so  often  glared  with  defiance  in  the  heat 
and  fury  of  battle,  and  so  often  kindled  with  enthusiasm 
and  pride  in  the  hour  of  success,  moistened  now ;  cheeks 
bronzed  by  exposure  in  many  campaigns,  and  withal  be 
grimed  with  powder  and  dust,  now  blanched  from  deep 
emotion  and  suffered  the  silent  tear ;  tongues  that  had  so 
often  carried  dismay  to  the  hearts  of  the  enemy  in  that  in 
describable  cheer  which  accompanied  "  the  charge,"  or  that 
had  so  often  made  the  air  to  resound  with  the  psean  of  vic 
tory,  refused  utterance  now ;  brave  hearts  failed  that  had 
never  quailed  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy ;  but  the  firm 
and  silent  pressure  of  the  hand  told  most  eloquently  of  souls 
filled  with  admiration,  love,  and  tender  sympathy,  for  their 
beloved  chief.  He  essayed  to  thank  them,  but  too  full  a 
heart  paralyzed  his  speech ;  he  soon  sought  a  short  respite 
from  these  trying  scenes  and  retired  to  his  private  quarters, 
that  he  might,  in  solitude  and  quiet,  commune  with  his  own 
brave  heart  and  be  still.  Thus  terminated  the  career  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia — an  army  that  was  never  van 
quished  ;  but  that,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  its  trusted 
commander,  who  was  himself  yielding  obedience  to  the  dic 
tates  of  a  pure  and  lofty  sense  of  duty  to  his  men  and 
those  dependent  on  them,  laid  down  its  arms,  and  furled  the 
standards  never  lowered  in  defeat. 

The  work  of  paroling  the  army  was  now  proceeded  with, 
and  was  completed  on  the  10th  of  April.  On  the  same  day 
General  Meade  called  to  pay  his  respects  to  General  Lee. 
The  latter  reported  to  his  staff,  after  the  visit,  that  the  con- 


154  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

versation  had  naturally  turned  upon  recent  events,  and  that 
General  Meade  had  asked  him  how  many  men  he  had  at 
Petersburg  at  the  time  of  General  Grant's  final  assault.  He 
told  him  in  reply  that  by  the  last  returns  he  had  thirty- 
three  thousand  muskets.  (In  his  recital  of  the  matter  he 
appealed  to  me  to  know  if  his  memory  was  correct,  and  was 
answered  in  the  affirmative.)  General  Meade  then  said, 
"  You  mean  that  you  had  thirty-three  thousand  men  in  the 
lines  immediately  around  Petersburg  ?  "  to  which  General 
Lee  replied  "  No,"  that  he  had  but  that  number  from  his 
left  on  the  Chickahominy  Eiver  to  his  right  at  Dinwiddie 
Court-House.  At  this  General  Meade  expressed  great  sur 
prise,  and  stated  that  he  then  had  with  him,  in  trie-one  wing 
of  the  Federal  army  which  he  commanded,  over  fifty  thou 
sand  men. 

The  number  of  men  and  officers  paroled,  including  the 
stragglers  who  had  caught  up  with  the  army,  and  all  the 
extra-duty  or  detailed  men  of  every  description,  was  in  round 
numbers  between  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  thousand. 

On  his  way  to  Richmond  General  Lee  stopped  for  the 
night  near  the  residence  of  his  brother,  Mr.  Carter  Lee,  of 
Powhatan  County  ;  and,  although  importuned  by  his  brother 
to  pass  the  night  under  his  roof,  the  general  persisted  in 
pitching  his  tent  by  the  side  of  the  road,  and  going  into 
camp  as  usual.  This  continued  self-denial  can  only  be  ex 
plained  upon  the  hypothesis  that  he  desired  to  have  his  men 
know  that  he  shared  their  privations  to  the  very  last. 

On  the  12th  day  of  April  he  returned  to  the  city  of 
Richmond  a  paroled  prisoner  of  war,  but  a  monarch  still  in 
the  hearts  of  his  countrymen,  and  an  object  of  admiration  in 
the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

General  Lee  indicted  by  the  Grand-Jury  at  Norfolk. — His  Advice  to  the  Young 
Men  of  Virginia. — His  Purpose  to  write  a  History  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia. — His  Desire  to  obtain  Correct  Information  of  the  Strength 
of  that  Army. 

IN  June  of  the  same  year  a  United  States  grand-jury  in 
Norfolk,  Virginia,  indicted  Mr.  Davis,  General  Lee,  and 
others,  for  treason,  or  something  similar  to  it.  I  immedi 
ately  informed  General  Lee  of  the  fact,  and  at  the  same  time 
expressed  a  regret  that  some  of  our  young  men  were  dis 
couraged  at  not  being  able  to  obtain  employment,  and  many 
in  consequence  talked  of  migrating  to  other  countries.  He 
replied  as  follows : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  June  17,  1865. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL:  I  am  very  much  obliged  to  you  for 
your  letter  of  the  13th.  I  had  heard  of  the  indictment  by  the 
grand-jury  at  Norfolk,  and  made  up  my  mind  to  let  the  au 
thorities  take  their  course.  I  have  no  wish  to  avoid  any  trial 
the  Government  may  order,  and  cannot  flee.  I  hope  others  may 
be  unmolested,  and  that  you  at  least  may  be  undisturbed. 

I  am  sorrv  to  hear  that  our  returned  soldiers  cannot  obtain 
employment.  Tell  them  they  must  all  set  to  work,  and,  if  they 
cannot  do  what  they  prefer,  do  what  they  can.  Virginia  wants 
all  their  aid,  all  their  support,  and  the  presence  of  all  her  sons 
to  sustain  and  recuperate  her.  They  must  therefore  put  them 
selves  in  a  position  to  take  part  in  her  government,  and  not  be 
deterred  by  obstacles  in  their  way.  There  is  much  to  be  done 
which  they  only  can  do.  .  .  . 

Very  truly  yours,  R.  E.  LEE, 

Colonel  W.  II.  TAYLOR. 


156  FOUR  YEARS  WITH  GENERAL  LEE. 

This  letter  utterly  refutes  the  charge  repeatedly  made  by 
writers  at  the  North  that,  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities, 
General  Lee  held  himself  aloof  in  sullen  silence,  declining 
to  accept  the  situation.  But  two  months  had  elapsed  since 
the  surrender  at  Appomattox — not  a  sufficient  time  for  the 
subsidence  of  the  passion  engendered  by  war  and  the  heal 
ing  of  the  wounds  occasioned  by  defeat ;  the  hearts  of  the 
people  of  the  South  were  yet  filled  with  resentment  and 
bitter  hatred  toward  their  Northern  adversaries — and  yet 
he,  their  greatest  captain,  counseled  a  prompt  and  ready 
acquiescence  in  the  inevitable,  urging  his  countrymen  not 
to  be  deterred  by  seeming  obstacles  from  resuming  their 
citizenship  with  all  its  obligations — that  is,  not  to  flinch 
from  a  compliance  with  distasteful  requirements,  but  to  con 
form  to  all  legal  enactments  necessary  to  enable  them  to 
resume  the  reins  of  the  government  of  their  State,  and  thus 
save  her  from  adventurous  aliens,  and  consequent  spoliation 
and  ruin. 

Soon  after  this,  General  Lee  conceived  the  idea  of  pre 
paring  the  data  for  a  complete  history  of  the  campaigns  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia.  Early  in  August  I  received 
the  following  letter  from  him,  which  fully  explains  his  pur 
pose  in  this  regard : 

NEAR  CARTERSVILLE,  July  31, 1865. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL  :  I  am  desirous  that  the  bravery  and  de 
votion  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  shall  be  correctly 
transmitted  to  posterity.  This  is  the  only  tribute  that  can  now 
be  paid  to  the  worth  of  its  noble  officers  and  soldiers  ;  and  I  am 
anxious  to  collect  the  necessary  data  for  the  history  of  the 
campaigns  in  Virginia,  from  the  commencement  of  its  organiza 
tion  to  its  final  surrender.  I  am  particularly  anxious  that  its 
actual  strength  in  the  different  battles  it  has  fought  be  correctly 
stated.  You  know  all  its  official  returns,  records,  etc.,  from  the 
time  of  my  connection  with  it,  have  been  lost  or  destroyed. 

As  you  prepared  the  tri-monthly  returns  for  so  long,  and 
tested  their  accuracy,  I  have  thought  its  gradual  changes  may 


CONJECTURAL  RETURNS  OF  FORCE,  ETC.  157 

have  been  impressed  upon  your  memory,  and  that  you  might 
state  with  some  confidence  its  effective  strength,  at  each  of  the 
great  battles  it  has  fought,  in  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery. 
You  may  also  have  some  memoranda  within  your  reach  that 
would  assist  your  memory.  Please  give  me  at  least  the  benefit 
of  your  recollection.  .  .  . 

Very  truly  yours,  B.  E.  LEE. 

Colonel  WALTER  H.  TAYLOR. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  I  communicated  with  Mr. 
Thomas  "White,  of  Alexandria,  Virginia,  a  detailed  soldier  and 
most  estimable  gentleman,  who  occupied,  during  the  period 
of  the  whole  war,  the  position  of  chief  clerk  in  the  office  of 
the  adjutant-general  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
whose  duty  it  was,  under  the  supervision  of  the  adjutant- 
general,  to  compile  the  army  field-returns  from  those  of  the 
Several  corps,  and  requested  him  to  give  his  recollection  of 
our  effective  strength  at  the  important  periods  of  the  war. 
In  response  to  this  request,  Mr.  "White  sent  the  following 
statement  of  the  effective  strength,  of  the  army  at  the  several 
dates  given,  according  to  liis  recollection  : 

SEVEN  DAYS'  BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND. 

Effective  infantry 73,000 

Effective  cavalry 3,000 

Effective  artillery 4,000 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 80,000 

CEDAR  RUN,  OR  SLAUGHTER'S  MOUNTAIN. 

Effective  infantry 18,500 

Effective  cavalry 2,000 

Effective  artillery 1,000 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 21,500 

SECOND  MANASSAS. 

Effective  infantry 38,000 

Effective  cavalry 5,000 

Effective  artillery 4,000 

Total  effective  of  all  arms. .  47,000 


158         CONJECTURAL  RETURNS  OF  FORCE 


HARPER'S  FERRY. 

Jackson 12,000 

J.  G.  Walker 3,000 


Infantry 15,000 

CRAMPTON  GAP. 

McLaws 4,000 

Anderson 4,000 

Infantry 8,000 

BOOXSBORO'. 

Longstreet 8,000 

D.  H.  Hill 7,000 

Infantry 15,000 

SHARPSBURG. 

Effective  infantry 33,000 

Effective  cavalry 4,500 

Effective  artillery 4,000 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 41,500 


FREDERICKSBURG. 

Effective  infantry 50,500 

Effective  cavalry 4,000 

Effective  artillery 4,000 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 58,500 


CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

Effective  infantry 42,000 

Effective  cavalry 4,000 

Effective  artillery 3,000 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 49,000 


GETTYSBURG. 

Effective  infantry 55,000 

Effective  cavalry 7,000 

Effective  artillery 5,000 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 67,000 


OF  THE   ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  159 

BRISTOE  STATION. 

Effective  infantry 32,000 

Effective  cavalry 6,000 

Effective  artillery 4,500 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 42,500 


MINE  RUN. 

Effective  infantry 30,500 

Effective  cavalry 6,000 

Effective  artillery 4,500 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 41,000 


WILDERNESS. 

Effective  infantry 48,500 

Effective  cavalry. 8,000 

Effective  artillery 5,000 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 01,500 


SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT-HOUSE. 

Effective  infantry 41,500 

Effective  cavalry 7,000 

Effective  artillery 4,500 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 53,000 

COLD  HARBOR. 

Effective  infantry 47  QOO 

Effective  cavalry 6,000 

Effective  artillery 4  500 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 57,500 


PETERSBURG,  JUNE  21,  1864. 

Effective  infantry 36,000 

Effective  cavalry 4,000 

Effective  artillery 3,500 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 43,500 

PETERSBURG,  OCTOBER  1,  1864. 

Effective  infantry 32,000 

Effective  cavalry 3,000 

Effective  artillery 3,500 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 38,500 


160  CONJECTURAL  RETURNS  OF  FORCE 

PETERSBURG,  JANUARY  1,  1865. 

Effective  infantry 38,500 

Effective  cavalry 2,500 

Effective  artillery 4,500 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 45,500 


PETERSBURG,  APRIL  1,  1865. 

Effective  infantry 36,000 

Effective  cavalry 3,500 

Effective  artillery 4,000 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 43,500 


A  duplicate  of  the  statement  of  Mr.  White  was  sent  by 
him  to  General  Lee,  who,  on  the  2d  of  November,  1865, 
wrote  as  follows : 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  November  2,  1865. 

MY  DEAK  COLONEL  :  Your  letter  of  August  has  remained  a 
long  time  unanswered.  Since  then,  I  have  received  from  White, 
to  whom  I  had  written,  a  statement  of  our  effective  strength  at 
the  chief  battles,  which  appeared  to  me  larger  at  some  points 
than  I  thought.  Marshall  has  also  given  me  his  recollection  on 
the  subject,  which  does  not  entirely  correspond  with  mine, 
either.  When  I  get  yours,  I  shall  have  to  make  a  just  average. 

I  have  made  no  progress  as  yet  in  writing,  and  very  little  in 
collecting  information.  Every  one,  I  suppose,  is  embarrassed 
by  loss  of  papers,  and  the  necessary  devotion  to  his  business. 
It  is  as  much  as  I  can  do  to  answer  applications  of  our  dis 
tressed  soldiers  and  bereaved  parents.  Matters  are  working 
much  smoother,  and  time  will  cure  all  things. 

Most  truly  yours,  R.  E.  LEE. 

Colonel  WALTER  II.  TAYLOR. 

The  reader  will  observe  that,  with  the  statement  of  Mr. 
White  before  him,  General  Lee's  only  criticism  in  regard 
thereto  was,  that  it  represented  our  strength  to  have  been 
greater  at  certain  periods  than  he  thought  it  was.  It  is  very 
much  to  be  regretted  that  the  general  did  not  prepare,  over 


OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  161 

his  own  signature,  a  statement  of  the  effective  strength  of 
his  army  at  the  most  important  epochs  in  its  history.  Such 
a  statement  would  have  been  accepted  without  question  by 
the  world.  In  its  absence,  his  letter  commenting  upon  the 
foregoing  statement — which  fortunately  has  been  preserved 
— assumes  great  historical  value,  for  it  establishes  beyond 
all  cavil  or  doubt  the  extent  of  the  disparity  of  numbers  be 
tween  the  two  armies,  should  Mr.  White's  estimates  be  made 
the  standard  of  comparison. 

11 


CHAPTEE  XIV. 

The  Strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  taken  from  the  Original  Re 
turns  now  on  File  in  the  Archive-Office  of  the  War  Department,  Washing 
ton,  D.  C. 

AFTEK  the  notes  contained  in  the  preceding  chapter  had 
been  prepared,  and  when  I  was  about  to  address  myself  to 
the  task  of  reproducing  the  statement  of  the  strength  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  made  by  me  from  memory, 
soon  after  the  war,  in  compliance  with  the  request  of  Gen 
eral  Lee,  I  ascertained  that  some  of  the  field  and  monthly 
returns  of  that  army  were  on  file  in  the  archives  of  the  War 
Department  at  Washington. 

Inasmuch  as  several  unsuccessful  attempts  had  been  made 
to  obtain  permission  to  examine  the  Confederate  papers  there 
on  file,  and  recognizing  the  force  of  the  objection  of  the  offi 
cials  in  charge  to  a  general  inspection  of  those  documents,  it 
was  with  considerable  misgiving,  and  indeed  with  but  little 
hope,  that  I  caused  application  in  my  behalf  to  be  made  to 
the  authorities  for  permission  to  examine  the  army  returns 
alluded  to ;  relying  solely  upon  the  fact  of  my  having  super 
vised  the  preparation  of  those  returns  for  several  years  as  an 
argument  in  favor  of  havdng  an  exception  made  in  my  case. 

Success  crowned  my  effort,  and  I  take  this  opportunity 
of  expressing  my  appreciation  of  the  very  kind  and  courteous 
treatment  I  received  at  the  hands  of  the  officials  of  the  War 
Department,  who  extended  to  me  every  facility  for  the  ac 
complishment  of  my  purpose ;  and  at  the  same  time  I  take 
pleasure  in  assuring  my  former  comrades-in-arms  of  the  evi 
dent  purpose  of  the  Government  authorities  charged  with 


OFFICIAL  RETURNS,   ARMY   OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  ETC.  163 

the  custody  of  these  records  to  discard  all  sectional  bias  in 
the  prosecution  of  their  labors,  and  to  preserve  faithfully  and 
impartially  all  documents  which  are  now  in  their  custody,  or 
which  may  be  hereafter  committed  to  their  care,  in  order 
that,  so  far  as  it  is  in  their  power,  the  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth,  shall  be  preserved.  Let  us  indulge  the  hope  that 
the  day  is  not  far  distant  when  the  American  people,  with 
out  distinction,  will  find  pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  all 
that  was  manly,  all  that  wTas  virtuous,  all  that  was  noble,  all 
that  was  praiseworthy,  in  the  recent  struggle  between  the 
sections,  whether  developed  on  the  side  of  the  North  or  that 
of  the  South ;  and  that  the  next  generation  will  cherish,  with 
pardonable  pride,  the  remembrance  of  the  deeds  of  valor, 
sacrifice,  and  noble  daring,  with  which  the  history  of  that 
war  so  richly  abounds,  wiiether  the  heroes  thereof  wore  the 
blue  or  the  gray. 

Let  censure  fall  only  where  fanatics  feigned  to  be  patriots, 
or  men  forgot  their  manhood,  and,  screened  behind  an  al 
leged  military  necessity,  gave  evidence  of  an  evil  heart  in 
deeds  of  malignant  cruelty  or  wranton  destruction ;  and  let 
merit  be  acknowledged  and  praise  be  bestowed  wherever  firm 
devotion  to  principle  and  to  duty  found  illustration  in  deeds 
of  valor  and  of  sacrifice. 

As  soon  as  practicable  I  availed  myself  of  the  permission 
accorded  me,  and  proceeded  to  make  an  examination  of  the 
army  returns  on  file  in  the  Department.  The  first  paper  that 
was  examined  by  me  proved  to  be  an  informal  return  of  the 
strength  of  the  army  commanded  by  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  which  I  at  once  recognized  as  having  been  on  file 
in  General  Lee's  oifice,  and  the  indorsement  upon  which  was 
in  my  own  handwriting,  except  the  date,  wThich  was  added 
either  by  Mr.  Davis  or  General  Long,  who  was  then  private 
secretary  to  General  Lee,  and  read  as  follows :  "  Army  near 
Richmond,  Department  of  Northern  Yirginia,  May  21, 
1862."  Within  was  the  following  statement  of  the  strength  of 
the  several  commands  of  which  that  army  was  then  composed : 


164     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

FIRST  DIVISION — MAJOR-GENERAL  G.  W.  SMITH. 

Whiting's  brigade 2,398 

Hood's  brigade 1,922 

W.  H.  Hampton's  brigade 2,225 

S.  R.  Hatton's  brigade 2,030 

Pettigrew's  brigade 2,017 

Total 10,592 

SECOND  DIVISION — MAJOR-GENERAL  LONGSTREET. 

A.  P.  Hill's  brigade 2,512 

Pickett's  brigade 2,460 

R.  H.  Anderson's  brigade 2,168 

Wilcox's  brigade 2,616 

Colston's  brigade 1,750 

Pryor's  brigade 2,310. 

Total 13,816 

THIRD  DIVISION — MAJOR-GENERAL  MAGRUDER. 

McLaws's  brigade 2,084 

Kershaw's  brigade 2,567 

Griffith's  brigade 2,534 

H.  Cobb's  brigade 3,796 

Toombs's  brigade 2,357 

D.  R.  Jones's  brigade 2,342 

Reserve  artillery— Cabell 240 

Total 15,920 

FOURTH  DIVISION — MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  H.  HILL. 

Early's  brigade 2,380 

Rodes's  brigade 3,040 

Colonel  Ward's  command 890 

Raines's  brigade 1,830 

Featherstone's  brigade 2,224 

Colonel  Crump's  command 787 

Total 11,151 

Cavalry  brigade 1,289 

Reserve  artillery : 

Pendleton's 611 

Washington 309 

Total.  .  920 


Total  strength  of  all  arms 53,688 

I  then  examined  carefully  all  the  field  and  monthly  re 
turns  of  the  "  Department  of  Northern  Virginia  "  on  file  in 
the  Archive-Office,  and  copied  therefrom  the  following  ex 
tracts,  which  make  an  authoritative  statement  of  the  strength 


FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   165 


of   the  army  commanded  by  General  Lee   at  the  periods 
named : 

DATE  OF  RETURN,  JULY  20,  1862. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA  AND  NORTH 

PRESENT  i 

roR  DUTY. 

CAROLINA. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Department  of  North  Carolina.  «...           

722 

11,509 

657 

7,929 

D  H  Hill's  division                     .  .                  

650 

8,998 

614 

7,188 

A.  P  Hill's  division  

619 

10,104 

Anderson's  division                                 

357 

5,760 

D.  R.  Jones's  division  

213 

3,500 

Whiting's  division                               

252 

3,600 

295 

3,740 

Pendleton's  artillery  

103 

1,716 

Rhett's  artillery                   

78 

1,355 

Total,  including  Department  of  North  Carolina.  . 

4,160 

65,399 

SEPTEMBER  22,  1862. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Lon  ^street's  command  

1,410 

19,001 

Jackson's  command  : 
D.  H.  Hill's  division 

310 

4  739 

318 

4,435 

Ewell's  division 

280 

3  144 

Jackson's  division             

183 

2,367 

Total  .  . 

2.501 

33,686 

PRESENT  FOE  DUTY. 


SEPTEMBER  30,  1862. 


PRESENT  FOB  DUTY. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

1,927 

26,489 

Jackson's  command                                                   .    ... 

1  699 

21  728 

Reserve  artillery  

50 

716 

Total  

3  676 

48,933 

No  report  of  cavalry. 


1G6     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
OCTOBER  10,  1862. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIRGINIA. 


PRESENT  FOK  DUTY. 


Officers. 


Enlisted  Men. 


Longstreet's  command 2,022  27,934 

Jackson's  command 1,841  25,603 

Cavalry 395  5,338 

Reserve  artillery 48  858 

Total 4,306  59,733 

NEAR  WINCHESTER,  OCTOBER  20,  1862. 

PRESENT  FOB  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 

Officers.       Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreet's  command 2,241  29,748 

Jackson's  command 2,002  26,368 

Cavalry 417  6,119 

Reserve  artillery 45  865 

Total 4,705  63,100 

CULPEPER  COURT-HOUSE,  NOVEMBER  10,  1862. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 

AEMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIEGINIA. 

Officers.       Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreet's  command 2,308  29,522 

Jackson's  command 2,243  29,461 

Cavalry.., 457  6,697 

Reserve  artillery No  report.  No  report. 

Total 5,008  65,680 

FREDERICKSBURG,  NOVEMBER  20,  1862. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA.  

Officers.       Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreet's  command 2,325  29,288 

Jackson's  command 2,346  30,441 

Cavalry..., 603  8,551 

Reserve  artillery No  report.  No  report. 

Total 5,274  68,280 


FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.    167 

FREDERICKSBURG,  DECEMBER  10,  1862. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIRGINIA. 

PBESKNT  i 

<X>B  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreetfs  command: 

531 

7  083 

McLaws's  division.  .             .    . 

559 

7311 

Pickett's  division  

675 

6  860 

Hood's  division   ...                                . 

521 

6  795 

253 

3  595 

Alexander's  artillery.  . 

24 

402 

Walton's  artillery  

13 

184 

Total  under  Longstreet 

2  576 

32  230 

Jackson's  command: 
Jackson's  division  .... 

463 

4  526 

D.  H.  Hill's  division  

588 

8  327 

Ewell's  division     

594 

7  100 

A.  P.  Hill's  division  

781 

10  743 

Brown's  artillery  

24 

449 

Total  under  Jackson  

2450 

31  145 

Cavalrv  

602 

8  512 

Reserve  artillery  

36 

677 

Total  

5  664 

72  564 

FREDERICKSBURG,  DECEMBER  20,  1862. 


PKESENT  FOB  DUTY. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIBGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Lioncrstreet's  command  

2,620 

31,670 

Jackson's  command                   . 

2,353 

29,046 

Cavalry  (report  of  December  10th  used)  

602 

8,512 

38 

683 

Total         .               

5,613 

69,911 

FREDERICKSBURG,  DECEMBER  31,  1862. 

Longstreet's  command — Total  effective 30,060 

Jackson's            "                      "              27,608 

Cavalry                                         "               8,814 

Artillery                                     «              4,490 


Total  effective  of  all  arms. 


70,972 


168     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 


FREDERICKSBURG,  JANUARY  31,  1863. 

Longstreet's  command — Total  effective , 

Jackson's  

Cavalry  

Artillery  

Valley  District  (General  W.  E.  Jones) 


..  , 28,696 

29,698 

7,125 

2,874 

3,833 

Total  effective,  including  troops  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  72,226 

FREDERICKSBURG,  FEBRUARY  28,  1863. 

Anderson's  and  McLaws's  divisions— Total  effective 14,540 

Jackson's  command                                                  30,977 

Cavalry                                                                         5,912 

Artillery                                                                        3,552 

Valley  District                                                         3,578 

Total  effective,  including  troops  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  58,559 


FREDERICKSBURG,  MARCH  31,  1863. 
Anderson's  and  McLaws's  divisions l  — Total  effective. 
Jackson's  four  divisions 
Cavalry 

Artillery  in  rear 
Valley  District 


...  15,649 

...  33,333 

...  6,509 

...  1,621 

...  3,186 

Total  effective,  including  troops  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  60,298 
FREDERICKSBURG,  MAY  20,  1863. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 

PEESENT  i 

-OR  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreefs  command: 
Anderson's  division                                                .  . 

553 

6439 

McLaw's  division     ...        .     ..          

579 

6,454 

558 

6,847 

Hood's  division                            .  . 

640 

6,858 

2,330 

25,598 

HiWs  command: 

722 

7,986 

Rodes's  division  .  .                                  

545 

6,457 

Early's  division  

496 

5,925 

Johnson's  division  

419 

4,783 

Total  under  Hill  

2,182 

25,151 

482 

6,524 

Artillery  (Dearing's  battalion  and  two  batteries  not  re 
ported)                   '                       

245 

4,708 

Total                    .                                

5  239 

61,981 

1  Pickett,  Hood,  and  Eansom,  detached. 


FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   169 


FREDERICKSBURG,  MAT  31,  1863. 

Longstreet's  command— Total  effective 26,583 

A.  P.  Hill's                                               27,773 

Cavalry                                         "             9,536 

Artillery                                                      4,460 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 68,352 

BUNKER  HILL,  JULY  20,  1863. 

PRESENT  FOR  DITTY. 
AKMY  OF  NOETHEBN  VIEGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreefs  Corps  : 
McLaws's  division  ) 
Pickett's  division     >-  

1  186 

11  731 

Hood's  division        ) 
Ewell's  Corps  : 
Rodes's  division        ) 
Early's  division         >•  

1,277 

12,440 

Johnson's  division    ) 
HiWs  Corps: 
Anderson's  division  ) 
Heth's  division         >-  

961 

8  930 

Pender's  division      ) 
Cavalry  

No  report 

No  report. 

Artillery  .... 

274 

4  589 

Total  

3,698 

37,690 

CULPEPER   COURT-HOUSE,  JULY  31, 

Longstreet's  corps — Total  effective 

Ewell's  corps  

Hill's  corps  "  

Artillery  corps  

Cavalry  corps 


1863. 


...  12,823 
. . .  12,369 
...  11,207 
. . .  4,736 
No  report. 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  AUGUST  10, 


41,135 


1863. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Longstreet's  corps 

1  279 

13  559 

Ewell's  corps.  ...        ...                                    

1,371 

14,422 

Hill's  corps 

1  115 

12  398 

Cavalry  corps 

595 

8,404 

277 

4,880 

Total  

4,637 

53,663 

PRESENT  FOK  DUTY. 


170     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  AUGUST  20,  1863. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 


PRESENT  FOE  DUTY. 


Officers.      Enlisted  Men. 


Longstreet's  corps 1,242  13,323 

Ewell's  corps 1,369  14,900 

Hill's  corps 1,094  13,059 

Cavalry  corps 617  8,094 

Artillery  corps 290  4,906 

Total 4,612  54,282 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  AUGUST  31,  1863. 

Longstreet's  corps — Total  effective 14,668 

Ewell's  corps                         "            15,428 

Hill's  corps                                        13,601 

Cavalry  corps  (1,333  dismounted) 7,701 

Artillery  corps— Total  effective 4,929 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 56,327 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  SEPTEMBER  10,  1863. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 

Officers.  Enlisted  Men. 

Ewell's  corps 1,274  15,804 

Hill's  corps 1,034  14,087 

Cooke's  brigade  (unattached) 134  2,100 

Artillery 147  3,226 

Cavalry No  report.  No  report. 

Total 2,589  35,217 

Longstreet's  corps  detached. 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  SEPTEMBER  20,  1863. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 

Officers.  Enlisted  Men. 

Ewell's  corps 1,391  16,235 

Hill's  corps 1,075  14,297 

Cooke's  brigade 135  2,045 

Cavalry  corps 560  7,547 

Artillery  corps 3,337 

Total...                                                              ....        3,345  43,461 


FROM   ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  TJ.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   171 


ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  SEPTEMBER  30,  1863. 

Ewell's   corps  —  Total  effective 16,638 

Hill's  corps                                     15,073 

Cooke's  brigade                            2,150 

Cavalry  corps                                 6,744 

Artillery  corps  3,762 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 44,367 

NEAR  BRANDY  STATION,  OCTOBER  20,  1863. 

PRESENT  FOE  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIRGINIA. 

Officers.  Enlisted  Men. 

Ewell's  corps 1,526  16,595 

Hill's  corps 1,328  16,069 

Cavalry  corps 505  6,867 

Artillery  corps 218  3,620 

Total 3,577  43,151 

Cooke's  brigade  attached  to  Heth's  division. 

BRANDY  STATION,  OCTOBER  31,  1863. 

Ewell's  corps  —  Total  effective 17,097 

Hill's  corps                                     , 16,533 

Cavalry  corps                                  7,917 

Artillery  corps                               4,067 

Total  effective  of  all  arms 45,614 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  NOVEMBER  20,  1863. 

PRESENT  FOE  DUTY. 
AEMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

Officers.  Enlisted  Men. 

Ewell's  corps 1,321  1 5,649 

Hill's  corps 1,361  17,522 

Cavalry  corps. 495  7,139 

Artillery  corps 233  4,418 

Total 3,410  44,728 


172     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY   OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  DECEMBER  10,  1863. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

PRESENT 

FOE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

1,413 

15447 

Hill's  corps                    .  . 

1415 

17  872 

552 

7481 

Artillery  corps            .        .        

244 

4  371 

18 

811 

9 

114 

Total              .  .          

3  651 

45  596 

Add  Twenty-first  North  Carolina  Regiment  just  report- 

500 

Total  

3,651 

46,096 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  DECEMBER  20,  1863. 


ARMY  OP  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

PBESENT  r 

OE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

E  well's  corps  

1,413 

15,735 

1,187 

15,543 

Cavalry  corps  

551 

7,530 

Artillery  corps                    .                .        

244 

4,371 

Headquarters  battalion  

8 

106 

Total                                 

3,403 

43,285 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  DECEMBER  31,  1863. 

Swell's  corps— Total  effective 15,540 

Hill's  corps                                15,468 

Cavalry  corps                             7,550 

Artillery  corps                           4,138 


Total  effective  of  all  arms 42,696 

Unattached  commands,  Yalley  District,  Maryland  line,  provost 

guard,  and  headquarters  battalion 862 


Walker's  brigade,  Ileth's  division,  and  Thomas's  brigade,  "Wilcox's  division,  detached. 


FROM   ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR 
ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  JANUARY  10, 


DEPARTMENT.    173 

1864. 


PRESENT  i 

OE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

406 

4714 

Second  Corps             J  John}Ws  division  .  . 

410 

4  476 

Lieutenant-General  Ewell.  |  Rodes,g  ^.^      """• 

440 

6  134 

1,256 

15,324 

m  •  A  n                     (  Anderson's  division..  . 

412 

5,957 

i*J5iS25m                

258 

325 

4,391 
4  972 

995 

15,320 

Cavalry  Corps,           j  Hampton's  division  

273 

3,931 

Major  -General  Stuart.    (  Fitz  Lee's  division 

250 

3,617 

Artillery  corps  

523 
217 

7,548 
4,338 

Total  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  

2,991 

42,530 

Unattached  commands,  Maryland  line,  provost-guard, 
and  headquarters  battalion  

67 

1,073 

Total  Department  of  Northern  Virginia 

3  058 

43,603 

Valley  District  not  reported. 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  JANUARY  31,  1864. 

Total  Effective. 

f  Early's  division. . . .     3,604   Hoke's  brigade  detatched. 
Second  Corps,    I  Johnson's  division. .     4,156 

Lt.-Gen.  Ewell.  ]  -p    ,    ,    r  .  .  ,  n,0  (  12th  and  21st  Ga.,  and  43d  N. 

<L  Rodes  s  division  . . .     5,042  -J      a  Regimentg  n^  reported. 

12,802 

mi  .  j  PnrT         (  Anderson's  division     5,577 

inira  uorps      j  Heth,g  diyision>  ^  _  _     4^2   ^alker's  brigade  detached. 

(  Wilcox's  division. .     4,896    Thomas's  brigade  detached. 

14,745 

fRosser's  brigade,  Lee's  brigade, 
Cavalry  Corps,  j  Hampton's  division,     2,198  J     tfc ree  regiments  of  Wickham's 

Maj.-Gen.  Stuart  |  Fitz  Lee's 1,162 1     brigade,  and  two  of  Gordon's, 

[    not  reported. 
3,360 

g.§  f  Artillery  corps 3,842 

1 1  I  Maryland  line 706 

•S  §  |  Provost-guard 281 

[§Q  [_  Headquarters  battalion 113 


Total  effective 35,849 


174     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  FEBRUARY  10,  1864. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

PEESENT  F 

OK  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

(  Early's  division 

295 

3  6531 

Second  Corps             \  j  ^     ,    division  
Lieutenant-General  Ewell.  |  Rodcg,s  divigion 

364 
392 

4,140 
5  1292 

1,051 

12,922 

(  Anderson's  division 

415 

5  595 

Third  Corps             J  H    j  ,    division 

267 

4,4113 

Lieutenant-General   Hill.  |  ™£«  divigion  

330 

4,9624 

1,012 

14,968 

Cavalry  corps            

Not 

reported. 

139 

2,588 

46 

706 

Provost-guard  

17 

228 

7 

123 

Total  .  . 

2,272 

31,535 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  MARCH  10,  1864. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


PEESENT  FOB  DUTY. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Second  Corps, 
Lieutenant-General  Ewell. 

Third  Corps, 
Lieutenant-General  Hill. 

Cavalry  

{Early's  division.  . 

229 
392 
429 

3,7815 
4,362 
5,8988 

Johnson's  division  
Rodes's  

(  Anderson's  division    

1,050 

14,041 

419 
406 
440 

5,684 
6,038 
6,571 

•<  Heth's  division  

(  Wilcox's  division 

1,265 

18,293 

Not 
200 
26 

reported. 
4,100 
428 

Artillery  corps  

Provost-guard  and  headqi 
Total  

larters  battalion  

2,541 

36,862 

1  Iloke's  brigade  detached. 

2  Twelfth  and  Twenty-first  Georgia  and  Forty-third  North  Carolina  Regiments  detached. 

3  Walker's  brigade  detached.  *  Thomas's  brigade  detached. 
3  Hoke's  brigade  detached. 

6  Twenty-first  Georgia  and  Forty-third  North  Carolina  Regiments  detached. 


FROM   ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   175 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  MARCH  20,  1864. 


DEPAETMENT  OF 

NOETHEEN  VIRGINIA. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 

Officers.      Enlisted  Men. 

Second  Corps, 
Lieutenant-General  Ewell 

Third  Corps, 
Lieutenaut-General  Hill. 

(  Early's  division  

310 
426 
426 

3,917' 

4,568 
6,1432 

•<  Johnson's  division  

'  {  Rodes's  division 

(  Anderson's  division  

1,162 

14,628 

452 
419 
474 

5,831 
6,245 
6,793 

•<  Ileth's  division 

(  Wilcox's  division  

1,345 

18,869 

292 
207 

4,4783 
4,066 

Artillery  corps 

Total  Army  of 

Northern  Virginia   .              .  . 

3,006             42,041 

55 
41 
20 
12 

736 
761 
237 
200 

Maryland  line  

Headquarters  battalion 

Total  Department  of  Northern  Virginia.  .  . 

3,134 

43,975 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  APRIL  10,  1864. 


DEPAETMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

(  Early's  division  

349 

4,1  854 

Second  Corps, 

•\  Johnson's  division 

496 

4  849 

Lieutenant-General  Ewell. 

(  Rodes's  division    

502 

6  6035 

1,347 

15,637 

(  Anderson's  division    

490 

6,381 

Third  Corps, 

•<  Ileth's  division 

460 

6,507 

Lieutenant  -  General   Hill 

(  Wilcox's  division 

515 

7,311 

1,465 

20,199 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 


1  Hoke's  brigade  detached. 

2  Twenty-first  Georgia  and  Forty-third  North  Carolina  Eegiments  detached. 

3  Chambliss's  and  Lomax's  brigades  not  reported. 

4  Hoke's  brigade  detached. 

5  Twenty-first  Georgia  and  Forty-third  North  Carolina  Regiments  detached. 


176     OFFICIAL   RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  APRIL  10,  1864 — Continued. 


PRESENT 

FOB  DUTY. 

DEPAETMENT  OF  NOETHEEN  VIRGINIA. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Cavalry  Corps             (  Hampton's  division          .  . 

180 

2  667 

Major-  General  Stuart.    (  Fitz  Lee's  division  

285 

4  796 

465 

7,463 

234 

4486 

Total  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  

3  511 

47,785 

Not 

reported. 

Maryland  line.  .  .            .  .                                            .... 

42 

737 

22 

286 

Headquarters  battalion  .  . 

12 

223 

Total  Department  of  Northern  Virginia.  .  .  . 

3,587 

49,031 

ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE,  APRIL  20,  1864. 


DEPAETMENT  OF  NORTHERN  YIEGINIA. 


PRESENT  FOB  DUTY. 


Officers.      lEnlisted  Men. 


Second  Corps, 
Lieutenant-General  Ewell. 

Third  Corps, 
Lieutenant  -  General  Hill. 

Cavalry  Corps, 
Major-  General  Stuart. 

{Early's  division  

356 
506 
512 

4,182 
4,894 
6,629 

Johnson's  division 

Rodes's  division           .      . 

(  Anderson's  division 

1,374 

15,705 

507 
516 

528 

6,439 
6,948 
7,261 

J  Heth's  division                 .  . 

(  Wilcox's  division  

j  Hampton's  division  

1,551 

20,648 

286 
279 

2,931 
5,001 

1  Fitz  Lee's  division.         .  . 

565 

7,932 

237 

4,617 

Total  Army  o 
Valley  District  

3,727 
Not 
45 
27 
11 

48,902 
reported. 
760 
293 
219 

Maryland  line  

Provost-guard  

Headquarters  battalion  of 
Total  Dcpartir 

couriers           .  . 

ent  of  Northern  Virginia.  .  .  . 

3,810 

50,174 

Hoke's   brigade,  Early's  division,  and   two  regiments  of  Rodes's  division, 
detached. 


FROM   ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  TJ.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.    177 


PETERSBURG,  JUNE  30,  1864. 


TEOOPS  UNDER  GENERAL  LEE. 

PBESENT  FOB  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

Depart.  N.  C.  and  So.  Va., 
General  Beauregard. 

First  Corps, 
Major  -General  Anderson. 

Third  Corps, 
Lieutenant  -General  Hill. 

Cavalry  Corps, 
Major  -General  Hampton. 

Artillery  corps  

j  B.  R.  Johnson's  division  .  . 
1  Hoke's  division 

472 
350 

6,364 
4,936 

(  Pickett's  division  

822 

11,300 

348 
413 

337 

4,536 
4,344 

4,180 

-<  Field's  division 

(  Kershaw's  division  

(  Anderson's  division  

1,098 

13,060 

411 
440 
351 

4,880 
5,159 
4,289 

•<  Heth's  division  

f  "Wilcox's  division 

C  Hampton's  division  
•<  Fitz  Lee's  division    .      ... 

1,202 

14,328 

130 
173 

2,888 
1,553 

2,677 

(  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division.  .  . 

303 

7,118 

257 

5,263 

Total..  . 

3,682 

51,069 

Second  Corps  detached  under  General  Early.     Dearing's  brigade  of  cavalry 
not  reported.     Only  three  battalions  of  artillery  of  the  Second  Corps  reported. 


NEAR  PETERSBURG,  JULY  10,  1864. 


TKOOPS  UNDER  GENERAL  LEE. 

PBESENT  FOE  DUTY. 

Officers.       Enlisted  Men. 

Dept.  N.  C.  and  So.  Va., 
General  Beauregard. 

First  Corps, 
Major-General  Anderson. 

j  B.  R.  Johnson's  division.  . 
")  Hoke's  division  

487               6,391 
346              4,678 

(  Pickett's  division  

833             11,069 

381              4,472 
427              4,284 
342              4,217 

•<  Field's  division 

(  Kershaw's  division  

1,150            12,973 

12 


178     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

NEAR  PETERSBURG,  JULY  10,  1864 — Continued. 


TEOOPS   UNDEK  GENERAL  LEE. 

PRESENT  FOB  DUTY. 

Officers.       Enlisted  Men. 

Third  Corps, 
Lieutenant-General  Hill. 

Cavalry  Corps, 
Major-General  Hampton. 

(  Anderson's  division 

468               5,567 
447              5,276 
373              4,410 

•<  Heth's  division  

(  Wilcox's  division  

(  Hampton's  division. 

1,288            15,253 

195               2,888 
115               1,591 
216              3,957 

•<  Fitz  Lee's  division  

(  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division...  . 

526              8,436 

276              5,293 

Total  

4,073            53,024 

PETERSBURG,  AUGUST  81,  1864. 


Total  Effective. 


First  Corps, 
Anderson. 


Second  Corps. 
Early. 


Third  Corps, 
A.  P.  Hill. 


Cavalry  Corps 


(  Pickett's  division 4,544 

•j  Field's  division 3,944 

r  Kershaw's  division 3,445 


f  Breckinridge's  division 2,104 

J  Rodes's  division 3,013 

1  Gordon's  division 2,544 

(  Ramseur's  division 1,909 


fMahone's  division 4,094 

I  Heth's  division 4,075 

1  Wilcox's  division 4,054 

l_  Fifth  Alabama  Battalion 151 

f  Hampton's  division 2,769 

J  Fitz  Lee's  division Detached. 

j  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division 2,575 

^  Bearing' s  brigade 1,395 


11,933 


9,570 


12,374 


Artillery  corps 

Total  effective  of  all  arms. 


6,739 
3,631 

44,247 


FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.    WAR  DEPARTMENT.  179 

PETERSBURG,  SEPTEMBER  10,  1864. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

First  Corps,    j 
Anderson.    1 

Second  Corps,  J 
Early.       1 

Third  Corps,  J 
A.  P.  Hill.    1 

Cavalry  Corps, 
Hampton. 

Artillery  corps 

Pickett's  division 

361 
409 
No  report. 

4,542 
4,046 

Field's  division  

Kershaw's  division  

Breckinridge's  division.  .  . 

770 

8,588 

194 

307 
271 

182 
39 

2,172 
3,244 
2,690 
2,010 
818 

Rodes's  division  

Gordon's  division.  . 

Ramseur's  division  

Carter's  artillery 

993 

10,934 

323 
321 
351 
14 

4,159 
4,120 
4,211 
145 

Mahone's  division.  . 

Wilcox's  division   

Fifth  Alabama  Battalion  

Hampton's  division 

1,009 

12,635 

184 

2,736 
Detached. 
2,545 
3,215 
225 
1,430 

Fitz  Lee's  division  

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division  

133 
353 
16 

82 

Lomax's  division 

Horse  artillery  

Dealing's  brigade 

768 
249 

10,151 
4,486 

Total  

3,7<89 

46,794 

CHAFIN'S  BLUFF,  OCTOBER  20,  1864. 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 

Officers.      Enlisted  Men. 

First  Corps,      j 
Longstreet.     1 

Pickett's  division 

364              4,967 
330              3,491 
301               3,787 

Field's  division  

995            12,245 

180     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

CHAFIN'S  BLUFF,  OCTOBER  20,  18G4 — Continued. 


AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN  VIEGINIA. 

PRESENT  i 

OR  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

837 

4,540 

Third  Corps,     \  Wilcox>s  division 

360 

4,730 

A.  P.  Hill.       |  Hahone's  division.                 

348 

4,368 

1,045 

13,638 

f  Hampton's  division 

101 

1,330 

Cavalry  Corps     1  "YV  H  F  Lee's  division.                 .  . 

130 

2,834 

Hampton         ]  Dearing's  brigade  

70 

1,211 

1  Horse  artillery 

3 

78 

304 

5,453 

252 

4,246 

First  District,  Department  North  Carolina  and  South 
ern  Virginia  \Vise's  command 

149 

2,248 

Provost-guard                                                         

22 

194 

Total..  . 

2,767 

38,024 

NOTE. — No  return  received  of  the  troops  serving  in  the  Valley  District,  nor 
of  Johnson's  division,  nor  of  the  Second  and  Third  Military  Districts  of  the  De 
partment  of  North  Carolina  and  Southern  Virginia.  Hoke's  division  is  included 
in  the  above  report  of  Longstreet's  corps  in  place  of  Kershaw's  division,  de 
tached  (in  the  Valley  of  Virginia).  Of  the  cavalry,  1,249  men  are  dismounted. 


First  Corps, 
Longstreet. 


Third  Corps, 
A.  P.  Hill. 


PETERSBURG,  OCTOBER  31,  1864. 

Total  Effective. 

(  Pickett's  division 5,764 

•j  Field's  division 3,994 

(  Hoke's  division 4,505 

14,263 


Heth's  division 4,198 

Wilcox's  division 5,034 

Mahone's  division 4,546 


1,435 


B.  R.  Johnson's  division 

f  Hampton's  division 

Cavalry  Corps,     J  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division 

Hampton.         1  Dearing's  brigade 1,248 

[  Horse  artillery 83 

Artillery  corps 

Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 


13,778 
6,329 


5,654 
5,057 


45,081 


FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   181 


Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
First  Military  District,  Department  of  North  Carolina 

and  Southern  Virginia,  Wise  commanding 

Third  Military  District,  Department  of  North  Carolina 
and  Southern  Virginia,  Whiting  commanding.  ... 

f  Rodes's  division 2,316 

1,794 

2,073 

1,538 

2,856 

923 


Total  Effective. 

45,081 


j 
[Artillery 


division., 
division. . 


Provost-guard 

Total  effective  detached  commands 

Total  effective,  Departments  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  and  North  Carolina  and  Southern  Vir 
ginia  


2,226 
3,863 


11,500 
205 


17,794 


62,875 


PETERSBURG,  NOVEMBER  10,  1864. 


PRESENT  FOB  DUTY. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

(  Pickett's  division 

397 

5,986 

First  Corps,    \  Y  ^    d-  .  . 

373 

4,227 

Longstreet.    j  £««  ™££  !    .  ]  .'  '  '  .'  .'  .' 

349 

4,956 

1,119 

15,169 

(  Heth's  division.  . 

333 

4,520 

Third  Corps,   \  Wilcox>8  divigion 

375 

5,360 

A.  P.  Hill.     |  Mahone's  division  

368 

4,795 

1,076 

14,675 

B  R  Johnson's  division  

529 

6,494 

f  Hampton's  division 

96 

1,224 

Cavalry  Corps   ]  W  H  F  Lee's  division 

141 

3  123 

Hampton       ]  Dear/ing's  brigade 

61 

1,303 

[Horse  artillery.  .    .    .        

3 

94 

301 

5,744 

Artillery  corps  

249 

5,174 

First  Mil.  Disk,  Dept.  N.  C.  and  So.  Va.,  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  H.  A.  Wise  

203 

2,271 

Provost-guard 

21 

200 

Total  

3,498 

49,727 

No  return  received  of  troops  serving  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  since  October 
31,  1864. 


182     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN   VIRGINIA, 


First  Corps, 
Longstreet. 


Third  Corps, 
A.  P.  Hill. 


PETERSBURG,  NOVEMBER  30,  1864. 

Total  Effective. 

fPickett's  division 6,176 

I  Field's  division 4,548 

1  Hoke's  division 5,273 

I  Kershaw's  division 3,414 


(  Heth's  division 4,957 

•J  Wilcox's  division 5,742 

(  Mahone's  division 4,844 


B.  R.  Johnson's  division 

First  Military  District,  Department  of  North  Carolina 
and  Southern  Virginia,  Brigadier-General  Wise. . . 

Provost-guard 

f  Hampton's  division 1,506 

Cavalry  Corps,    J  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division 3,605 

Hampton.        1  Dearing's  brigade 995 

[Horse  artillery 102 

Artillery  corps 

Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Army  Northern  Virginia, 

f  Early's  division 2,345 

Rodes's  division 2,789 

Valley  District,    J  Gordon's  division 2,662 

Early  commanding,  j  Wharton's  division 1,859 

Lomax's  cavalry 1,846 

I^Fitz  Lee's  cavalry 1,455 


19,411 


15,543 
6,594 

2,305 
219 


6,208 
6,144 


Total  effective  in  Valley  District 

Total  effective  in  Department  of  Northern  Virginia, 
Of  Hampton's  cavalry,  reported  above,  1,298  are  dismounted. 

PETERSBURG,  DECEMBER  20,  1864. 


56,424 


12,956 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NOETIIEEN  VIEGINIA. 

PRESENT  FOE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

First  Corps, 
Longstreet. 

Second  Corps, 
Gordon. 

Third  Corps, 

f  Pickett's  division                                 .  . 

432 
397 
376 

298 

6,365 
4,576 
5,517 
3,552 

J  Field's  division                   

"j  Hoke's  division  

[Kershaw's  division. 

(  Rodes's  division  

1,503 

20,010 

193 
133 
179 

3,056 
2,406 
2,717 

K  Early's  division  . 

(  Gordon's  division  

(  Mahone's  division. 

505 

8,179 

353 
361 
383 

4,544 

4,905 
5,825 

•<  Heth's  division  

(  Wilcox's  division 

1,097 

15,274 

FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS   IN  TJ.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.   183 

PETERSBURG,  DECEMBER  20,  1864 — Continued. 


PRESENT 

FOE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

B   R  Johnson's  division                             

504 

6,692 

(  Hampton's  division 

145 

2,431 

Cavalry  Corps,  j  w  j|  p  Lee,s  division>   . 

158 

3,592 

Hampton.     |  Hor8e  artillery  

3 

109 

306 

6,132 

Artillery  corps                           

266 

5,190 

First  Mil.  Dist.  Dept.  N.  C.  and  So.  Va.,  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  H  A  Wise                     

94 

520 

Provost-guard   

22 

239 

Total    .    .   .               

4,297 

62,236 

PETERSBURG,  JANUARY  10,  1865. 


PRESENT 

FOR  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

TT    j.  /i                 (  Pickett's  division 

279 

4  704 

First  Corps,       ]  Field>s  division.  .  ] 

395 

4  569 

Longstreet.        |  Kershaw's  division  

260 

3  140 

934 

12,413 

c«        j  n              C  Rodes's  division 

203 

3  077 

Second  Corps,      \                        on' 

136 

2  411 

Gordon-           (  Gordon's  division.  .  .  .  .  .  .  '.  '.  '.  .'  .  . 

161 

2  684 

500 

8,172 

mu-  A  n               (  Mah  one's  division..  . 

312 

4  536 

Third  Corps,        \^^  division... 

353 

4  827 

-A..  Jr.  Jtllll.            j  TTr»i        i      i»    •  « 

(  VVilcox  s  division  

362 

5  827 

1,027 

15,190 

B.  R.  Johnson's  division.    .  . 

433 

6  608 

r\      -i      r\              (  Hampton's  division 

133 

2  183 

Orps'     -1  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division 

146 

3  190 

Hampton.          )  TT 
(  Horse  artillery  

3 

104 

282 

5,477 

Artillery  corps  

256 

5  120 

Total  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  .  . 

3,432 

52,980 

184     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

PETERSBURG,  JANUARY  10,  1865 — Continued. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


(  Wharton's  division., 


Brigadier-General 

J.  A.  Walker. 
Provost-guard .... 


Richmond  &  Danville  Railroad  de 
fenses  


PBESENT  FOE  DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

110 

42 
Not 

1,914 
950 
reported. 

152 

2,864 

110 

22 

1,472 
219 

3,716 

57,535 

Total  Department  of  Northern  Virginia 

NOTE. — Hoke's  division  transferred  to  North  Carolina ;  Conner's  brigade, 
Kershaw's  division,  transferred  to  South  Carolina.  Of  cavalry  reported,  1,799 
are  dismounted. 


PETERSBURG,  JANUARY  31,  1865. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

TOTAL  EFFECTIVE. 

T,.    .  r\              (  Pickett's  division.  .  . 

4,684 
4,418 
3,066 

12,168 
7,762 

14,805 
6,248 
4,057 
4,881 

49,921 
3,524 

First  Corps,      \ 

Longstreet.      |  Kershaw's  division.  "I. 
c,         ,  n            (  Rodes's  division  .  . 

2,914 
2,319 
2,529 

Second  Corps,    3  Early's  division 

Gordon.         ^  Gordon's  division. 

mi_«  j  /i             (  Heth's  division 

4,319 
5,840 
4,646 

Third  Corps,     \  WUcox,g  division  •  • 

(  Mahone's  division  

B.  R.  Johnson's  division  

1,112 

775 
Not 

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division,  cavalry.  . 

Artillery  corps  

Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Army  of 

Valley  District,  <  ^*  tatary       - 

reported. 

1,887 
1,438 
199 

Ear1?'           (  Cavalry.  . 

J.  A.  Walker  —  R.  &  D.  Railroad  defenses. 
Provost-guard  

Total  effective   of   all    arms,  Depart 
ment  of  Northern  Virginia 

53,445 

FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.    185 

PETERSBURG,  FEBRUARY  10,  1865. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

PRESENT  i 

OK   DUTY. 

Officers. 

Enlisted  Men. 

•P.-    ,  n               (  Pickett's  division  .  . 

306 

4  773 

First  Corps,      \  K  w,    divigion 

334 

4  453 

Longstreet.      |  Kershaw>s  division  

297 

3  083 

867 

12,309 

ci        j  n            (  Rodes's  division.  .  . 

183 

2  929 

Second  Corps,    \  Gordon,g  divigion> 

148 

2  281 

Gordon.        |  Early,g  divigion  

119 

2,151 

450 

7,361 

_...,_,             (  Mahone's  division 

284 

3  890 

A  irp  nT  '     \  Heth's  division  • 

295 

4,190 

A.  r.  Mill.       J  Wilcox's  division  

316 

5,445 

895 

13,525 

B  R  Johnson's  division                                                 . 

426 

6  527 

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry  

137 

2,664 

54 

1,112 

191 

3,776 

Total  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  

2,829 

43,498 

Vallcv  District    (  TVharton's   infantry         .    .  . 

66 

1,076 

Early.           (  Long's  artillery  

18 

390 

84 

1,466 

J  A  Walker  —  R    &  D  Railroad  defenses 

100 

1,417 

Provost-guard  and  signal  corps                                      . 

27 

341 

Total  Department  of  Northern  Virginia  
No  report  of  artillery  embraced  in  this  return. 

3,040 

46,722 

186     OFFICIAL  RETURNS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 


PETERSBURG,  FEBRUARY  28,  1865. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIR 
GINIA. 

OFFICERS. 

ENLISTED 
MEN. 

TOTAL. 

(  Pickett's  division... 
First  Corps,      \  Fie]d,g  division 

304 
341 
206 

4,761 
4,436 
2,967 

42,484 

6,041 
5,399 

3,105 
2,064 

53,924 
5,169 

Longstreet.      |  Kershaw>a  division.  . 

(  Gordon's  division.  . 
Second  Corps,    i  Rodes,s  division.  .  .  . 
Gordon.         j  Early's  division  .      . 

851 

12,164 

143 

186 
129 

458 

2,309 
3,022 
2,292 

(  Mahone's  division  .  .  . 
Third  Corps,     \  Heth,g  divis}on 

7,623 

262 
294 
309 

3,880 
4,324 
5,383 

A.  P.  Hill.       (Wilcox>s  division... 
B  R  Johnson's  division                      .  . 

865 

13,587 

431 

6,505 

Effective  infantry       

185 
96 

3,935 
1,825 

(W.   H.  F.   Lee's  di- 
Cavalry  Corps    -<      vision  

(  Fitz  Lee's  division.  .  . 
Effective  cavalry       

68 
20 
154 

104 
42 

1,112 

368 
1,383 

1,414 

504 

Effective  artillery 

Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia 

f  Wharton's     division, 
infantry  

Yalley  District,    \  Long's    division,    ar- 
Early           1      tillery  

j  L  o  m  a  x  '  s   division, 
(_     cavalry  

Total  effective                                .  . 

J.  A.  Walker.    \  Rf*  ^^^  d* 

Unattached  commands.    .   .        

Total  effective,  detached  commands. 

Total  effective  of  all  arms,  Depart 
ment  of  Northern  Virginia. 

59,093 

FROM  ORIGINAL  PAPERS  IN  U.  S.  WAR  DEPARTMENT.    187 

By  reference  to  the  returns  of  the  Federal  armies  of  the 
1st  of  March,  1865,  as  given  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress  (vol.  v.,  p.  55),  I  find  that 
General  Grant  had  available  at  that  date,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  under  General  Meade,  one  hundred  and  three  thou 
sand  two  hundred  and  seventy-three  present  for  duty ;  the 
army  in  the  "  Department  of  Virginia  "  under  General  Ord, 
numbering  forty-five  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighty-six ; 
and  the  cavalry  force  of  the  Middle  Military  Division  under 
General  Sheridan,  twelve  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighty 
strong :  making  an  effective  total  of  all  arms  of  one  hundred 
and  sixty-two  thousand  two  hundred  and  thirty-nine. 

There  is  no  return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
on  file  in  the  Archive-Office,  at  Washington,  of  later  date 
than  that  last  given.  It  will  be  seen  that  on  the  28th  of 
February,  1865,  General  Lee  had  available  thirty-nine  thou 
sand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-nine  muskets.  During  the 
month  of  March  the  army  lost  heavily.  In  the  assault  made 
by  General  Gordon's  troops  on  the  line  of  the  enemy,  on  the 
25th,  the  Confederate  loss  -was  between  twenty-five  hundred 
and  three  thousand.  The  loss  to  the  army  by  desertion,  in 
the  last  thirty  days  of  the  siege,  was  three  thousand  men ; 
an  average  of  one  hundred  per  day.  On  the  31st  of  March, 
General  Lee  had  therefore  but  thirty-three  thousand  mus 
kets,  with  which  to  defend  a  line  over  thirty  miles  in  length 
— one  thousand  men  to  the  mile ! 

In  the  engagement  at  Five  Forks  on  the  1st  of  April, 
the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Bushrod  Johnson  were  well- 
nigh  annihilated  by  the  Federal  turning  force,  under  Sheri 
dan  and  Warren,  which  overwhelmed  them ;  the  loss  sus 
tained  there  reached  seven  thousand  men.1  In  the  encounters 
at  other  points  on  the  31st  of  March  and  the  1st  of  April, 
and  in  the  general  assault  on  the  lines  made  on  the  2d  of 
April,  the  loss  was  very  heavy,  perhaps  six  thousand  men. 
So  that,  when  General  Lee  withdrew  his  army  from  the 

1  The  Federals  claim  to  have  taken  five  thousand  prisoners. 


188  FOUR  YEARS   WITH   GENERAL  LEE. 

lines  during  the  night  of  the  2d  of  April,  he  had  not  over 
twenty  thousand  muskets  available.  The  cavalry  had  also 
suffered  heavily,  and,  of  all  arms,  not  over  twenty-five  thou 
sand  men  began  the  retreat  that  terminated  at  Appomattox 
Court-House. 

Speaking  in  behalf  of  my  former  comrades  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  I  here  rest  our  case,  and  declare  our 
readiness  to  accept  the  judgment  of  the  world,  as  to  the 
genius  and  skill  of  the  commander,  and  the  valor  and  endur 
ance  of  the  men,  who  fought  so  nobly  and  fell  so  bravely, 
full  of  honors,  though  denied  success. 

In  what  I  have  written,  I  have  endeavored,  first,  to  as 
sist  in  making  clear  some  matters  touching  the  history  of 
General  Lee,  heretofore  shrouded  in  obscurity  or  doubt ; 
secondly,  to  present  a  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  army 
which  he  commanded,  that  could  be  relied  upon  as  accurate. 

In  regard  to  the  first  branch  of  my  undertaking,  I  need 
not  that  others  should  remind  me  of  the  imperfect  manner 
of  its  execution  ;  but,  of  the  matter,  and  of  the  spirit  in 
which  I  addressed  myself  to  the  work,  I  claim  that  my  only 
aim  has  been  historic  accuracy.  Indeed,  I  have  written  as 
if  under  the  supervision  of  General  Lee  himself,  fully  realiz 
ing  that,  were  that  illustrious  man  now  living,  he  would  scorn 
any  advantage  obtained  through  injustice  to  others,  or  the 
sacrifice  of  truth :  and  this  conviction  has  been  present  to 
my  mind  as  a  controlling  force  through  my  entire  narrative. 

In  regard  to  the  second  branch  of  my  subject,  I  feel  as 
sured  that  the  statement  of  the  strength  of  the  Confederate 
army  has  been  presented  in  such  form  as  to  command  the 
confidence  of  all.  Startling  to  some  as  the  disparity  in  num 
bers  between  the  two  armies  on  certain  occasions  may  ap 
pear,  it  is  nevertheless  established  upon  incontrovertible  evi 
dence,  and  makes  pardonable  the  emotions  of  pride  with 
which  the  soldier  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  points 
to  the  achievements  of  that  incomparable  body  of  soldiery, 
under  its  peerless  and  immortal  leader.  Had  he  lived,  I  have 


FOUR  YEARS   WITH   GENERAL  LEE.  189 

shown  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  prepare  for  the  benefit  of 
posterity,  and  as  a  just  tribute  to  the  courage  and  endurance 
of  his  men,  a  true  statement  of  the  odds  against  which  they 
had  to  contend.  What  the  designs  of  an  inscrutable  but  all- 
wise  Providence  prevented  him  from  doing,  in  this  particu 
lar,  I  have  had  the  temerity  to  attempt,  and  now  submit  the 
result  of  my  labor  to  the  judgment  of  my  countrymen,  in  the 
hope  that  in  criticising  my  work  they  will  not  lose  sight  of 
the  purpose  by  which  I  have  been  actuated,  or  the  spirit  in 
which  I  have  performed  my  task. 


ADDEESS 
ON  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE, 

Delivered  in  Richmond,  on  Wednesday,  January  19,  1876,  the  Anniversary  of 
General  Lee's  Birth,  by  Captain  John  Hampden  Chamberlayne. 


FELLOW-CITIZENS  :  I  shall  not  obtrude  upon  you  apologies 
or  explanations,  as  if  I  had  the  orator's  established  fame  to 
lose,  or  looked  that  future  fame  to  win.  You  are  not  come 
to  hear  of  my  small  hopes  or  fears.  Yet,  to  you,  and  to  the 
gravity  of  the  occasion,  it  is  due  to  say  that  I  appear  before  you 
on  sudden  order,  to  my  sense  of  duty  hardly  less  imperative 
than  those  famous  commands  under  which  we  have  so  often 
marched  at  "  early  dawn." 

By  telegraph,  on  last  Saturday  night,  this  duty  was  laid  up 
on  me,  and  I  come  with  little  of  preparation,  and  less  of  ability, 
to  attempt  a  theme  that  might  task  the  powers  of  Bossuet  or 
exhaust  an  Everett's  rhetoric. 

It  can  scarcely  be  needful  to  rehearse  before  you  the  facts 
of  our  commander's  life.  They  have  become,  from  least  to 
greatest,  parts  of  history,  and  an  ever-growing  number  of  books 
record  that  he  was  born  in  1807,  at  Stratford,  in  Westmoreland 
County,  of  a  family  ancient  and  honorable  in  the  mother-country, 
in  the  Old  Dominion,  and  in  the  State  of  Virginia  ;  that  he  was 
appointed  a  cadet  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  in 
1825,  and  was  graduated  first  in  his  class,  and  commissioned 
lieutenant  of  engineers  ;  that  he  served  upon  the  staff  of  Gen 
eral  Scott  through  the  brilliant  campaign  from  Vera  Cruz  to 


ADDRESS  ON  THE   CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.        191 

the  city  of  Mexico,  was  thrice  brevetted  for  gallant  and  meri 
torious  conduct,  and  was  declared  by  General  Scott  to  have 
borne  a  chief  part  in  the  counsels  and  the  battles  which  ended 
with  the  triumph  of  our  arms  ;  that  he  was  promoted  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  cavalry,  and  served  for  years  upon  the  Southwestern 
frontier ;  that  he  was  in  1861  called  to  Washington  as  one  of  a 
board  to  revise  the  army  regulations  ;  and  that  on  the  20th  day 
of  April,  1861,  four  days  after  the  withdrawal  of  Virginia  from 
the  Union,  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the  United  States 
Army,  and  that  he  became  commander-in-chief  of  Virginia's 
forces,  and  thereafter  accepted  the  commission  of  general  in  the 
army  of  the  Confederate  States. 

Still  more  familiar  to  you  than  these  facts  are  the  events  of 
which  you  and  I  had  personal  knowledge  :  how  Lee  organized, 
patiently  and  skillfully,  the  raw  resources  of  Virginia  ;  how  he 
directed  the  coast  defenses  of  the  South  Atlantic  States,  and 
how  he  labored  against  a  thousand  difficulties  in  the  mountains 
of  West  Virginia,  serenely  accepting  without  a  murmur  the 
popular  verdict  on  what  ignorant  presumption  adjudged  a  fail 
ure.  In  June  of  1862  he  was  at  length  placed  in  a  command  to 
meet  whose  vast  responsibility  his  life  had  been  the  preparation, 
and  at  once  his  name  became  forever  linked  with  that  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  which  met  and  mastered  army  after  army, 
baffled  McClellan,  and  destroyed  successively  Pope,  Burnside, 
and  Hooker  ;  which  twice  invaded  the  enemy's  country,  and 
which,  when  at  last  against  it  were  thrown  all  the  resources  of 
the  United  States,  Grant  in  its  front  and  Sherman  in  its  rear, 
Europe  for  their  recruiting-ground,  and  a  boundless  credit  for 
their  military  chest,  still  stood  for  eleven  months  defiantly  at 
bay,  concentrated  on  itself  the  whole  resources  of  the  United 
States,  and  surrendered  at  Appomattox  eight  thousand  starving 
men  to  the  combined  force  of  two  great  armies  whose  chiefs  had 
long  despaired  to  conquer  it  by  skill  or  daring,  and  had  worn  it 
away  by  weight  of  numbers  and  brutal  exchange  of  many  lives 
for  one.  We  all  know,  too,  how  the  famous  soldier  sheathed 
his  sword,  and  without  a  word  of  repining,  without  a  look  to 
show  the  grief  that  was  breaking  his  heart  and  sapping  the 
springs  of  his  noble  life,  accepted  the  duty  that  came  to  him, 


192        ADDRESS   ON  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

and  bent  to  his  new  task,  as  guide  and  teacher  of  boys,  the 
powers  which  had  wielded  the  strength  of  armies  and  almost 
redressed  the  balances  of  unequal  fate. 

Such  are  the  leading  facts,  in  barest  outline,  of  the  great 
life  that  began  sixty -nine  years  ago  to-day.  Well  known  as 
they  are,  it  is  wise  to  recall  them  when  we  gather  as  we  have 
gathered  here.  In  these  hurrying  days  men  pass  swiftly  away 
from  human  sight,  the  multitude  of  smaller  figures  vanishing 
behind  the  curtain  of  forgetfulness,  the  few  mighty  ones  soon 
wrapped  in  the  hazy  atmosphere  of  the  heroic  heights,  enlarged, 
it  may  be,  but  ofttimes  dim  and  distorted,  always  afar  off,  unfa 
miliar,  not  human,  but  superhuman,  demi-gods  rather  than  men ; 
our  wonder  and  our  despair,  who  should  be  our  reverence  and 
our  inspiration. 

Thus  has  it  already  been  with  him  who  lies  at  Mount  Ver- 
non.  Let  it  be  our  care,  men  of  this  generation,  that  it  be  not 
so  in  our  day  with  him  who  lies  at  Lexington  ;  let  it  be  our  care 
to  show  him  often  to  those  who  rise  around  us  to  take  our  place, 
to  show  him  not  only  in  his  great  deeds  and  his  famous  victories, 
but  also  as  citizen  and  as  man. 

The  task  is  hard  to  divide  what  is  essentially  one,  and  Lee 
so  bore  himself  in  his  great  office  as  that  the  man  was  never 
lost  in  the  soldier.  Never  of  him  could  it  be  said  that  he  was 
like  the  dyer's  hand,  subdued  to  what  he  worked  in  :  always  the 
sweet  human  quality  tempered  his  stoic  virtue,  always  beneath 
the  soldier's  breast  beat  the  tender,  loving  heart. 

Most  of  us  here  have  seen  and  known  him,  if  not  in  his 
splendid  youth,  fit  at  once  to  charm  the  eye  of  the  Athenian 
multitude  and  to  awe  a  Roman  Senate,  yet  in  his  maturer  years, 
when  time  and  care  had  worn  his  body  but  to  show  more  glori 
ous  the  lofty  soul  within.  Among  us  and  ours  his  life  was  led, 
so  blameless  as  might  become  a  saint,  so  tender  as  might  be 
come  a  woman,  so  simple  as  might  become  the  little  children 
"  of  whom  is  the  kingdom  of  heaven."  So  consistent  was  that 
life,  so  devoted  to  duty,  without  a  glance  to  right  or  left,  so 
fixed  on  the  golden  rule,  adopted  once  and  forever,  that  his 
biographer,  even  now  in  a  time  of  passion  and  distorted  truth, 
hesitates  what  to  choose  for  his  highest  praise — lingering  in 


ADDRESS  ON  THE   CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.       193 

turn  over  Lee  the  son,  Lee  the  husband,  Lee  the  father,  Lee  the 
friend.  Idle,  then,  it  were  for  me  to  picture  him  in  all  the  rela 
tions  he  bore  to  those  around  him,  and  worse  than  idle  were  I 
to  follow  what  is  much  the  fashion  nowadays  and  make  a  study 
of  Lee  the  Christian,  pry  with  curious  glance  into  the  sacred 
chamber  wherein  man  kneels  to  his  God,  or  dare  to  touch  the 
awful  veil  which  fools  are  swift  to  rend. 

"  But,"  says  the  critic,  "private  virtue  is  not  for  public  use; 
a  Torquemada  may  be  gentle  in  his  home,  and  a  Stuart  seek  to 
enslave  his  people,  yet  lead  a  life  of  chastity." 

'Tis  true,  but  still  our  great  commander  shines  flawless  and 
perfect,  at  once  in  the  quiet  beams  of  the  household  hearth  and 
in  the  fierce  light  that  beats  upon  the  throne  of  him  born  to  be 
king  of  men. 

Let  one  great  example  show  it.  None  but  those  who  know 
the  power  of  lofty  ambition  can  tell  what  vast  temptation  beset 
our  leader  ;  none  can  know  the  heroism  of  the  decision  in  the 
dark  days  of  1861.  He  was  the  favorite  soldier  of  all  who  fol 
lowed  Scott ;  he  was  the  picked  and  chosen  man  for  high  com 
mand  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  He  was  besought 
almost  with  tears  by  him  he  reverenced  as  a  second  father  ;  to 
him  was  tendered  the  baton  of  general-in-chief.  Who  can  tell 
what  visions  trooped  upon  his  sight — of  power,  that  dearest 
boon  to  the  powerful,  of  fame  world-wide,  of  triumph,  not  easy 
but  certain  ?  And  who  can  tell  but  fairer  dreams  than  these 
assailed  him  ;  hope,  nay,  almost  belief,  that  he  and  he  alone 
might  play  the  noble  part  of  pacificator  and  redintegrator  pa- 
trice,  that  he  might  heal  the  wounds  of  civil  strife,  and  be  hailed 
by  North  and  South  as  worthy  the  oaken  garland  ? 

He  had  been  more  or  less  than  human  had  not  these 
thoughts,  or  such  as  these,  arisen  when  he  strove  through  days 
and  bitter  nights  to  find  his  duty. 

He,  we  must  remember,  was  wedded  to  no  theory  ;  his  mind 
grasped  concrete  truth  rather  than  abstractions.  His  horizon 
was  bounded  by  no  lines  of  neighborhood  or  of  States.  He 
knew  the  men  of  the  North,  as  well  as  of  the  South  ;  he  had 
maturely  weighed  the  wealth  of  the  one  and  the  poverty  of  the 
other.  Few  knew  so  well  as  he,  none  better,  the  devotion  we 
13 


194        ADDRESS   ON   THE   CHARACTER  OF   GENERAL   LEE. 

could  offer  to  any  cause,  but  he  knew  likewise  the  stubborn, 
deep-resting  strength  of  the  Northern  will  that  we  took  for  a 
passing  whim.  He  had  all  his  life  obeyed  and  respected  the 
organized,  concentrated  form  of  the  Union;  and  he,  the  pupil 
of  Scott,  the  follower  of  Washington,  the  son  of  Light-Horse 
Harry,  might  and  should  and  did  pause  long.  Paused  long,  to 
decide  forever — to  decide  with  never  a  look  backward,  with 
never  a  regret,  even  when  the  end  had  come,  darker  than  his 
fears  had  pictured. 

Cast  away  all,  to  obey  the  voice  of  Virginia,  his  country;  to 
defend  Virginia,  his  mother.  Scarcely  twice  since  the  world 
began  has  mortal  man  been  called  to  make  such  choice. 

Will  not  history  consent,  will  not  mankind  applaud,  when 
we  still  uphold  our  principles  as  right,  our  cause  as  just,  our 
country  to  be  honored,  when  those  principles  had  for  disciple, 
that  cause  for  defender,  that  country  for  son,  Robert  Lee  ? 

The  day  has  by  no  means  come  to  fix  with  absolute  precision 
the  rank  of  Lee  among  the  world's  great  soldiers.  But  the  day 
will  come,  and  it  is  ours  to  gather  and  preserve  and  certify  the 
facts  to  be  the  record  before  the  dread  tribunal  of  time. 

Turning,  then,  to  the  soldiership  of  Lee  :  from  first  to  last, 
we  see  his  labor  and  exactness,  giving  always  the  power  to  gain 
from  every  means  its  utmost  result.  Thus  he  so  pursued  the 
sciences  which  underlie  the  soldier's  art  that  he  entered  the 
army  fully  equipped  with  all  that  theory  could  teach,  and  while 
yet  a  subaltern  was  more  than  once  intrusted  with  tasks  of  the 
engineers'  bureau  which  had  baffled  the  skill  of  men  far  older 
and  more  experienced.  The  same  qualities  were  shown  when 
he  first  saw  actual  war.  To  us,  who  look  back  across  the  field 
of  a  gigantic  strife,  of  a  struggle  where  not  brigades  nor  divis 
ions  but  great  armies  were  the  units,  where  States  were  forti 
fied  camps  and  a  continent  the  battle-ground — to  us  that  march 
on  Mexico  seems  as  small  as  it  is,  in  fact,  far  off  in  time  and 
space.  But  small  and  great  are  relative,  and  the  little  army  of 
Scott  which  gathered  on  the  sands  of  Vera  Cruz  was  little  in 
much  the  same  sense  as  that  other  army,  of  Cortez,  whose  foot 
steps  it  followed  and  whose  prowess  it  rivaled.  In  that  cam 
paign  Lee's  soldiership  first  found  fit  field.  It  was  he  whose 


ADDRESS  ON  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.   195 

skill  gave  us  the  quick  foothold  of  Vera  Cruz.  At  Cerro  Gordo 
and  Contreras  his  was  no  mean  part  of  the  plan  and  its  accom 
plishment.  At  the  city  of  Mexico  it  was  his  soldier's  eye  and 
soldier's  heart  which  saw  and  dared  what  Cortez  had  seen  and 
dared  before,  to  turn  the  enemy's  strongest  position,  and  assault 
as  well  by  the  San  Cosme  as  by  the  Belen  gateway,  a  movement 
greatly  hazardous,  but,  once  executed,  decisive.  In  the  endless 
roll  of  wars  that  campaign  of  Mexico  must  always  remain  to  the 
judicious  critic  masterly  in  conception  and  superb  in  execution. 
But  to  us  it  is  memorable  chiefly  as  the  training-school  whose 
pupils  were  to  ply  their  art  on  a  wider  scale  to  ends  more  ter 
rible,  and  Winfield  Scott  selected  from  them  all  Robert  E.  Lee 
as  the  chosen  soldier. 

The  time  was  soon  to  come  when  he  should  try  conclusions 
with  many  of  that  brilliant  band,  and  prove  himself  the  master 
of  each  in  turn — of  McClellan,  of  Burnside,  of  Hooker,  of  Pope, 
of  Meade,  of  Grant,  of  whomsoever  could  be  found  to  lead  them 
by  the  millions  he  confronted.  When  the  War  of  Secession  be 
gan,  you  all  remember  how  for  a  time  Lee  held  subordinate 
place,  and  how,  when  what  seemed  chance  gave  him  command 
of  the  forces  defending  Richmond  from  the  hundred  thousand 
men  who  could  hear,  if  they  would,  the  bells  of  our  churches 
and  almost  the  hum  of  our  streets — you  all  remember  how  the 
home-staying  critic  found  fault  with  him,  how  he  was  described 
as  a  closet-soldier  and  a  handler  of  spade  and  mattock,  rather 
than  of  gun  and  bayonet.  Sudden  and  swift  was  the  surprise 
when  the  great  plan  disclosed  itself,  and  the  guns  at  the 
Meadow  Bridges  of  the  Chickahominy  cleared  the  way  for  the 
first  of  those  mighty  blows  which  sent  McClellan  in  hopeless 
rout  to  the  shelter  of  his  shipping,  thence  to  hurry  as  he  might 
to  the  rescue  of  Pope's  bewildered  divisions,  and  to  organize 
home-guards  in  the  defenses  of  Washington.  That  single  cam 
paign  of  the  Seven  Days  is  itself  fame.  To  amuse  an  army  out 
numbering  his  own  by  fifty  thousand  ;  to  watch  with  a  large 
detachment  lest  that  army  should  make  a  junction  with  the 
divisions  at  Fredericksburg  ;  to  bring  Jackson's  skill  and  Jack 
son's  devoted  men  to  his  aid  ;  to  cross  a  marshy  and  often  im 
practicable  stream  ;  to  attack  McClellan  on  his  flank  and  to  roll 


196   ADDRESS  ON  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE. 

up  his  army  like  a  scroll,  while,  at  each  step  gained,  his  enemy 
should  be  weaker  and  himself  be  stronger  and  in  stronger  posi 
tion,  yet  at  the  same  time  to  guard  lest  his  enemy  should  break 
his  centre  as  Napoleon  pierced  the  Russians  on  Austerlitz  field 

such  was  the  problem.     You  know,  all  the  world  knows,  its 

execution.  Despite  the  errors  of  subordinates  ;  despite  the  skill 
of  his  opponent,  a  soldier  truly  great  in  defense  ;  despite  the 
rawness  of  many  of  his  troops  ;  despite  the  lack  in  the  general 
officers  of  the  skill  necessary  to  movements  so  delicate  ;  and 
despite  the  inferiority  of  his  force,  Lee  succeeded  fully  in  his 
main  object,  relieved  Richmond,  inflicted  on  his  enemy  losses 
materially  immense  and  morally  infinite  ;  in  seven  days  abso 
lutely  undid  what  McClellan  took  six  months  to  do,  and  by  a 
single  combination  threw  back  his  enemy  from  the  hills  in  sight 
of  Richmond  to  a  defensive  line  in  Washington's  suburbs.  This 
campaign,  for  its  audacity,  its  wide  combination,  its  insight  into 
the  opponent's  character,  its  self-reliance,  its  vigor  of  execution, 
and  its  astonishing  results,  may  be  safely  compared  with  the 
best  campaigns  of  the  greatest  masters  in  the  art  of  war — with 
Frederick's  Leuthen,  to  which  it  bears  as  much  likeness  as  a 
campaign  of  days  can  bear  to  a  battle  of  hours,  or  with  that 
greater  feat,  the  amazing  concentration  by  Washington  of  con 
tingents  from  New  York  and  from  North  Carolina,  of  new  levies 
from  the  Virginia  Valley,  and  of  a  French  fleet  from  the  West 
Indies,  to  besiege  and  to  capture  the  army  of  Cornwallis. 

It  is  argued  that  Lee  was  strong  only  in  defense,  and  was 
averse  to  taking  the  offensive.  Nothing  could  be  more  false.  He 
was  to  prove  in  the  last  year  of  the  war  his  fertility  of  defensive 
resource  and  his  unrivaled  tenacity  of  resistance.  But  his  genius 
was  aggressive.  Witness  the  bold  transfer  of  his  army  from 
Richmond  to  the  Rapidan,  while  McClellan's  troops  still  rested 
on  the  James  River.  Witness  the  audacity  of  detaching  Jack 
son  from  the  Rappahannock  line  to  seize  Manassas  Junction  and 
the  road  to  Washington  in  Pope's  rear.  Witness  the  magnifi 
cent  swoop  on  Harper's  Ferry,  of  which  accident  gave  to  Mc 
Clellan  the  knowledge  and  by  which  timidity  forbade  him  to 
profit.  Witness  that  crowning  glory  of  his  audacity,  the  change 
of  front  to  attack  Hooker,  and  that  march  around  what  Hooker 


ADDRESS   ON   THE   CHARACTER   OF   GENERAL   LEE.        197 

called  "  the  best  position  in  America,  held  by  the  finest  army  on 
the  planet."  Witness  his  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  a  campaign 
whose  only  fault  was  the  generous  fault  of  over-confidence  in 
an  army  whose  great  deeds  might,  if  anything,  excuse  it — an 
over-confidence,  as  we  ourselves  know,  felt  by  every  man  he 
led,  and  which  made  us  reckless  of  all  difficulties,  ready  to  think 
that  to  us  nothing  was  impossible.  He  was  a  commander  who 
had  met  no  equal ;  we  were  an  army  who  saw  in  half  the  guns 
of  our  train  the  spoil  of  the  enemy,  who  bore  upon  our  flags  the 
blazon  of  consistent  victory.  If  he  and  we  confided  in  our 
daring,  and  trusted  to  downright  fighting  for  what  strategy 
might  have  safely  won,  who  shall  blame  us  and  which  shall 
blame  the  other  ?  It  was  a  fault,  if  fault  there  were,  such  as  in 
a  soldier  leans  to  virtue's  side  ;  it  was  the  fault  of  Marlborough 
at  Malplaquet,  of  the  Great  Frederick  at  Torgau,  of  Napoleon  at 
Borodino.  It  is  the  famous  fault  of  the  column  of  Fontenoy, 
and  the  generous  haste  that  led  Hampclen  to  his  death. 

Lee  chose  no  defensive  of  his  own  will.  None  knew  better 
than  he  that  axiom  of  the  military  art  which  finds  the  logical 
end  of  defense  in  surrender.  None  knew  better  than  he  that 
Fabius  had  never  earned  his  fame  by  the  policy  some  attribute 
to  him,  nor  saved  his  country  by  retreats,  however  regular,  or 
the  skill,  however  great,  to  choose  positions  only  to  abandon 
them.  The  defensive  was  not  his  chosen  field,  but  he  was  fated 
to  conduct  a  defensive  campaign  rivaled  by  few  and  surpassed 
by  none  in  history.  Of  that  wonderful  work  the  details  are  yet 
to  be  gathered,  but  the  outlines  are  known  the  world  over. 
The  tremendous  onset  of  Lee  in  the  tangled  Wilderness  upon 
an  enemy  three  times  his  force,  who  fancied  him  retreating;  the 
grim  wrestle  of  Spottsylvania  ;  the  terrible  repulse  of  Cold  Har 
bor,  from  which  the  veteran  commanders  of  Grant  shrank  back 
aghast  —  these  great  actions  will  be  known  so  long  as  war 
shall  be  studied,  and  future  generations  will  read  with  admira 
tion  of  that  battle-field  of  seventy  miles,  where  Lee  with  fifty- 
one  thousand  men  confronted  Grant  with  his  one  hundred  and 
ninety  thousand — attacked  him  wherever  he  showed  uncovered 
front,  killed,  wounded,  and  captured,  more  men  than  his  own 
army  numbered ;  and,  in  a  campaign  of  thirty-five  days,  forced 


198        ADDRESS   OX   THE   CHARACTER  OF   GENERAL   LEE. 

the  most  tenacious  soldier  of  the  Union  armies  to  abandon 
utterly  his  line  of  attack,  to  take  a  new  position  always  open  to 
him  but  never  chosen,  and  to  exchange  the  warfare  of  the  open 
field  for  the  slow  and  safe  approach  of  the  earthwork  and  the 
siege. 

They  will  read,  too,  that  in  the  midst  of  this  campaign  Lee 
was  bold  to  spare  from  his  little  army  force  enough  to  take  once 
more  the  offensive,  to  traverse  once  more  the  familiar  Valley,  to 
break  once  more  through  the  gate  of  the  Potomac,  and  to  insult 
with  the  fires  of  his  bivouacs  the  capital  city  of  his  enemy. 
Reading  these  things,  they  will  refuse  to  believe,  what  we  know,, 
that  men  were  found  here  and  now  to  call  this  marvelous  cam 
paign  a  retreat. 

The  truth  is,  that  Lee  took  a  real  defensive,  if  at  all,  only 
in  the  trenches  of  Petersburg  ;  was  driven  to  that  defensive  not 
by  one  army  nor  by  many  armies  in  succession,  but  by  the  com 
bined  force  of  the  armies  in  his  front  and  in  his  rear.  Vicks- 
burg  it  was,  not  Cemetery  Hill,  which  baffled  the  Army  of  Nor 
thern  Virginia  ;  at  Nashville  and  Atlanta,  not  from  the  lines  of 
Petersburg,  came  the  deadly  blows  ;  and  the  ragged  remnant  of 
Appomattox  surrendered  not  to  the  valor  or  skill  of  the  men 
they  had  so  often  met  and  overcome,  but  to  the  men  they  had 
never  seen,  and  yielded  neither  to  stubborn  Grant  nor  braggart 
Sheridan,  but  to  the  triumphant  hosts  of  Rosecrans,  of  Thomas, 
and  of  Sherman. 

It  is  not  hard,  then,  my  friends,  to  see  that  history  will  hold 
Lee  to  be  a  great  soldier,  wise  in  counsel,  patient  in  prepara 
tion,  swift  in  decision,  terrible  in  onset,  tenacious  of  hold,  sullen 
in  retreat,  a  true  son  of  that  Berserker  race  that  rushed  from 
the  bosom  of  Europe's  darkest  age,  furious  to  fight,  lovers  of 
battle,  destined  to  sweep  away  the  old  world  and  to  mould  the 
modern. 

Rightly  to  estimate  his  power  as  commander  is  not  and  may 
never  be  possible.  There  is  no  second  term  of  comparison.  He 
was  in  a  position  as  novel  as  were  the  conditions  of  a  war  where 
the  railroad  existed,  but  the  highway  was  not  ;  where  telegraphs 
conveyed  orders,  yet  primeval  forests  still  stood  to  conceal 
armies  ;  where  concentration  was  possible  at  a  speed  unknown 


ADDRESS  ON  THE  CHARACTER  OF  GENERAL  LEE.   199 

to  war  before,  but  where  concentration  might  easily  starve  it 
self  before  it  could  strike  its  enemy. 

Strange  as  the  material,  were  the  moral  conditions  of  Lee's 
command.  He  was  hampered  by  political  considerations  ;  he 
was  trammeled  by  the  supreme  importance  of  one  city ;  and, 
above  all,  on  him  was  complete  responsibility,  but  never  com 
mensurate  power.  To  the  integrity  of  his  army,  to  the  morale 
of  half  his  force,  the  successful  defense  of  the  South  and  South 
west  was  essential,  and  on  operations  in  which  he  had  no  voice 
turned  the  issue  of  his  campaigns. 

•  Of  these  things  account  will  yet  be  taken,  let  us  be  sure  of 
that ;  for  though  in  barbarous  ages  conquered  peoples  write  no 
histories,  yet,  as  the  world  grows  older,  history  grows  more 
and  more  a  judge,  less  and  less  a  witness  and  advocate  ;  more 
and  more  to  every  cause  that  appeal  lies  open  which  Francis 
Bacon,  of  Verulam,  made  "  to  future  ages  and  other  countries." 

Fit  is  it  that  we  trust  to  that  great  verdict,  seeing  that 
nothing  less  than  the  tribunal  of  mankind  can  judge  this  man, 
who  was  born  not  for  a  period,  but  for  all  time  ;  not  for  a  coun 
try,  but  for  the  world  ;  not  for  a  people,  but  for  the  human 
race. 

Not  for  him  shall  the  arch  of  triumph  rise  ;  not  for  him  col 
umns  of  victory,  telling  through  monumental  bronze  the  hideous 
tale  of  tears  and  blood  that  grins  from  the  skull-pyramids  of 
Dahomey.  Not  to  his  honor  shall  extorted  tributes  carve  the 
shaft  or  mould  the  statue  ;  but  this  day  a  grateful  people  give 
of  their  poverty  gladly,  that  in  pure  marble,  or  time-defying 
bronze,  future  generations  may  see  the  counterfeit  presentment 
of  this  man — the  ideal  and  bright  consummate  flower  of  our 
civilization  ;  not  an  Alexander,  it  may  be  ;  nor  Napoleon,  nor 
Timour,  nor  Churchill — greater  far  than  they,  thank  Heaven — 
the  brother  and  the  equal  of  Sidney  and  of  Falkland,  of  Hamp- 
den  and  of  Washington  ! 


THE   END. 


14  DAY  USE 

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